By: Rebekah Dodson
Introduction
On May 2, 2022, Hamas incited large protests and riots by hanging a large propaganda poster over the Temple Mount entrance. Over 200,000 Arabs visiting the Temple Mount for Eid were welcomed by Hamas’ banner (Joffre, 2022). While the banner was hung, Palestinians were found chanting against the Palestinian Authority and Hamas (Joffre, 2022). Outwardly, Iranian support is not visible to the public, however, riots at the Temple Mount provoked the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) into intervening. The intervention of the Israeli military furthered tensions and continued the deterioration of regional relations; this is the outcome that is supported by Iran. These riots are timed to follow the Negev Summit between the United States, Israel, United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Morocco. Hamas and Iran’s relationship operates within the region to create instability and counter the United States’ ally, Israel.
This paper will investigate the strategic relationship between Hamas and the Islamic Republic of Iran as a means to address the connection between irregular warfare and state sponsored terrorism. Through the York Intelligence Red Team Model, it will demonstrate how Hamas is supported by Iran to advance regional instability against Israeli national security, specifically looking at how Hamas uses diplomacy, information, military, and economic power within the region to advance their strategic objectives.
State Sponsorship of Terrorism: Iran and Hamas
The current discussion on the state sponsorship of terrorism is focused on how legitimate governments subvert accountability by sponsoring terrorism through non-state actors (NSA). Interstate rivalry is closely related to state sponsored terrorism (Khan & Zhaoying, 2020, 242). The Steps-to-War Theory articulates that territorial disputes are the foundation to the causes of war (Khan, 2021, 1522). The theory indicates that the increasing hostility between interstate rivalries is escalated through strategic diplomatic objectives and policy objectives (Khan, 2021, 1522). Kahn argues that a missing escalating step in the theory is the state sponsorship of terrorism.
State sponsorship of terrorism works to destabilize specific regions to escalate interstate military conflicts (Khan, 2021, 1523). State sponsorship of terrorism is exploited because it functions to overcome asymmetric differences between state actors. Asserting that the threat from NSAs is a constant security threat and diverts resources to counter the threat posed (Khan, 2021, 1522-1523). State sponsorship of terrorism operates for several reasons: to destabilize a target state, the proliferation of ideologies, to strengthen a regime domestically, and/or other reasons (Khan, 2021, 1526). Overall, the theory suggests that, specifically, the Middle East is situated with interstate rivalries that allow for the deterioration of security through the sponsoring of terrorism with NSAs (Khan, 2021, 1534). Through applying Khan’s theory that the state sponsorship of terrorism in the Middle East is an escalation towards war, this study will explore how specifically Iran employs Hamas to cause deterioration in the region through an alternate model.
The current discussion on the Islamic Republic of Iran’s sponsorship of the NSA, Hamas, is focused on the military support that is provided to the group to create regional instability. Government reports dominate the field for exploring and assessing the strength of the relationship between Hamas and Iran. An overview of the Islamic Resistance Movement finds that it originates from the ideologies created from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The group was formally organized in 1987. The reformation of the Islamic Resistance Movement, known as Hamas, was structured ideologically to prescribe to ethnonationalist and jihadist terrorist identities. This means that the group has dual identities and is considered a hybrid ideology (Law, 2016, 298). One of the identities is the dedication to liberating Palestinians and ideologically rejecting the sovereignty of Israel and Zionism (Troen & Fish, 2017, 112). This is the key identity that Hamas shares with Iran and is supported through government assessments (Zanotti, 2021A, 6; Katzman, 2021, 2).
Hamas rose to power in 2006 after winning a majority of the legislature’s vote in Gaza for the Palestinian Authority (PA) (Zanotti, 20201A, 5). The Palestinian militants won 44 percent of the direct party vote as opposed to Fatah, which received 41 percent (Troen & Fish, 2017, 113). There is a belief that Hamas only gained this support from the Palestinians as a show that they stood against the perceived corruption in the Palestinian Authority under Fatah (113). This win in the PA election led to Hamas, within the next year, seizing control of Gaza; their actions made them the acting sovereign government of Gaza (Zanotti, 2021A, 7). This allowed for Hamas to gain marginal advancements in their military capabilities compared to other Palestinian militants through the addition of short-range ballistic missiles and later mid-range ballistic missiles (Brecher, 2016, 185). However, Hamas does not have control of their borders. Israel and Egypt share control of the border around Gaza, including ports and the bordering crossing points (Zanotti, 2021A, 7).
Until his death in 2024, Yahya Sinwar was the leader in Gaza and originated from the al Qassam Brigades (Zanotti, 2021B, 2). However, the political leader of Hamas–up until his death in 2024–was Ismail Haniyeh; Haniyeh was responsible for the organization’s international operations and relationships in addition to coordination with Iran (Zanotti, 2021B, 2). Within Gaza, there are refugee camps for internally displaced individuals. Haniyeh used to frequently visit the refugee camp in Sidon, specifically, receiving a “hero’s welcome,” which solidified his relationship with the Palestinian people within Gaza (Associated Press, 2020). Together, these two were the political figureheads of the Palestinian militant group and led the strategic direction. These men were the overt leaders who met internationally with other regional state actors, primarily the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The Islamic Republic of Iran, created in 1979 after the Islamic Revolution, was founded with a Shia cleric dominated regime (Katzman, 2021, 2). Leading Iranian government officials cite the revolution as cutting influence from the United States (Katzman, 2021, 2). However, they state that their ideology is not sectarian because of the support they give to Sunni groups, including the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas (Katzman, 2021, 2). Iran’s strategic national interests are focused on maintaining regional prestige (Khan & Zhaoying, 2020, 249). Iranian foreign policy objectives sought to engage non-state actors to promote their geopolitical interests (Katzman, 2021, 3). The United States, in 1984, listed Iran on the international terrorism watchlist and listed the state as “the most active” for the state sponsorship of terrorism (Katzman, 2021, 3).
The relationship between Hamas and Iran began covertly in 1997 under Commander Soleimani, who was in the top leadership of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps- Quds Force (IRGC-QF) (Zohar, 2015, 432). Hamas and the Islamic Republic of Iran have similar strategic objectives against Israel. Both do not accept the establishment of a Zionist state in the Middle East (Troen & Fish, 2017, 112). Through sharing this same political objective against Israel, it allows for the different Islamic sects to work together strategically and operationally. Iran employs a variety of different methods to push forward their National Security Strategy and foreign policy. The IRGC-Quds Force, under Khomeini in 2014, moved in the strategic direction of supporting NSAs to wage irregular warfare (Katzman, 2021, 3). The IRGC-QF is directly responsible for supporting Palestinian militant group Hamas (Zohar, 2015, 444). Through Khomeini’s policy, the support given to Palestinian militant groups was labeled the ‘axis of resistance’ (Zohar, 2015, 445). During the time examined by this paper, Commander Esmail Qaani was the head of the IRGC-QF (Zanotti, 2021A, 5).
For Hamas, the relationship with the IRGC is dominated through their supply of large and high-quality arms and weapons systems (Zohar, 2015, 438). In 2014, top Iranian official Hashemi Rafsanjani, the chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council, stated that the strength of the armed Palestinians came only from Iran (Zohar, 2015, 350). For Iran, supporting Hamas is essential to maintaining influence in the Gaza Strip (Malakoutikhah, 2020, 922).
Iran and Hamas do not always share the same strategic objectives, including the ongoing Syrian conflict in 2012 (Katzman, 2021, 35). The rift occurred because of Hamas’ Sunni sympathy to the rebels in Syria instead of Asad’s regime that Iran supported. Iran brought tactical support for Hamas in 2014 for their brief conflict against the IDF by providing the militants with missiles for their conflict (Katzman, 2021, 35). Following 2014, the relationship between Iran and Hamas has improved due to increased cooperation to rebuild rocket capabilities (Katzman, 2021, 36). The public restoration of relations was not announced until August 2017. An important 11-day dispute, which foreshadowed the current conflict in Gaza, occurred between the IDF and Hamas in May 2021. This conflict is significant because it included the issues within the Arab-Jewish unrest and violence in Jerusalem and the West Bank (Zanotti, 2021B, 2). Hamas launched rockets indiscriminately at Israel and Jerusalem, targeting both civilians and the military. The rockets were supplied from Iran to support Hamas in their campaign against Israel. Israel retaliated against the action of Hamas through military strikes that targeted the infrastructure of al Qassam’s military operations (Zanotti, 2021B, 2). This conflict deepened the divide between Israel and the international community, which was attempting to rebuild Gaza’s failing infrastructure.
As of 2022, the government assessments of Hamas were centralized only around the military actions undertaken by Hamas that were supported by Iran. These assessments do not explore how the sponsoring of Hamas as a proxy actor is supported through diplomatic, information, or economic capabilities. To build upon the government reports that investigate the strength of Iran’s sponsorship of Hamas, this study will explore the three other national power instruments used by the Palestinian militants and supported by the IRGC.
Methodology and Research Question
To analyze the effectiveness of the Islamic State of Iran’s state sponsorship of Hamas’ terrorism against Israel, this study will employ the York Intelligence Red Team Model (YIRTM). The YIRTM theoretical framework employs the four instruments of national power: focused diplomacy, targeted information, military capabilities, and economic pressure (D.I.M.E.) (Weaver, 2020, p. 5). This study will explore how the non-state actor, Hamas, uses or projects to use diplomacy, information, military, and economic means to escalate regional tensions aimed against Israel. This case study examines, as of 2022, how the support Iran gives to Hamas could potentially apply these instruments to weaken the United States and its primary regional ally, Israel’s, position in the Persian Gulf region.
The YIRTM logic model starts with the strategic direction of an opposing state or non-state actor that attempts to weaken the national security of a state actor. The strategic direction of the non-state actor is from the top leadership and provides the initial implications of how the national power is applied (Weaver, 2020, 6). The study will examine “what” and “how” Hamas weakened the security of Israel within the region before Hamas attacked Israel. This directly aids in seeing how Hamas implements D.I.M.E. tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for the advancement of their strategic direction. Focused diplomacy involves how Hamas creates favorable conditions for their strategic direction through applying and manipulating other actors and leaders, both regionally and globally. Targeted information explores how Hamas applies influence throughout the region. This instrument is the least expensive, most readily available, and includes cyber capabilities and message targeting. Military capabilities involve the traditional arms based TTPs Hamas uses against Israel. Lastly, economic pressure examines how Hamas exerts regional influence using economic tools (Weaver, 2020, 6-7).
After reviewing the origins and the threat environment of the relationship between Hamas and Iran, the study begins to answer how the state sponsorship of terrorism escalates regional conflict against Israel.
Question: How has the relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Hamas effectively grown in creating escalating regional tensions against Israel in the context of YIRTM as of 2022?
To analyze the findings, this study will ensure that there is a balance between the types of sources used. In order to confirm this balance, a case study triangulation model was applied. The Federal Qualitative Secondary Data Case Study Triangulation Model balances plans and systems, government documents, speeches, and press releases. New sources were also used in the study, however, they were limited in the scope to be within 2020 and 2022 range. The analysis relied upon the use of open-source materials. The study relied heavily upon press releases from Hamas, Iran, Israel, and the United States.
Limitations to YIRTM include its scope, which includes only the four instruments of national power. This excludes looking at external forces that affect Hamas’ ability to create regional instability, including natural disasters and failing infrastructure that directly impact the effectiveness of Hamas’ actions within the region.
Analysis and Findings
The overall relationship between Hamas and Iran has grown, and the systems and plans that govern their actions indicate this relationship developing. Focusing on how Hamas has created regional instability through their relationship and allies within the context of the four instruments of national power: diplomacy, information, military, and economics. The analysis is based on the data from Annex A, which was formed to gain a better understanding of the strategic relationship between Hamas and Iran. The sources (raw data) that are found in Annex A were collected and applied to base the study’s analysis and findings on. These sources were then appropriately coded, adhering to the YIRTM. Found in Annex A, military has nine counts, information has seven counts, diplomacy has five counts, and economics has two counts. The M.I.D.E. is the alternate model created as a result of the national instruments of power counts.
Diplomacy
The Islamic Resistance Movement mobilizes their relationships with Egypt, Turkey, and Iran to advance their regional agenda for increasing influence and control of the Palestinian people. Foremost, Hamas is fundamentally supported by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The relationship with Iran and Hamas goes against the Palestinian militant’s strategic policy of engaging in isolation (Zanotti, 2021B, 4). This relationship is only fragmented through utilizing the Egyptian government as a mediator for all conflicts between Hamas and the IDF (Zanotti, 2021B, 3). Prior to the war breaking out, Hamas grew diplomatic capabilities in Gaza, the West Bank, and Jerusalem through the resources employed by the militants from the Iranians.
The former IRGC-QF Brigade General, Esmail Qaani, was overtly and publicly in direct contact with Hamas’ former supreme commander of the al-Qassam Brigades, Mohammed Deif, which strengthened their diplomatic relationship. Qaani stated, “We will not leave Palestine alone, regardless of the pressures and siege” (Toameh, 2021). The regional support supplied by Iran to Hamas connects their overarching strategic goal of ending the perceived Israeli military occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip border. Iran provides Hamas with perceived legitimacy, acknowledging their sovereignty to control the Gaza Strip. This perceived regional legitimacy for Hamas has allowed the Palestinian militants to expand influence outside of Gaza and into East Jerusalem and the West Bank.
Ismail Haniyeh has created an embedded relationship with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and linked this militant organization to the IRGC as well. However, this shared ideological and allied relationship has aided the creation of domestic unrest. Following the 2021 May conflict between Hamas and the IDF, the Gaza Strip is confronted with unmanageable internal infrastructure damage and political protests threatening their rule (Hendrix, Miller, & Rubin, 2021). The political violence against Israel from the al Qassam Brigades has also impacted the domestic diplomatic power. The Israeli government has reduced the number of work permits to Palestinians in Gaza (Hendrix, Miller, & Rubin, 2021). They were cut back to 20,000 work permits allocated to Gaza; this directly impacted the domestic sphere of influence for Hamas (Hendrix, Miller, & Rubin, 2021).
The Islamic Republic of Iran’s foreign ally, Turkey, provides diplomatic support to the Palestinian militants. Hamas has built a relationship with the President of Turkey, Erdogan. The relationship with Turkey is strengthened through the historical ties of the Turkish party and Dawah because they share Muslim Brotherhood roots (Frantzman, 2020). Erdogan has given some of Hamas’ top leadership political asylum within Turkey and hosted meetings with them (Dos, 2021). This solidifies a relationship with Turkey, who is a regional Iranian military ally, and positions Hamas for foreign diplomatic support.
Hamas has grown to rely upon Iranian leadership for regional influence and legitimacy. The relationship has allowed Hamas to grow their influence in Jerusalem and the West Bank. Hamas has publicly stated support and started inciting political protests in Jerusalem that oppose the Palestinian Authority. Open opposition to the PA with the assistance of Iran provides Hamas the ability to grow diplomatically.
Information
Hamas has shown considerable growth in applying information to advance their regional position and influence. Technological innovations allow NSAs to acquire cyber capabilities that previously were only granted to state actors. Cyber capabilities and the growth of social media allow NSAs to have access to global outreach and regional exploitations at a low cost. Together, these aspects support Hamas’ ability to apply the national power instrument of information against Israel efficiently with the operation support of the IRGC-QF.
Hamas has expanded and grown intelligence capabilities and operations to include sophisticated cyber cells. Multiple al Qassam cyber intelligence units operate out of Northern Gaza, targeting Israeli soldiers online and managing the group’s external communications (Ahronheim, 2022, 1). The intelligence units are also responsible for the production of information to Palestinians and Hamas’ regional partner, Iran. One method that Hamas has recently employed is using cyber “honey traps” on IDF soldiers to plant spyware on their cell phones (Zilber, 2020, 1). The spyware is programmed to gain access to the data storage held in the phone and control the GPS locator, contacts, audio, and camera for Hamas’ military servers (Zilber, 2020, 1). This allows Hamas to advance and diversify their cyber capabilities from basic denial of service attacks against Israeli counterintelligence drones to leveraging cyber-attacks against vulnerable young non-officer IDF soldiers (Joffre, 2022).
One of the most effective methods of disseminating information to the Palestinian people within and outside Gaza is through Hamas Television, also known within the Persian Gulf region as AL-ASKA (DoT, 2022, 542). As of 2022, this TV station has been sanctioned by the United States; however, they are still able to transmit within the region from independent funding operations (DoT, 2022, 542). This allows Hamas to control the media within the Gaza Strip and command the narrative that is released and the information that is broadcasted. The platform provides Hamas with the ability to broadcast propaganda that supports the Quds force’s regional objectives while countering the Palestinian Authority. Countering the influence of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the party in power of the PA, is an important strategic objective to Hamas. This allows Hamas to influence the Palestinian people remotely and incite violence in the West Bank and Gaza. Through AL-ASKA TV, Hamas has the potential to reach 4.8 million Palestinians in Gaza, the West Bank, and Jerusalem (Zanotti, 2021B, 1). Iran also supports the propaganda efforts of Hamas through broadcasting pro-Palestinian messages into the region from Iranian channels (Zanotti, 2021B, 3). Together, the IRGC and Hamas combine strategic objectives and perpetuate propaganda against Israel.
Within the United States, there is an ongoing debate for consideration of the reclassification of the IRGC as an FTO. “The most urgent challenge we would face is a nuclear-armed Iran or an Iran that was on the very precipice of obtaining a nuclear weapon” (DoS, 2022). An important aspect of Hamas being supported by the Iranians is that they are no longer bound by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) terms for nuclear proliferation that were agreed upon under the Obama Administration (Katzman, 2021, 12). This allows Iran to be more aggressive with their support to Hamas through assisting information for cyber capabilities within the region. If the IRGC is reclassified, and is not an FTO, then the Quds forces would be able to increase support to Hamas and the other proxy actors supported by the Iranian regime.
Military
The Islamic Resistance Movement has historically heavily relied upon the use of their military capabilities to achieve regional goals. Regional instability instigated by Hamas was created through asymmetric rocket campaigns or through their support to lone actor attacks against Israel. The Islamic Republic of Iran relies upon the IRGC-QF to provide operational and tactical support to create regional instability through supporting NSAs (DoS, 2021). The Quds force is the organization responsible for assisting Hamas with the acquisition of small arms and the smuggling of rockets into the Gaza Strip. Hamas continues to rely upon conventional military capabilities through the support of the IRGC and has mobilized the addition of covert units within the region.
An integral aspect of the military tactical support the Quds forces supplies to the al Qassam brigades is the advantages provided through the physical terrain and how it aids with the launching of missiles. The terrain within Gaza is an important aspect for how the militants engage Israel. Gaza primarily fires rockets and missiles from the North of the strip, and this location is closest to Israeli civilians located in the Negev Desert (Johnson, 2011, 102). In the South of the Gaza Strip, the border near Egypt is well known for widespread arms smuggling operations (Zanotti, 2021B, 35). The arms smuggling through the south border is integral for Hamas to maintain conventional asymmetric missile campaigns. For the IDF, the Gaza region is within the range for missiles; however, Hamas takes advantage of the urban landscape of Gaza and houses military command posts for Qassam among dense population centers (Johnson, 2011, 103). This severely inhibits the IDF from being able to complete targeted attacks and avoid civilian casualties when retaliating against Hamas launching missiles into Israel.
The most important aspect of the relationship between the IRGC-QF and Hamas is through the material support of rockets. Iran provides Hamas with the Fajr rocket, which is estimated to have a range around 40 miles (Katzman, 2021, 12). These rockets would not be able to fire directly into Jerusalem, however, they are within range of the Negev desert and surrounding Israeli towns. The IRGC is responsible for providing the knowledge of how to construct rockets to Hamas as well. This process has led the two organizations to rebuild a closer relationship (Zanotti, 2021B, 35).
The May 2021 conflict between Hamas and the IDF highlights how Hamas relies upon the use of tunnels for tactical support in military operations. The reliance upon an underground network within the Gaza Strip, that took the militants approximately three years to build, was targeted in an Israeli airstrike (Hendrix, 2021, 1). The tunnel system beneath Gaza City functions essentially as an underground city and a strategic advantage for Hamas to launch rockets (Hendrix, 2021). Hamas houses weapons depots within members of the al Qassam homes to decentralize the locations (Ahronheim, 2022, 1). The decentralization of weapons is advantageous to Hamas because it ensures that it ensures that if one weapon depot is identified, then other locations can be moved.
Between 2021 and 2022, Hamas grew their naval capabilities within the region, and at the time, their goals for this remained unknown. Israeli military sources have revealed that Hamas has created clandestine naval commandos that are crossing into Israel or attacking from the sea (Bilefsky, 2021). Submergible naval weapons give Hamas an asymmetric capability against Israel to try and undermine the Iron Dome system. By subverting the air military superiority of Israel through the sea, it provides Hamas with the opportunity to target critical infrastructure.
However, the United States has agreed to ensure that the Israeli military maintains a qualitative military edge within the region. This agreement is on top of the former Biden Administration, where they agreed to continue financially supporting the Iron Dome. (Biden, 2022). These factors were done in an attempt to ensure the military capabilities of al Qassam were not an existential threat to Israel because it would help maintain Israel’s air superiority over Hamas, thereby making missile campaigns ineffective.
Economics
The economic capabilities that Hamas can exert against regional actors are limited in their scope. Currently, the IRGC, IRGC-QF, and Hamas have multiple economic sanctions placed against them by the United States, Israel, and other state actors. The IRGC-QF and associated Quds Institutes have been sanctioned by the United States government (DoT, 2022, 72). Foreign assistance is an integral aspect for the rule and security of Hamas over the Gaza Strip. Iran provides Hamas with a $100 million annual budget (Katzman, 2021, 35). Hamas is mainly dependent on this outside funding from the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Gaza has a very small economy with limited influence regionally.
The United States government, under the Department of Treasury has targeted specific industries to sanction against NSAs. One targeted industry is construction; the construction companies of Habab Engineering and Steel companies that are linked to the Quds force were sanctioned. Hamas and affiliated groups under their name have economic sanctions placed against them (DoT, 2022, 542). These sanctions inhibit both Hamas and Iran from accessing international financial institutions. Under Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Islamist based political party, Justice and Development Party (AKP), Turkey has been an advocate for Hamas. Turkey has financially supported the Palestinian militants (Katzman, 2021, 39). Erdogan’s government is also a recipient of financial support from the Islamic Republic of Iran (Katzman, 2021, 39). However, Hamas’ funds continue to be seized from Turkish shell companies (DoT, 2022, 1149). One example was the company Riden Money Exchange, which operated as a shell company to evade economic sanctions placed on the IRGC-QF and Hamas (DoT, 2022, 114). Economic sanctions have effectively limited the financial influence Hamas is able to exert regionally.
Conclusion
Analyzing the threat environment in Gaza prior to Hamas’ October 2023 attack on Israel, the relationship between Hamas and Iran has grown to become more integrated. Iran looks to engage in irregular warfare by supporting Hamas to regionally challenge Israel, a United States ally within the Persian Gulf region. Through the collection and analysis of the sources, it showed an alternate model, M.I.D.E., to explain how Hamas applies the support of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Regarding the research question, Hamas and Iran have effectively grown regional instability through their relationship of state sponsorship of terrorism. For military capabilities, the IRGC-QF continues to supply Hamas with missiles and operational support. This allows the Palestinian militants to apply military pressure against the IDF in retaliation. For information, Hamas has been able to grow al Qassam brigades to perform cyber-attacks and manage external communications. Diplomatically, the Islamic Republic of Iran is the foundation for Hamas’ foreign agenda and external support on the international stage. This has allowed Hamas to gain support from Turkey and host public meetings. The economic capabilities of Hamas, while being financially supported by Iran, are minimal while under United States sanctions. However, these findings are relevant in relation to Iran rejecting all offers from the United States government on a nuclear deal. Looking at evidence up to 2022, this indicates that in the future, Iran will most likely continue to engage in state sponsorship of terrorism to achieve their regional goals.
While this study focused on the relationship between Hamas and Iran as a regional unit creating instability in the Persian Gulf region, prior to the October 2023 attack, future research could focus on the internal competition between Hamas and Iran. The competition for support from the Palestinians will become more relevant as the current President of the PA has health issues and Hamas continues to push for more foreign allies through Iran.
Annex A
| How | DIME | Source | Source Type | Date | Page (If Applicable) |
| Hamas relies upon the Egyptian government to assist with ceasefires with the IDF. Hamas also has the capabilities to directly reach all Palestinians through broadcasts. The IRGC provides Hamas with the knowledge to build rockets independently. | D, I, M | Zanotti | Government Report | 2021B | 1, 3, 4, 35 |
| IRGC-QF leader publicly stated ongoing diplomatic support for Hamas. | D | Toameh | News Source | 2021 | n/a |
| The domestic impact on Hamas’ relationship and support from Iran on workers permits to Israel. | D | Hendrix,Miller, & Rubin | Press Release | 2021 | n/a |
| Historical ties and diplomatic support between Hamas and Turkey. | D | Franzman | News Source | 2020 | n/a |
| Turkey’s president hosted a meeting with Hamas top leadership providing regional diplomatic support to the group against Israel. | D | DoS | Press Release | 2021 | n/a |
| Iranian group collaborates for strategic goals with DDOS cyberattack against Israeli critical infrastructure. | I, M | Joffre | News Source | 2022 | n/a |
| Ongoing debate of the reclassification of the IRGC as an FTO. | I | DoS | Press Release | 2022 | n/a |
| Iran is no longer held to the binding agreement with the JCPOA. The IRGC provides Hamas with conventional military rockets and financial support. | I, M, E | Katzman | Government Report | 2021 | 8, 12, 35, 39 |
| Hamas has intelligence cyber units that operate out of Northern Gaza to conduct attacks against Israel. Hamas decentralizes weapons depots within members’ houses. | I, M | Ahronheim | News Source | 2022 | 1 |
| Hamas has grown cyber-attack capabilities against non-officer IDF soldiers. | I | Zilber | News Source | 2020 | 1 |
| Hamas has broadcast capabilities for information to be targeted to Palestinians and a global audience. The United States government has placed heavy sanctions against Hamas and the IRGC. | I, E | DoT | Government Report | 2022 | 72,542, 1149 |
| The support given from the IRGC-QF to regional actors for the creation of instability. | M | DoS | Government Report | 2021 | n/a |
| The physical terrain of Gaza gives Hamas military advantages when launching conventional attacks. | M | Johnson | Academic Journal Article | 2011 | 102-103 |
| Hamas clandestine naval operations to enter and hit Israel by sea. | M | Bilefsky | News Source | 2021 | n/a |
| The Palestinian militants built an extensive underground tunnel system for strategic ground advantages. | M | Hendrix | New Source | 2021 | 1 |
| United States commitment to Israel maintaining a QME. | M | Biden | Speech | 2022 | n/a |
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