By: Stephen Strausser
The Secret War
With the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1947, very few who had a hand in creating the organization could have conceived that, within thirty short years, the agency would be orchestrating a large-scale war without Congressional or public knowledge. Founded as part of the National Security Act, the CIA regularly employed espionage and covert action to complete its missions.[1] The theatre for this grand paramilitary operation was the small country of Laos, set against the backdrop of the Vietnam Conflict and the greater Cold War. This “Secret War” raged from 1961 to 1975, concluding when the United States (U.S.) withdrew its troops from Southeast Asia and the Communist forces took over the region. The Laotian people suffered losses of ten percent of their population, along with over seven hundred Americans, in the fourteen yearlong multi-billion dollar war that resulted in the unsuccessful attempt to stop the Communist invasion.[2] Yet, the former Director of the CIA Richard Helms wrote in his memoir that, “[Laos] was the war we won.”[3]
The different biases within the CIA contributed to a fluid understanding of what warranted success, of which accounts for differing opinions on how integral the Secret War was in efforts to distract Hanoi during the Vietnam War. For example, former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) William Colby, who served in the position from 1973 to 1976, argued that anything that portrays the CIA’s actions in a positive light was a success.[4] Operation Momentum, which kept American soldiers out of harm’s way through the CIA’s paramilitary operations, was attractive to policymakers. In a 1972 letter to the editor, Thomas F. McCoy, a former CIA agent, asserted that the job done by the CIA in Laos “based on any comparison with the U.S. military effort in Vietnam would have to be: A spectacular success.”[5]
CIA leaders, agents, and historians have argued that the Secret War in Laos, and particularly Operation Momentum, was a success for the CIA, despite the miserable outcomes for Laos and American policy in Southeast Asia. The CIA maintains that their operations in Laos were successful because they trained the Hmong tribesmen to be cheap, yet effective, irregular anti-Communist troops. Agency leaders also believe that the CIA was successful in Laos because their paramilitary operations gave the agency war-fighting experience. The CIA believed their most important success in Laos came from their perception that they were able to distract Hanoi, along with tens of thousands of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops, from the ongoing conflict in neighboring Vietnam.[6] Therein lies the fundamental principle of all U.S. participation in Southeast Asia, and the reason the CIA claims success in Laos, despite other signs of failure in the operation. U.S. policy was focused solely on Vietnam and stopping the spread of communism in the region. Critics of the CIA were given plenty of fodder due to the disastrous results that came after the American’s withdrawal from Vietnam and Laos. The retrospective analysis of the CIA’s actions in Laos matches the agency’s and U.S. government’s evaluation of the situation at the time. Both the CIA and the State Department documents show that neither the CIA nor broader policies of U.S. leadership had the interests of Laos at heart, except for the small country to act as a “sideshow” against the greater Vietnam War.[7]
The “Twilight War”
The current historiographical discussion is split over the consideration of Operation Momentum and the war in Laos as a success, with different conclusions coming due to what historians consider a success. The achievement of the goals claimed by the CIA warrants success to CIA historians, whereas the impacts the war had on the Hmong and Laotian people as a whole deems it a failure to outside historians. Thomas Ahern Jr., one of the CIA’s top historians, argued that the CIA should consider Operation Momentum a success due to the accomplishments of training the Hmong to be anti-Communist soldiers, the cost effectiveness of the program, and because the agency was able to gain experience in paramilitary operations. He makes this case in Undercover Armies: CIA and Surrogate Warfare in Laos, commissioned and published by the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) in order to address the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of the CIA’s involvement in Laos.[8] Ahern had almost unrestricted access to top-secret documents to write Undercover Armies. Although some of the study is still redacted, Ahern’s work was declassified in 2009. Ahern argued that the CIA was successful in Laos because of the unique circumstances there. He argues that “the close-in guidance that our case officers have been able to provide to the troops for whom they are responsible almost certainly accounts for the success that has been achieved here over the years.”[9] The Hmong program had thrived while other CIA paramilitary efforts around the world had failed, such as the Bay of Pigs invasion. Ahern argues that Operation Momentum was able to repair the CIA’s reputation and prove their competence in covert warfare to policy makers.[10] The program that CIA operative Bill Lair and Vang Pao developed together to train the Hmong people seemed to have worked,
“the Hmong who constituted the bulk of the manpower had, in the space of two-and-a-half years, undergone a transformation without which the operation could not have been contemplated… Tribal irregulars previously uncomprehending of any technique or tactic beyond ambush at the approaches to one’s own village could now be deployed, in relatively large units, far from home.”[11]
Ahern believed one of the reasons Momentum worked was the cooperation and collaboration between USAID and the CIA in both the field and Vientiane to harmonize their respective goals of refugee relief, economic and social development, and military security. The two agencies often informally loaned each other aircrafts and supplies to meet emergency needs because they knew that the ambassador “would furnish protective cover when their masters in Washington questioned their departures from normal bureaucratic practice.”[12] However, Ahern does question the importance of distracting the Viet-Cong with the Hmong, arguing “It is another and more dubious thing to infer that Hanoi could not have deployed these forces earlier to South Vietnam, or that they were indispensable to turning the tide there at the beginning of 1975.” Compared to the boundaries the Royal Laotian Government controlled at the signing of the Geneva Agreements in 1962, Ahern makes the point that, when the cease-fire took hold in early 1973, the Royal Laotian Government controlled nearly the same amount of territory. Vang Pao also still ruled territory in the mountains when Saigon fell to the Communist forces.[13] Ahern acknowledges that, after the CIA retreat from Laos, many clandestine officers working in the Secret War spread the idea that the agency could handle warfare when re-assigned to their other posts.[14]
Joshua Kurlantzick’s A Great Place to Have a War: America in Laos and the Birth of a Military CIA also takes a sympathetic approach to the Secret War, arguing Operation Momentum was successful and relatively cost-effective.[15] Kurlantzick argues that the CIA and the Hmong managed to occupy over seventy thousand North Vietnamese troops, who might have otherwise engaged American soldiers in Vietnam.[16] Even as the Geneva Accords of 1962 forbade American military involvement, the paramilitary operation allowed the CIA to continue pursuing the United States’ interests in Laos.[17] Kurlantzick focuses mainly on the CIA in the Secret War, drawing on the past decade of recently-declassified information as well as several author interviews with CIA officers who served in Laos such as Bill Lair, Tony Poe, and Sullivan’s former aides. He also cited Ahern’s histories.[18] A major questionable aspect about Kurlantzick’s sources is that several times throughout the book he claims to have gotten “special access to still-top secret” material. If confidential, top-secret information is implemented into a historical writing, it is important to question how Kurlantzick got access to it? Although Kurlantzick offers a more sympathetic assessment of the CIA in Laos, he does not shy away from discussing the atrocities that were committed during the Secret War. He argues that Operation About Face, the United States’ Air Force sustained bombing campaign against the Viet Cong in Laos, backfired disastrously.
The plight of the Hmong over the course of the Secret War, followed by their eventual abandonment by the CIA of which resulted in expulsion, exploitation, and execution, is well-documented, notably in Tragic Mountains: The Hmong, the Americans, and the Secret Wars for Laos, 1942-1992 by Jane Hamilton-Merritt. Hamilton-Merrit focuses on how the Hmong suffered during and after American intervention. She points out that, in the United States’ withdrawal from Indochina and the resulting takeover of Laos by Communist forces, the CIA was able to fly Vang Pao and some of his commanders out of Laos before the defeat; however, there were still thousands of Hmong who were forced to flee to refuge in Thailand. Since very few of them had vehicles or transportation animals, many were not able to escape the Communists and were put in the Pathet, Lao’s brutal gulags, and/or executed.[19]
Throughout Tragic Mountains, it is clear that Hamilton-Merritt holds the CIA and U.S. Government responsible for the Hmong’s suffering. She writes about the Congressional Hearings of October 1969, where William Sullivan was the primary witness. Sullivan was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the time of the hearings. Hamilton-Merritt writes “In three explosive days of hearings, some extraordinary views emerged– particularly from Sullivan. They foretold disaster for the Hmong.”[20] The main issue, revealed in the hearings, was that the United States had no formal obligation to support the Hmong, since the Geneva Accords forbid foreign intervention. Sullivan also confirmed to the Senate Committee that America could pull out of Laos completely within a couple of hours, if needed. Sullivan testified that “We use as a rule of thumb our ability to make it reversible and terminate within eight hours. It would probably take twenty-four hours now, but it still could be done.”[21]
Another major criticism of the CIA’s involvement in Laos came from Tim Weiner’s Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA with the 800-page epic, spanning the entire history of the CIA, making the agency out to be the villains every chance possible. Laos serves as a prime example. Weiner suggests that the arrogance of the CIA is why Laos eventually fell to the Communists. He quotes Richard Holm, who expressed that “The ignorance and the arrogance of Americans arriving in Southeast Asia during that period were contributing factors. We came to help, but we had only minimal understanding of the history, culture, and politics of the people we wanted to aid.”[22] Weiner and Holm are, for the most part, correct in their assessment. The Americans called the Hmong “Meo,” a deeply offensive derogatory term meaning “dark-skinned barbarian.”[23] The majority of the primary sources used in this paper do in fact address the Hmong as Meo. Weiner quotes the deputy Director for Intelligence Robert Amory, Jr. saying, “[the CIA] were all for a war in Laos. They thought that was a great place to have a war.”[24]
The release of the Pentagon Papers in 1971 allowed researchers to argue the main reason for U.S. presence in Laos throughout the era, with many claiming it to be a show of force against communism, and a tool to combat the spread of ideology out from Vietnam. When the “Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task Force,” better known as the Pentagon Papers, were released, they exposed the CIA’s involvement in Laos, as well as Vietnam, dispelling any secrecy the “Secret War” had left. Both the American public and American policymakers were outraged at the lack of transparency of the Johnson administration. William Fulbright, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, even testified in an October 1969 hearing that he “had no idea we had a full-scale war going on” in Laos.[25] Walt Haney wrote an essay on what the Pentagon Papers revealed about the CIA’s involvement in Laos and argued that the agency had no interest in Laos outside of the context of the Vietnam War. To back up this argument, Haney cites a communication from counterinsurgency expert Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale. In the communication, Lansdale states that a local veteran’s organization and a grass-roots political organization in Laos, which under CIA direction and control, are capable of carrying out propaganda, sabotage and harassment operations. Haney argues that Lansdale’s belief is flawed, asking “Did the renowned counterinsurgency expert really believe that a grass-roots political organization could be ‘subject to CIA direction and control’?”[26] Haney makes the argument that the “doublethink” used by Lansdale reflects U.S. involvement in Laos and Vietnam. CIA leaders knew that they needed to have the grass-root support of Laos, but at the same time, the CIA believed that they needed to have complete and total control over Laos.[27] The Pentagon Papers, according to Haney, show that the main reason for the CIA and U.S. government’s involvement in Laos was a show of strength to stand up against communism in the region. Based on the American’s actions, Haney argues they were not concerned about what happened to the people of Laos, as long as the U.S. appeared to be tough on communism.[28] As Haney stated in the conclusion of his essay: “We have ‘been tough’ in Laos and have ‘gotten bloodied.’ But the blood is not our own.”[29]
In the discussion of the success of intelligence operations, there exists no clear indications of success, as different groups can possess different viewpoints on what warrants success. In the case of the events in Laos, the CIA maintains that their operations were successful due to their training of Hmong tribesmen into cheap anti-Communist troops, the gaining of war-fighting experience for the agency from paramilitary operations, as well as the establishment of a distraction to Hanoi along with tens of thousands of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops from the ongoing conflict in Vietnam. Even if a specific stand against communism through the training and exploitation of the Hmong tribesmen did not succeed, the CIA was able to claim success as American foreign policy was focused primarily on Vietnam, and the prevention of the spread of communism, of which never came to Laos. The events in Laos characterized American foreign policy in Southeast Asia, with the CIA able to hold that any actions against communism were a success, despite other signs of failure.
“A Cork in the Bottle”
In 1961, American leadership feared that a takeover of Laos by Communist forces was possible due to the newly established sovereign government.[30] Geographically, Laos shared its northern border with Communist China and its eastern border with Vietnam. Laos had just emerged from a civil war in 1960 between the right-wing General Phoumi Nosavan, and the would-be usurper Captain Kong Le. The Pathet Lao was a Communist group established in the 1950s, during the war against the French. They were funded primarily by the Hanoi and could not exist without the Vietnamese Communists’ support. Their leader was Prince Souphanouvong, the half-brother of the Prime Minister of Laos, Souvanna Phouma. Phouma preferred balancing the Pathet Lao with more conservative forces in a coalition government. The coalition government was ineffective and was overthrown in 1958. The new government was more conservative, and it forced many of the Pathet Lao to flee to Vietnam for a short while. A more conservative, yet very corrupt, U.S.-back military regime came to power in Laos in 1959 following the disposal of the previous government in 1959.[31]
Despite American backing, the new non-Communist Lao Hom Laotian government allowed the Pathet Lao to hold up to twenty new seats in the Lao National Assembly. This development greatly concerned the DCI and the U.S. military leaders.[32] In December 1960, Kong Le led an uprising that destroyed half of Vientiane, but General Phoumi forced Le out of the nation’s capital. The United States was not ardent in their support of Phoumi. The Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Harry D. Felt said that; “Phoumi is no George Washington. However, he is anti-Communist, which is what counts most in the sad Laos situation.”[33] Once Kong Le and his men started rebuilding their forces and allied with Communist forces, such as the Pathet Lao and the Soviet Union, President Eisenhower believed Laos was vulnerable and that the U.S. needed to act.[34]
The developing political unrest put Laos in the spotlight in Washington because of the administration’s belief in the domino theory. The domino theory was the idea that if one country “fell” to communism, the surrounding countries would also succumb to the Communist influence, thus rendering entire regions of the world under Communist control. President Eisenhower and his national security advisors believed if Vietnam or Laos fell to Communists, all of Southeast Asia would soon follow suit. President Kennedy even explained in a 1961 news conference that,
“the commitments which the United States and obligations which the United States has assumed towards Laos as well as the surrounding countries – as well as other signatories of the SEATO pact – it’s quite obvious that if the Communists were able to come in and dominate this country, it would endanger the security of all, and the peace of all of Southeast Asia.”[35]
U.S. military leaders believed that the Laotian government’s forces would not be able to hold Vientiane without serious support from Washington.
Bill Lair had observed the Hmong people for a decade and believed that they would make the perfect proxy army, due to their low social status as ethnic minorities and outcasts from society. Lair’s background and expertise came from success in training paramilitary troops with the Thai Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit.[36] The Hmong were tribesmen who lived in clans in the mountains of Laos. They were led by a man named Vang Pao, who had united many clans through marriages and alliances. They were an ethnic minority and societal outcasts, and few were educated.[37] Even though Laos was considered among the poorest countries in the world, with Laotians earning around $75 annually on average, the Hmong tribesmen were considered poorer than those standards. They would roam around northern Laos because their culture valued distance from any powerful authority. If forces confronted the Hmong, they would either fight or move somewhere else. The French were unable to control the hill tribes, and were largely met with primitive, yet fierce and unconquerable, guerilla warfare.
The Hmong despised communism after they witnessed the oppressive local governments the Pathet Lao had established over areas they controlled in Northern Laos. The Hmong people spent generations in the mountains of Laos, giving them physical and strategic advantages in the conflict’s setting.[38] James Lilley, the former U.S. ambassador to China who was working with the CIA at the time recalls that “We had people working with us who wanted to fight the Vietnamese. They hated them. The Montagnards [Hmong] weren’t like the lowland Laos. These hill people were tough. They were led by Vang Pao and company. We then had a very modest effort.”[39] Lair believed that the deep-seated hatred for the Pathet Lao, their natural abilities, and their fear of a takeover by Communists made the Hmong the perfect proxy army.[40]
Bill Lair knew that Vang Pao had thousands of Hmong soldiers at his command, and if the CIA could train the Hmong, they would gain a potent guerilla force in the north that might be able to reduce the Pathet Lao and its North Vietnamese supporter’s territory to a minimum. In 1962, Lair received permission from Washington, along with funds and supplies, to start training the Hmong. Thus began the CIA’s paramilitary Operation Momentum, which would train the Hmong to fight against the Communist forces in Laos. In 1959, the CIA believed that the National Lao army was the only organization capable of maintaining internal security. But, if Laotian Communists were able to infiltrate the unwieldy military, their effectiveness would disintegrate.[41] By 1961, the CIA and Washington firmly believed that the Hmong would be far more effective than the national Lao army.
The Hmong were also much cheaper of an option than American troops. U.S. troops stationed in Southeast Asia ate rations of beef, eggs, and ice cream, while the Hmong subsisted off of rice and local food; and each soldier would get around $3 a month, as compared with the $339 per month that a U.S. Army private earned serving in Vietnam.[42] Vang Pao enthusiastically agreed to have the most powerful country in the world back his ragged guerilla army.[43] Vang Pao believed that the Hmong’s “only hope of an honorable existence [sic] in Laos is to remain a strong enough group so that any Laotian government will be forced to treat Meos (Hmong) with respect.”[44] The importance of having a proxy army would only grow as President Kennedy was inaugurated later in 1961. Kennedy did not want to send American troops to die in the jungles of Laos, instead he called on the CIA to double its tribal forces to fight back against any invasion by Communist forces.[45]
The CIA believed that their use of covert action allowed them to subvert international treaties. While the Hmong program was still in its first stages and expanding, President Kennedy had been seeking a diplomatic solution to the situation in Laos.[46] Kennedy recognized the importance of America’s interests in Laos, but preferred to resolve the Laos issue diplomatically rather than militarily.[47] In 1962, Kennedy got his wish; the governments of Indochina, France, Poland, the United Kingdoms, the United Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United States all met in Geneva to answer the “Laotian Question.”[48] Together, they all signed a formal “Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos.” It provided for a coalition government and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the country by October of that year.[49] The United States was forced to recall 666 military advisers and support staff, and Air America ceased dropping weapons and supplies to the Hmong. The Assistant Secretary of State Averill Harriman, in compliance with the Declaration, allowed the CIA to only keep two men in Laos, in order to monitor Communist compliance.[50] With this though, the Declaration distinctively failed to restrict the North Vietnamese. Four weeks after the Declaration was signed, CIA headquarters received reports from its two officers in Laos suggesting that Laos would not remain neutral, as it soon became clear that seven thousand NVA troops had not left the country.[51] In fact, the NVA was aggressively expanding its control, attacking Hmong positions throughout Laos. When asked what happened to the U.S. participation in the Geneva Accords, Secretary of State Dean Rusk answered:
“What happened? The non-Communist elements complied. The Communists did not. At no time since that agreement was signed have either the Pathet Lao or the North Viet- Nam authorities complied with it. The North Vietnamese left several thousand troops there–the backbone of almost every Pathet Lao battalion. Use of the corridor through Laos to South Vietnam continued. And the Communists barred the areas under their control both to the Government of Laos and the International Control Commission.”[52]
The CIA believed that they were able to subvert the requirement that no U.S. forces become involved in Laos, because the Hmong were the ones doing the fighting. The CIA was there to train and support, and the agency was not the U.S. military. Across the board, CIA leadership considered the Geneva Agreement disastrous to the United States’ efforts in Laos. Although the CIA was able to return to Laos to continue the fight against the Communist invasion, they believed that the Geneva Accords proved detrimental in the long run, since it prohibited any serious U.S. intervention down the road. CIA Case Officer Holm explains that
“U.S. policies in Laos are largely responsible for the disaster that befell the Hmong… The discussions in Geneva were about big power issues more than about Laos or Vietnam. Our strategic interests were superimposed onto a region where our president had decided to “draw the line” against communism. And we would do it our way.”[53]
Holm was correct in saying that the Geneva Accords were more concerned with powers greater than Laos. In a memorandum from an April 1963 meeting with President Kennedy, CIA Director Colby noted that discussions on bombing Northern Laos were centered around the effect it would have on Premier Khrushchev, rather than the effect that Air Force involvement would have on a neutral Laos.[54]
When President Kennedy wanted to both adhere to Laotian neutrality in accordance with the Geneva Agreement and also keep the “cork in the bottle” in Laos, letting the CIA run the Hmong program was his only option.[55] The program became more important to the White House, in 1964, when Hanoi deployed the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) into South Vietnam. The Ho Chi Mihn trail became the main conduit for NVA men and supplies, so Washington began to consider the operation in Laos as instrumental in the grander Vietnam Conflict. Since the Royal Laotian Government were not interested in the Ho Chi Mihn trail, the Hmong became the primary anti-Communist troops defending the trail, having previously only been occupied with the Pathet Lao and the NVA troops in Northern Laos.[56]
Prior to the training of the Hmong, however, the CIA had not attempted a paramilitary operation on a scale this large. The CIA had experience training paramilitary irregular forces such as the Cuban exiles for the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion.[57] Before the setbacks began in late 1967, the CIA operatives in charge of the war in Laos often prided themselves on their discovery of the new model for guerilla warfare, substituting both tactical and transport airpower for the limitations of tribal guerrillas.[58] In William Colby’s memoir, the former DCI wrote that “In the opinion of many officers in the CIA Clandestine Service, the paramilitary programs that the agency operated in Laos… were the most successful ever mounted.” One of the conclusions made in a 1968 Special National Intelligence Estimate solidified the success of the Hmong training program, stating that “Man for man, the Meo guerrillas are probably better fighters than either [the Pathet Lao or Royal Laotian Army.]”[59] From Laos, the CIA believed that they had gained experience in paramilitary warfare.
The CIA claims another success Operation Momentum accomplished is that the Secret War had “bled” North Vietnam, prolonging the United States’ ability to fight in Southeast Asia. A 1964 Special National Intelligence Estimate defined success in Laos as “clear-cut achievement of the U.S. objectives… would signify not that the Communist threat in Southeast Asia was removed, but simply that time had been gained for further constructive action to deal with the threat.”[60] Although the United States eventually failed to stop the spread of communism in Southeast Asia, the CIA believed that the Hmong proved themselves as a distraction for Hanoi. Colby contended that the Secret War had occupied seventy thousand Viet Cong who might otherwise have fought Americans in Vietnam.[61] There is some contention between CIA leadership over the importance of Laos serving as a kind of “sideshow” to distract Hanoi. A National Intelligence Estimate from March 1961 noted that “although the Communist threat in South Vietnam has reached serious proportions, the prospects for a Communist victory there were less than in Laos.”[62]
Notably though, a Special National Intelligence Estimate from seven years later in 1968 reiterated the CIA’s belief that Laos was serving as a distraction for North Vietnam. The report stated that, “Hanoi has ambitions to control all of Laos, but has been unwilling to take actions there which would jeopardize higher priority goals in South Vietnam, and there is no disagreement that there were NVA troops fighting in Laos.”[63] Colby was close in his claim because by 1970, sixty-seven thousand NVA troops had invaded Laos.[64] After the Laotian cease-fire, two divisions of NVA troops (the 312th and the 316th) returned to Vietnam to help with the final assault on Saigon. Richard Holm, a CIA case officer who served in Laos, explained that “From its origins as an effort to organize and train the Hmong in guerrilla tactics to resist Communist encroachment, our program gradually evolved into a direct confrontation not only of the local Pathet Lao, but also of North Vietnamese forces.”[65]
The CIA considered bombing support from the Air Force essential to the success of their irregular forces, as combining air bombing with Hmong forces on the ground allowed small numbers of guerilla fighters to engage and seriously damage the Communist forces.[66] In 1969 alone, the United States dropped more bombs on Laos than it did on Japan during the entirety of World War II. By the end of the bombing campaign in 1973, the U.S. flew over 580,000 bombing runs in the country.[67] In his hearings, Senator Stuart Symington testified that “We made a big thing in the Johnson administration about stopping the North Vietnam air strikes. But at the same time, we were increasing, in secret, the air strikes against Laos. In fact, as the general just said, which I knew, orders were that if you do not need the planes against Vietnam, use said planes against Laos.”[68] However, Senator Symington’s testimony does not completely match up with CIA documents. In a memorandum from a meeting with General Brown, the Commander of the 7th Air Force, CIA agent Stuart Methven explains that in the meeting “General Brown emphasized once more, however, that until directions came from Washington that the effort in Laos be given a higher priority, the chances were slim for CIA getting more air support than that being currently provided.”[69] Based on General Brown’s skepticism, it did not seem like Commander-in-Chief Johnson viewed Laos as a priority over Vietnam.
Regardless of Washington’s intentions to bomb the opposing forces, it was the Laotian civilians who bore the brunt of the assault. Fred Branfman, the former aid worker turned anti-war activist recalled that “Laos is deeply forested, and the only ‘targets’ visible from the air were [civilian] villages… The [Communist] soldiers moved through the deeply carpeted forests of northern Laos and were relatively unscathed by the bombing.” The bombs dropped would cause widespread fires, and the anti-personnel mines were so well-hidden that many Laotian children were accidentally maimed or killed.[70] The mounting civilian casualties proved detrimental to Vang Pao and the Hmong’s war effort. By 1971, civilian casualties were reaching an all-time high, with U.S. pilots causing more destruction in Laotian villages than the Communists were.[71] In a classified survey conducted by the United States in 1969, 97% of surveyed Laotian civilians had witnessed a bombing attack, and 61% had personally seen someone killed by the bombing.[72] Vang Pao’s propaganda was based on the idea that he was fighting against foreign invaders who threatened the Laos population, but due to the Laotians hurt in the bombing runs, it seemed like the United States was turning into the invader. Vang Pao and his men’s survival depended on the support of the Laotian people, and the encroachment of the U.S. rubbed many civilians the wrong way.
One of the main reasons that the CIA and the U.S. government could claim that the Secret War was successful is because their policies in Indochina allowed them the luxury of leaving Laos after the cease-fire. The CIA believed that they did not have to deal with the ramifications of being on the losing side, whilst the Hmong were forced to flee or be persecuted at the hands of the Communist invaders. Ernest Kuhn, a USAID volunteer, reflected back on his time serving in Laos and his relationship with the Hmong.
“We used the Meo (Hmong), we used hill tribes, we used people and then dropped them. Well, maybe we did, but I don’t think we should be so cynical and sit back and say, “Gee, that was terrible,” because that was already drilled into me when I first went to Laos. I was basically told that…and I believe in the domino theory. I truly believe the domino theory was correct. If Laos had been taken over by the Communists… Thailand was in no condition to defend itself against a massive move across the Mekong”[73]
Although Operation Momentum was successful at training the Hmong into a fighting force, and the CIA believed that the Hmong were successful at slowing the Communist invasion, there were setbacks started in 1967 from which the anti-Communists would never recover.[74] By 1969, Hanoi was beginning to assign better commanders and more men to invade Laos. It was exactly what Washington had wanted, since those men were not fighting Americans in Vietnam. Paul White, a former member of the International Voluntary Services (IVS) who was in Laos during the Secret War recalled that
“The essential reason was, as someone called Cambodia, Laos was a sideshow. The action was Vietnam. So what we were doing in Laos was essentially a holding action to, one, bomb the Ho Chi Minh trail and try to contain the North Vietnamese and try to not let them move through Laos to the Thai border. So it was more of us having a policy that did not look at what the needs of the Lao were as much as what our needs were to fight this war in Vietnam.”[75]
However, it was disastrous for Vang Pao and the Hmong; by the middle of 1969, the Hmong were suffering around 70% of all the casualties taken by the anti-Communist forces in Laos. The hardships continued through 1970 and 1971, as the Communists began to seize the Plain of Jars, a vital area to hold Laos. Irregular wet and dry seasons inhibited U.S. bombing capabilities, thus allowing the Communist forces to continue dominating the land.[76] By the end of 1971, it was clear that the Hmong would not be able to hold back the NVA and the Pathet Lao. Holm recalls that “More training, larger units, increased firepower, and air support were introduced little by little. But it remained a mismatch. Despite our best efforts, the Hmong were slowly decimated.”[77]
“They were fighting for Laos, not the United States”
Even after the U.S. pulled all of its forces out of Vietnam, and the CIA left the Hmong in Laos, American leadership believed that the operations in Laos were a success because at the end of it all, the overall well-being of Laos and its people were not the primary concern of U.S. policy. As Senator Symington testified in his hearings: “Why do we publish our military failures… in Vietnam, but do not tell the people about our successes in Laos?”[78] The U.S. government did use the Hmong as pawns to distract the NVA from American lives in Vietnam. Ahern admits that “…the Hmong would have been less badly off had they never chosen to cast their lot with the United States.”[79] Still, that is one of the main reasons the CIA maintains that Momentum was a success. Due to their Vietnam-centric policies, the CIA and U.S. government believed that they were able to skirt around any responsibility for the tragedies that befell the Laotian people during and after the Secret War, because they believed that they had no obligation to do so. The CIA felt that training Hmong tribesmen into cheap, yet effective, anti-Communist soldiers was a beneficial course of action. Bill Lair went as far as to say that,
“Most people [in the U.S. government] thought you couldn’t make an effective soldier with a lot of ethnic people. But I believed they would be better than the average American soldier… in the mountains the Hmong could walk faster than anyone… they couldn’t read or write, but they were very bright and easy to train. That’s what impressed me. And they were fighting for Laos, not the U.S.”[80]
The CIA’s training program permitted American involvement even when international treaties prevented direct foreign intervention. Despite Lair’s and the Agency’s contention that the combination of tribal irregulars and U.S. Air Force bombings would be enough to hold back the Communist invasion, the Hmong were not able to win a war of attrition over North Vietnamese forces. As it turned out, the failure to stop a Communist takeover of Laos and Vietnam did not mean further ramifications on Indochina, since the Communists did not make any serious attempt to spread to Thailand, Indonesia, or the Philippines. After the U.S. abandoned the region, the ever-revered Domino Theory seemed to no longer matter in Southeast Asia.[81] But in accordance with U.S. policy in the region, the CIA believed that they made a stand against communism in Laos while they could, which is all that mattered to them.
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[1] Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (New York: Anchor Books, 2008), 11.
[2] Joshua Kurlantzick, A Great Place to Have a War: America in Laos and the Birth of a Military
CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2016), 267.
[3] Kurlantzick, A Great Place to Have a War, 245.
[4] William E. Colby, “Heroin, Laos, and the CIA,” Letter to the Editor, New York Review of Books.
[5] Thomas F. McCoy, Letter to the Editor, Washington Post, January 11, 1972. https://www.dclibrary.org/wapo.
[6] William Colby, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), 191-93.
[7] Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), National Intelligence Estimate Number 50-61: The Outlook in Mainland Southeast Asia, 28 March 1961, Avaliable from https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001166395.pdf. (Accessed 20 April 2020), 6.
[8] Thomas L. Ahern Jr, Undercover Armies: CIA and Surrogate Warfare in Laos, 1961-1973 (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2006), vii.
[9] Ahern Jr, Undercover Armies, 479.
[10] Ahern Jr, Undercover Armies, 480.
[11] Ahern Jr, Undercover Armies, 174.
[12] Ahern Jr, Undercover Armies, 523.
[13] Ahern Jr, Undercover Armies, 529.
[14] Ahern Jr, Undercover Armies, 525.
[15] Kurlantzick, A Great Place to Have a War, 81.
[16] Kurlantzick, A Great Place to Have a War, 245.
[17] Ahern Jr, Undercover Armies, vxi.
[18] Kurlantzick, A Great Place to Have a War, 286-310.
[19] Jane Hamilton-Meritt, Tragic Mountains: The Hmong, the Americans, and the Secret Wars for Laos, 1942-1992 (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1993), 355-362.
[20] Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountains, 226.
[21] Hearings on the United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Kingdom of Laos, Vol. 1, Part 2, October 20, 22, 28, 1969, U.S. Senate, 91st Congress, 1st session (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1970), 376.
[22] Weiner, Legacy of Ashes, 245.
[23] Weiner, Legacy of Ashes, 245.
[24] Weiner, Legacy of Ashes, 245.
[25] Hearings on the United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Kingdom of Laos, Vol. 1, Part 2, October 20, 22, 28, 1969, U.S. Senate, 91st Congress, 1st session, 718.
[26] Walt Haney, “The Pentagon Papers and the United States Involvement in Laos,” The Pentagon Papers, The Senator Gravel Edition, Volume 5: Critical Essays, Ed. Noam Chomsky and Howard Zinn, (1972): http://legaciesofwar.org/files/The_Pentagon_Papers_and_the_United_States_Involvement_in_Laos.pdf, 262.
[27] Haney, “The Pentagon Papers and the United States Involvement in Laos,” 262.
[28] Haney, “The Pentagon Papers and the United States Involvement in Laos,” 282.
[29] Haney, “The Pentagon Papers and the United States Involvement in Laos,” 282.
[30] Kurlantzick, A Great Place to Have a War, 69.
[31] Kurlantzick, A Great Place to Have a War, 65.
[32] Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), National Intelligence Estimate Number 68-59: The Outlook for Laos, (19 May 1959), Avaliable from https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001166381.pdf, (Accessed 20 April 2020), 1
[33] Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 641; Felt is quoted in Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict: From Military Assistance to Combat (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986), pp. 24-25.
[34] Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 58-61: Probable Communist Reactions to Certain U.S. Courses of Action with Respect to Laos, (21 February 1961), Avaliable from https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001166396.pdf, (Accessed 20 April 2020), 1-2.
[35] Kennedy Presidential News Conference as Quoted in the New York Times, March 24, 1961. News Conference of March 23, 1961, https://nara-media-001.s3.amazonaws.com/arcmedia/research/pentagon-papers/Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-A-Vol-IC.pdf, C-6.
[36] William M. Leary, “CIA Air Operations in Laos, 1955-1974,” Studies in Intelligence (Winter, 1999-2000), Available from https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/winter99-00/art7.html, (Accessed 19 April, 2020).
[37] “Interview with Franklin E. Huffman,” Interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, January 30, 2006, https://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Huffman,%20Franklin%20E.toc.pdf, 21.
[38] “Interview with Franklin E. Huffman,” Interview by Charles Stuart
Kennedy, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, 21.
[39] “Interview with James R. Lilley,” Interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, May 21, 1998, https://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Lilley,%20James%20R.toc.pdf, 25.
[40] Kurlantzick, A Great Place to Have a War, 68.
[41] DCI, National Intelligence Estimate Number 68-59: The Outlook for Laos, 5-6.
[42] Kurlantzick, A Great Place to Have a War, 81-82.
[43] Steven Schofield, Secret War in Laos: Green Berets, CIA, and the Hmong, (Independently Published, 2019), 34.
[44] Ahern Jr, Undercover Armies, 144.
[45] Schofield, Secret War in Laos, 55.
[46] Ahern Jr, Undercover Armies, xvi.
[47] Memorandum from the Directorate of Plans (Colby) to the Director of Central Intelligence (McCone), April 20, 1963, The Vietnam Center & Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive (VNCA), Texas Tech University, Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive.
[48] Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, Geneva, 23 July 1962, United Nations Treaty Series, No. 6564, 1.
[49] Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, Geneva, 23 July 1962, United Nations Treaty Series, No. 6564, 3.
[50] William Colby, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), pp. 191-93.
[51] Ahern Jr, Undercover Armies,138. The actual report that Ahern cited remains redacted.
[52] Address by Secretary Rusk, Made Before the American Society of International Law on April 23, 1965, “The Control of Force in International Relations,” Department of State Bulletin, May 10, 1965, p. 697, https://nara-media-001.s3.amazonaws.com/arcmedia/research/pentagon-papers/Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-A-Vol-IID.pdf, D-99.
[53] Holm, “Recollections of a Case Officer in Laos, 1962-1964.”
[54] Memorandum from the Directorate of Plans (Colby) to the Director of Central Intelligence (McCone), April 20, 1963, The Vietnam Center & Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive (VNCA), Texas Tech University, Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive.
[55] Ahern Jr, Undercover Armies, 522.
[56] Central Intelligence Agency, “Infiltration of Viet Cong into South Vietnam, 1966-1968,” 1968, The CIA’s Vietnam Histories, The National Security Archive, Available from https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB121/E-1.pdf. (Accessed 21 April 2020), 1-4.
[57] William E. Colby, “Heroin, Laos, and the CIA,” Letter to the Editor, New York Review of Books, November 22, 1990, https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1990/11/22/heroin-laos-the-cia/.
[58] Ahern Jr, Undercover Armies, 528.
[59] Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 58-1-68: Communist Capabilities and Intentions in Laos Over the Next Year, 31 October 1968, Avaliable from https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/COMMUNIST%20CAPABILITIES%20AN%5B15604018%5D.pdf, (Accessed 1 May 2020), 4.
[60] Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 50-2-64: Probable Consequences of Certain U.S. Actions with Respect to Vietnam and Laos, 25 May 1964, Avaliable from https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/reports/images.php?img=/images/041/0410577004.pdf, 6.
[61] Colby, “Heroin, Laos, and the CIA,” Letter to the Editor, New York Review of Books.
[62] Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), National Intelligence Estimate Number 50-61: The Outlook in Mainland Southeast Asia, 28 March 1961, 6.
[63] DCI, Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 58-1-68: Communist Capabilities and Intentions in Laos Over the Next Year, 31 October 1968, 2.
[64] CIA, Office of National Estimates, Stocktaking in Indochina, 17 April 1970, DDRS 1977: 270C.
[65] Holm, “Recollections of a Case Officer in Laos, 1962-1964.”
[66] Memorandum From the Chief, Far East Division, Directorate of Plans (Nelson) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms, July 12, 1968, United States Department of State Archive. FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964-1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos. Department of State. Washington, DC. https://1997-2001.state.gov/about_state/history/vol_xxviii/371_390.html.
[67] Kurlantzick, A Great Place to Have a War, 177.
[68] Hearings on the United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Kingdom of Laos, Vol. 1, Part 2, October 20, 22, 28, 1969, U.S. Senate, 91st Congress, 1st session, 713.
[69] Memorandum From the Chief, Far East Division, Directorate of Plans (Nelson) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms, July 12, 1968, United States Department of State Archive. FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964-1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos. Department of State. Washington, DC. https://1997-2001.state.gov/about_state/history/vol_xxviii/371_390.html.
[70] Kurlantzick, A Great Place to Have a War, 177.
[71] Kurlantzick, A Great Place to Have a War, 192.
[72] Hearings on the United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Kingdom of Laos, Vol. 1, Part 2, October 20, 22, 28, 1969, U.S. Senate, 91st Congress, 1st session, 730.
[73] “Interview with Ernest C. Kuhn,” Interview by Arthur J. Dommen, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, March 25, 1995, https://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Kuhn,%20Ernest%20C.toc.pdf, 47-48.
[74] Kurlantzick, A Great Place to Have a War, 160.
[75] “Interview with Mr. Paul E. White,” Interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy, The
Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, May 30, 2006, https://adst.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/White-Paul-E.toc_.pdf, 30.
[76] Kurlantzick, A Great Place to Have a War, 163.
[77] Holm, “Recollections of a Case Officer in Laos, 1962-1964.”
[78] Hearings on the United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Kingdom of Laos, Vol. 1, Part 2, October 20, 22, 28, 1969, U.S. Senate, 91st Congress, 1st session, 790.
[79] Ahern Jr, Undercover Armies, 524.
[80] Kurlantzick, A Great Place to Have a War, 90.
[81] Kurlantzick, A Great Place to Have a War, 243.