By: Garrett Hunt
Introduction
When Ian Fleming first penned Casino Royale in 1953, it is doubtful that he had any idea of his work’s implications on the perception of espionage in the 20th and 21st centuries. The character of James Bond, the gentleman spy, has been perpetuated in the Bond movies, and almost every other spy or espionage film, book, or popular media adaptation. However, while Fleming was writing his books and they were being adapted for the big screen, a very real espionage war was going on. The end of the Second World War brought many political, economic, and social changes to the cultural fabric of the world. During the war, the United States was forced to move away from its historically isolationist stature, and take on the role of a global super-power to support the war effort. Besides building aircraft carriers, planes, and nuclear bombs, the United States also created something else that had been relatively unimportant to the Americans in past years. On June 13, 1942, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was established with the goal of collecting and analyzing strategic information and conducting unconventional and paramilitary operations (CIA, 2020). At the onset of the Second World War, the US realized it had a serious lack of intelligence on foreign nations. The British, for example, had long standing intelligence organizations like MI5 and MI6, and the US realized it needed an intelligence apparatus to win the war. Following the successful allied victory, the United States emerged as the sole global super-power. Now firmly placed on the global platform, the United States realized that intelligence capabilities were essential to protecting the US homeland and US interests abroad. This realization is partly the cause behind the National Security Act of 1947, which turned the OSS into the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (CIA, 2020). Soon after the end of WWII, the CIA and the fledgling hegemony of the US faced perhaps its most challenging issue yet: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republicans (USSR).
At this point, Fleming’s description of the gentleman spy comes into play. At the same time movies like Dr. No and From Russia with Love were hitting the big screen, the CIA and the rest of the new intelligence community (IC) were being put to the test combating the Red Scare and the spread of Communism. This ideological battle between the capitalist United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was taking place around the globe in places like: Latin America, Southwest Asia, mainland Europe, and even in the US and Russia itself. Although Fleming may have dramatized certain aspects, the realization was that in a war where standing armies could never meet, the world of James Bond became a reality. The nuanced spy methods like dead drops, soirees, and being chased through a foreign city were practiced in nearly every country by the CIA and its Soviet counterpart the KGB. The methods of the Cold War would persist indefinitely through the end of the 20th century.
A decade after the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States was enjoying its relatively peaceful place as the sole world super-power once again. The morning of September 11, 2001 would catch the United States and the world off guard. An unprecedented attack by an extremist religious group operating from undeveloped regions in the Middle East was a change from the last 50 years of Cold War conflict the US had experienced. President George W. Bush declared the global War on Terror, forcing the intelligence community to follow suit. Waging a war in a new theater, with new enemies, forced the United States to adapt new strategies. Fleming’s methods of attending parties with foreign dignitaries and marking lampposts with chalk would no longer be effective in the War on Terror. The CIA would have to modify its tactics to adapt for the intelligence needs of the 21st century. Methods that would have been unthinkable just decades before became common for the CIA and other intelligence agencies. Overt bases and drone strikes, typically common in the military, became practices of the intelligence community. In a short span of time the IC lost much of its covert nature and took on a more militarized role. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the degree to which the Central Intelligence Agency became militarized and to analyze what risks the potential militarization holds for the future.
Literature Review
Drone Program
One of the most notable changes in the nature of the CIA is their willingness to conduct relatively overt operations, and as a result the historically secretive agency has been dragged into the spotlight. In recent years, both the military and CIA have been criticized publicly for their extensive use of drones in the Middle East. The drone program has been controversial for years, but came under new scrutiny during President Obama’s term when drones began to be used with increasing frequency. Some scholars now describe Obama’s use of the drone program as “industrial-scale extrajudicial execution” (Fuller, 2014). Greg Miller of the Washington Post went as far to say that “No president has ever relied so extensively on the secret killing of individuals to advance the nation’s security goals” (Fuller, 770, 2014). In his article, Fuller conducts a deep dive into the history of the CIA’s drone program, starting with the Reagan administration in 1982. Fuller traces the foundations of the program through multiple presidential administrations and to legislation as recent as 2011 with the successful use of predator drones against Mummar al-Gaddafi (Fuller, 2014). In an article reviewing several works on the topic of the CIA drone program, Robert Steele makes criticisms that echo the viewpoints of Fuller. Steele makes several assertions in his article including claims that: the Obama administration used drones to assassinate US and German citizens, the government has been dishonest in their portrayal and use of the drone program, the Iranian government fabricates drone stories to incite Muslim violence against the United States, and that drones are used to murder thousands of innocent noncombatants (Steele, 2017).
Despite several challenges, President Reagan ushered in a thawing of the Cold War during the 1980s. As a result of the Cold War thawing, the CIA and others in Reagan’s presidency saw the rise of other threats to national security. One of these rising threats was international terrorism. Several men saw this rising threat, and decided to stand against it. Little did they know, their stance would create and amplify the aggressive, militaristic attitudes seen in the CIA today (Fuller, 2014). These men were: Secretary of State George Schultz, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) William Casey and the infamous Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North. Schultz and Casey became two of the first anti-terrorist hardliners in the United States. Both gave speeches where they echoed each other’s warnings of terrorism and announced their intentions to stop it. In April of 1985, Casey gave a public speech in which he called international terrorism, “a perpetual war without borders,” and in a closed session of the Senate Intelligence Committee in June of 1985, declared that he believed “the United States is at war” with terrorism (Fuller, 775, 2014). This language is reminiscent of the speeches made by various political figures following the events of 9/11, despite predating it by nearly two decades. The trio of terrorist hardliners faced resistance from the Secretary of Defense, Casper Weinberger, and the Pentagon, who were hesitant to use American military force against terrorists. Casey and Schultz recognized the terrorist threat, and sought to not only destroy it, but to send a message to other potential terrorist groups. Schultz especially saw terrorism as an “Achilles heel” for the United States, as he believed terrorism was proving to be a successful strategy for challenging the US (Fuller, 2014). DCI Casey and Lt. Col North were especially close, with North viewing Casey as a mentor figure. Despite his attachment to the Iran-Contra scandal, where the United States illegally sold weapons to Iran, Oliver North was truly more involved in counterterrorism. North described himself as the “de facto counterterrorism coordinator” for the United States (Fuller, 777, 2014). North and Casey may have gotten along so well because of their shared views on international terrorism; as North put it “it was time to kill…terrorists” (Fuller, 777, 2014). Fuller argues that “the availability of drones did not generate this mindset; it is arguably more accurate to think of the mindset generating the drones” (Fuller, 777, 2014).
In 1984, President Reagan signed off on National Security Decision Directive 138 or NSDD138. This directive was written by North, and may have set the precedent for the CIA’s actions today. NSDD138 was multifaceted, and some of its effects included: the recognition of terrorism as a threat to national security, developed a strategy for a preemptive program to combat state-sponsored terrorism, suggested the development of preemptive strike capabilities with the ability to “neutralize” anti-American terrorist groups, and established the CIA as the lead organization for counterterrorism activities (Fuller, 2014). Initial reactions to NSDD138 were harsh, especially in regards to North’s use of the term neutralize. The previous decade, the Church Commission, which was a congressional commission looking into misdeeds of the CIA, officially condemned the use of assassination as a tool of foreign policy. Additionally, Reagan signed Executive Order 12333 which stated, “No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination” (Fuller, 779, 2014). Eventually, the term “neutralize” would be replaced with “proactive”, however the context and meaning remained the same.
The CIA’s Counter Terrorism Center (CTC) was formed in 1986, and it is from this organization that the CIA’s drone program began. In its first year, the CTC focused mainly on two terrorist threats: the state-sponsored terrorism of Gaddafi in Libya and the hostage crisis in Lebanon (Fuller, 2014). Duane Clarridge was selected by DCI Casey to serve as the first director of CTC. Clarridge was known around CIA headquarters to be “a man of action” and he structured his agency as such. The CTC was placed within the CIA’s Directorate of Operations, which is the arm of the CIA that conducts the operational or clandestine activities, as opposed to say analysis. Clarridge became especially upset after the bombing of the La Belle nightclub in Berlin by Libyan agents, and even more so with the disaster of the retaliatory bombing raid on Tripoli. According to his memoir, Clarridge expressed his frustrations to the DCI and said, “We have to find a better way to send a message to outlaw nations that we don’t like their behavior short of sending in squadrons of F-111Bs” (Fuller, 782, 2014). Clarridge’s frustrations would increase with continued rejections from the Pentagon to use conventional force or Special Operations Forces (SOF). In order to meet his needs, Clarridge turned to the “technical geniuses” employed by the CIA and instructed CTC engineers to create a “highly classified pilotless drone” he admitted to in an interview years later (Fuller, 783, 2014). The drones were designed to have small rockets loaded onto them to fire at pre-designated targets; additionally, the drones would be equipped with infrared cameras, intercept equipment, and low-noise propellers. Clarridge’s dream was becoming a reality: a project codenamed the Eagle Program (Fuller 2014). Before Clarridge’s dreams could be recognized, however, the coalition that empowered him fell apart. In November 1986, North was dismissed because of the Iran-Contra scandal, DCI Casey fell ill due to a brain tumor, and Clarridge was forced to retire from the CIA. The aggressive anti-terrorist CTC that Clarridge had imagined ceased to exist and the Eagle Program no longer had the necessary support to continue. It wasn’t until anti-American terror once again became a credible threat that the Eagle Program was brought back (Fuller, 2014).
Cultural Changes
The 1990s through the early 2000s were a hectic time for the intelligence community. In less than a decade, the IC transitioned from challenging an ideological enemy capable of mutual assured destruction (MAD) to being an unchallenged world power. This transition seemingly happened overnight in December of 1991, and then as quickly as it had begun, the Cold War ended with the fall of the Soviet Union. The time period after the Cold War can be broken down into two basic aspects: the time leading up to the 9/11 attacks and the time period after the 9/11 attacks. Some academics look at the time before 9/11 solely in terms of sitting presidents. As Jones writes, during the Clinton Presidency the message was clear: the CIA could no longer remain the same as it had been before the fall of the Soviet Union (Jones, 2001). The pre 9/11 period was a new time for the CIA, Congress began to ask the agency to mend its shortcomings, and more importantly, adapt for the “new dynamics of its external environment” (Jones, 503, 2001). There was uncertainty for the CIA now that their one enemy was finally defeated.
The September 11th attacks had a profound impact on the CIA. For one, it is possible that the attacks reversed the downsizing trend that had been going on in the agency since the mid 1990s. Despite the conjecture around the possible effects of 9/11, it is a definitive fact that 9/11 revitalized the IC and ushered in a new militarized society (Giroux, 2008). The time period after the September 11th attacks led to many sweeping changes of the IC: changes in leadership, additions of agencies, and a complete restructuring swept through the IC. These changes, combined with the fact that the country was now at war, shifted both the internal attitudes and external perceptions of the CIA
Higher Education
As the United States closes in on 20 years of the War on Terror, some scholars are pointing to signs that American culture, not just the CIA, is becoming militarized. In his article, Henry Giroux issues an alarming warning of the military industrial complex that has absorbed American culture. Giroux points to American universities and higher education as proof of this militarization and its preparation for continued indoctrination. Colleges, universities, and schools have often been targeted first because they are tasked with both socializing the younger generations and educating them about the cultures and people outside of the American borders (Giroux, 2008). There are over 150 military-educational institutions within the United States with the goal to “train a youthful corps of tomorrow’s military officers” (Giroux, 63, 2008). Besides dedicated military-educational institutions, the Pentagon also funds research, provides classes for military personnel, and creates programs aimed at future employment in numerous agencies and departments at hundreds of universities nationwide. During the Presidency of George W. Bush, his Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced the “Minerva Consortium” which funds various universities to “carry out social-sciences research relevant to national security” (Giroux, 63, 2008). According to a 2002 report by the Association of American Universities (AAU) nearly 350 colleges and universities were conducting research funded by the Pentagon. At the time, the Department of Defense (DoD) was the third largest federal funder of research behind the National Institute of Health and the National Science Foundation (Giroux, 2008). In April of 2019, the Association of American Universities requested nearly 23 billion dollars of Defense Department funded research. The AAU cited benefits to both the nation’s economic and national security as reasons for the request, and the technological innovation found at American universities was a force multiplier for the DoD (AAU PDF, 2019). Though these claims may be true, it is important to recognize the triangle of benefits that is forming between higher education, the DoD, and private industry. For example, the DoD funds 75 percent of the robotics program at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) (Giroux, 2008).
The CIA is no stranger on college campuses, especially in the years after 9/11 when universities were most receptive to intelligence agencies. Besides using universities to develop advanced technologies for fighting the War on Terror, the CIA also uses its presence on campuses to groom the next generation of CIA analysts. The expanding job market at the CIA, however competitive, provides college graduates with the tantalizing offer of government benefits and a healthy outlet for the revitalized patriotism that had been instilled post 9/11 (Giroux, 2008). Though Giroux initially wrote his article over a decade ago, his article may have been more prescient than he anticipated. Programs relating to national security continue to be in demand, and colleges and universities nationwide continue to add related programs to their curriculum. Some popular choices can include cyber security management and intelligence analysis.
Theory
The Central Intelligence Agency is a government organization like no other. It is not only a world leader in intelligence capabilities and analysis, but it is the omphalos of the United States intelligence community. Of the seventeen agencies making up the IC, the CIA is essentially the final stop for intelligence. Besides having its own sources and methods, the CIA receives reports from almost every other intelligence agency. Since the end of WWII, the CIA has been serving as the premiere intelligence agency of the United States. An organization like the CIA does not change its business model overnight without probable cause. Yet, because of the secretive nature of the IC, no organization, especially the CIA, would ever admit to changing their strategies and certainly would never publish the reasons behind the change. Thus, scholars are left to theorize about what could have prompted such a change in an organization that had been such a staple of Cold War era espionage.
One theory for the militarization of the CIA can be traced back to the September 11th attacks and the intelligence reform that occurred afterwards. It is impossible to deny the lasting effects that 9/11 had on the culture and mindset of American citizens and the policies of the United States. For the first time since the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941, America had been struck at home in a symbolic attack against Western ideologies. In response to the attacks, the Bush administration began the War on Terror, and the intelligence community was quick to follow suit. Despite the ability of the American people and government to quickly rally their forces after 9/11 and unite against a single enemy, someone still had to be blamed domestically. Although Al-Qaeda received the majority of the blame, the intelligence community was unable to escape unscathed. The success of the 9/11 attacks were viewed as a failure of the intelligence community to communicate between agencies as well as a lack of centralized leadership and direction.
The 9/11 commission was set up in 2002 to take a complete account of the attacks, the circumstances that allowed them to happen, and what could be done to prevent future attacks. In this over 500 page report, the intelligence community was described as needing a “unity of effort” to effectively continue their mission (9/11 Commission, 2004). The Commission found that part of the IC’s failure to predict and stop the 9/11 attack was their continued use of Cold War methods. During the Cold War, the agencies of the intelligence community were relatively independent, and integration was not as crucial to track down the thousands of Soviet military targets. Intelligence Agencies, during this period, would focus on their own specialized missions, acquire their own information, and intelligence would only be shared at the last step in the process via formal reports. The Commission realized that these Cold War methods would no longer be suitable for intelligence in the 21st century, and thus the Commission made several suggestions to modernize the IC (9/11 Commission, 2004).
Congress took the suggestions from the 9/11 Commission and passed IRTPA, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act in 2004. This act restructured the intelligence community in many ways, but most significantly, it changed the position of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Since the inception of the intelligence community the DCI had dual roles, as both director of the CIA and as director of the entire intelligence community. After the passing of IRTPA, the two roles were separated into the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) who would be in charge of the IC, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (D/CIA), who would continue to oversee the CIA. Additionally, IRTPA also created the National Counterterrorist Center (NCTC) to serve as an integrating force, gathering intelligence related to terrorism from all agencies on domestic and foreign threats. The Department of Homeland Security was created soon after 9/11, and its mission statement was adjusted in the passing of IRTPA to ensure that the civil rights and liberties of people are not diminished in efforts to protect the homeland (Justice Information Sharing, 2004). With all of the changes to the intelligence community aimed at fighting the global War on Terrorism, it is no surprise that the CIA may have changed its approach to intelligence, especially after specifically being criticized by the 9/11 Commission in their report.
A second theory for the change seen in the Central Intelligence Agency could have come from a loss of identity experienced by the CIA. After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, there was no longer a singular force for the IC to focus its efforts on, making the 1990s an uncertain time for the CIA. When George Tenet took over as DCI in 1997 (1997-2004) he became the fifth DCI within seven years. Between 1991 and 1997 the CIA lost 3,000 employees, which equates to 20 percent of its entire workforce (White, 2008). This sudden turmoil was not a result of the collapse of the USSR. Congress saw that the end of the Cold War also meant a shift in foreign and national defense policy. George H.W. Bush, President from 1989-1993, had also served as DCI for a year from 1976-1977 and placed intelligence as a priority during his presidency.
After the election of Bill Clinton, the CIA faced many difficulties. The CIA did not experience sweeping changes during the Clinton presidency, however, during that time the prioritization of intelligence certainly changed from the Bush presidency. There was a marked difference between the presidents, the attention they paid to both the IC and the CIA, and the attitudes of Congress during their terms. James Woolsey, DCI 1993-1995, once joked after a man crashed his plane onto the White House lawn in 1994 that it had actually been Woolsey attempting to get a meeting with President Clinton (White, 2008). It is not surprising that the 1990s would be a difficult decade for the CIA. After nearly 40 decades of relatively unwavering support from the American people and their government, the CIA began to fall prey to the democratic process it defended.
It is important to note that there were certainly widespread criticisms of the CIA during the Cold War, including outcries as a result of: Operation Condor (where the US backed right wing dictatorships in South America), Operation Bloodstone (where the CIA recruited anti-communist exiles to work undercover for US intelligence inside Latin America, Canada, and the Soviet Union), Operation Cyclone (where the CIA armed and financed resistance fighters during the Soviet-Afghan War), and the wiretapping and spying on American citizens (Simpson, 2014). Regardless, the 1990s were a break from tradition as the CIA began to face the realization of a shrinking emphasis on national defense and secrecy of the intelligence community (Jones, 2001). This wouldn’t be changed until 9/11 and the War on Terror, when the IC would once again have a singular force to fight. However, despite facing a threat localized in one region, sharing a single ideology, this would not be the same as fighting the Soviet Union. The old Cold War tactics would be applicable in the War on Terror. Fighting a war against an ideology would prove more difficult than fighting a war against a sovereign nation.
Hypotheses
The operating hypothesis for this paper will combine both theories explained above. The nature of the CIA is not only secretive, but also driven by many forces. Therefore, it is impossible to believe that a change in the culture of the CIA was caused by a single confounding factor. Rather, it is most likely that a loss of identity after the fall of the Soviet Union, combined with the changes to the intelligence community following the 9/11 attacks prompted the change of culture in the CIA. Through the following research this study expects to find evidence of both theories, and a combination of them affecting the actions of the CIA. Although there is no way to reach a definite answer for this question, the following sections will seek to explain how both theories affected the operations of the intelligence community and inevitably created an environment for a more militarized CIA to emerge.
Research Design
Conducting scholarly research on the intelligence community is limited by several confounding factors, the first of which is the simple nature of what the intelligence community is and does. The protection of sources and methods is integral to the mission of the IC, and open scholarly research is essentially the antithesis to the main attributes of the intelligence community itself. Because of these limitations, research had to be done using open sources such as peer-reviewed journals and scholarly books. This study conducted interviews from two members of the intelligence community. These individuals have asked to remain anonymous, but it is understood that they were employed in the time span preceding, during, and after the 9/11 attacks. Additionally, due to the secretive nature of the intelligence community, this author was unable to conduct any effective tests or analyses simply because the necessary information is not publicly available. Scholarly and peer-reviewed research is the only material available on topics such as this, as well as firsthand experience when available.
Analysis
To evaluate to what degree the CIA did or did not become militarized, the first part of the joint theory must be addressed. The post-Soviet, pre-9/11 era was a complex time for the CIA. The removal of the paramount threat left room for improvements to be made. One of the first limits placed on the CIA was the elimination of the agency’s National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC). Complaints by military commanders during the Gulf War stating that they lacked up-to-date satellite images led the DoD to establish the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) in 1996, which would replace the CIA’s NPIC. The formation of NIMA sent a clear message to the CIA challenging their Cold War role as an “all-source intelligence agency” (Jones, 508, 2001). Another Cold War privilege of the CIA that was taken away was the CIA’s autonomy in counterintelligence. During the Cold War, the CIA and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) could operate independently from each other with the assumption that the two agencies would coordinate their efforts. Instead of enhancing counterintelligence abilities, this independence hampered the effectiveness of the two agencies by creating a rivalry between the two. This issue was brought to light when Aldrich Ames, a CIA officer, was imprisoned in 1994 after selling state secrets to the Soviets for nine years (Jones, 2001). Presidential Decision Directive 24 (PDD-24) ended the CIA’s counterintelligence autonomy, and granted the FBI the right and capacity to conduct foreign counterintelligence investigations, including those on CIA employees.
The most significant change in the culture of the CIA after the Soviet era was the redefinition of the agency’s mission. Sixty percent of the CIA’s assets were aimed at intelligence gathering related to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Although the agency continued to monitor Russia’s military movements, especially the location of the former USSR’s nuclear arsenal after its fall, the list of intelligence targets for the CIA had to be expanded for it to remain a viable agency. Following the fall of the USSR, to reiterate the necessity of the CIA, DCI Woolsey would famously repeat the phrase: “We have slain a large dragon. But we live in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes” (Jones, 509, 2001). In order to remain relevant for the 21st century, the CIA expanded their mission to include the following competencies: limiting the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMDS) and CBRN weapons (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear), monitoring the growing economic and military power of China and rogue states such as Iran, North Korea, Libya, Iraq, Sudan and Syria, combating drug smugglers, counterintelligence, and cyber warfare capabilities (Jones, 2001).
During this pre 9/11 era, the CIA closed all 13 regional recruitment outposts, and began to rely on college representatives and internal systems in its recruitment office. Every aspect of the agency was affected during this period of downsizing. Thousands of employees were laid off, and only a few hundred new people were hired each year. Although this trend began to reverse around 1998, the damage had already been done to the CIA (Jones, 2001). Additionally, it likely did not help internal sentiments that the reversal in hiring occurred because of failures to forecast the nuclear armament of India and Pakistan.
The next section of the analysis will interpret the interviews with two intelligence professionals. They will be referred to as anonymous source one (AS1) and anonymous source two (AS2). When asked to recollect the Cold War, AS1 recalled that it was “all strategy;” aside from some border skirmishes, everything was strategic towards Russia. The main strategic objectives centered around Soviet military buildup and quasi economic warfare (economic actions like trade restrictions or sanctions to put pressure on a country). AS1 noted that, up until 9/11, the United States had a “strategic footing,” policy built on monitoring and long-term strategic plans as opposed to immediate action, because this worked best in Cold War conditions. However, AS1 recalled that after 9/11–when Cold War strategies were no longer effective– the strategic footing immediately transitioned to a tactical one involving a more immediate physical action than surveillance. Russia was no longer the biggest threat and had “been pushed to the back of the bus” (AS1). Linguists who were fluent in Russian were now volunteering to learn languages like Urdu, Amharic, Arabic, Pashto, and Afghan. These are languages which had not been considered of necessarily high importance before 9/11. Seemingly overnight, the strategic focus on Russia over the past 50 years had been “pushed to the back burner” (AS1). The shift in priorities was so drastic that entire departments within the IC became “cannibalized” by support for the 9/11 movement (AS1). AS2, however, experienced a more gradual transition of priorities. This could be because of several factors, however, both sources attest to the fact that because of the 9/11 attacks, there was a shift away from strategic footing, and a new emphasis on tactical intelligence and abilities for the intelligence community (AS2).
Although the Eagle Program had effectively died with Clarridge, it would not be long before the CIA began to experiment with drones again. In 1995, the CIA acquired an RQ-1 Predator Drone in order to provide intelligence on Serbian installations. After the African Embassy bombings of 1998 the threat of Sunni Islamic terror became a newly realized issue for the Clinton Administration. In Operation Afghan Eyes, President Clinton’s counterterrorism coordinator, Richard Clarke, pushed the CTC to use their Predator drones to search for Osama bin Laden (Fuller, 2014). Although the Pentagon was still hesitant to commit military assets in the counterterrorism fight, the Clinton Administration gave the CIA authorization to use deadly force against bin Laden. Ironically, the CTC that had previously been trying to develop their own weaponized drone was now hesitant to use deadly force with the president’s permission. Despite protests from DCI Tenet, the first armed Predator drone began development in 1999. Legal and financial debates began over the drone, and it was not until September 17, 2001 that George W. Bush decided the CIA was authorized to deploy the armed Predator drone. Again stalled by legal debates, the CTC’s first lethal drone strike occurred on November 3, 2002 in Yemen, killing six Al Qaeda militants traveling in a jeep. After over a decade, the Eagle Program had succeeded and the CTC was in possession of an armed drone (Fuller, 2014).
Although the CIA’s first drone strike only took place after tense legal battles, the future for the CIA’s drone program would not be nearly as arduous as completing the first strike. After the first strike in Yemen, drone strikes began to be used in Pakistan to target both Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters hiding along the Afghani-Pakistani border. These targets were originally designated as “high-value” targets, in areas that US troops were prohibited from operating or Pakistani troops refused to go. In 2008, targeting rules were expanded to allow strikes on lower-level targets and “signature strikes” (Kibbe, 2014). Signature strikes are conducted against targets whose intelligence signatures– information gathered from various intelligence sources such as human intelligence, signals intelligence, or aerial intelligence– exhibit terrorist behavior. Before the 2008 changes, the Pakistani government would have to give consent for a drone strike; however, after the program progressed, it was believed the targets were being warned by individuals in the Pakistani government (Kibbe, 2014). As a result, President Bush modified the agreement and decided Pakistani officials would receive “concurrent notification” meaning they would be notified during or after a strike was taking place. Drone strikes were common in Pakistan between 2008 and 2012. For example, in 2008 the Bush administration authorized 36 drone strikes, which was the highest recorded during the Bush administration, in 2009, there were 54 strikes, 2010 had 122 strikes, in 2011 there were 73, and in 2012 there were 48 drone strikes occurring in Pakistan (Kibbe, 2014). Additionally, in 2011, President Obama gave authorization for the CIA to conduct signature strikes in Yemen as a result of increased terrorist insurgency in the country.
Conclusion
As stated previously, an open source analysis of the intelligence community is going to be a flawed analysis. When dealing with an organization that does not publish its budget, activities, number of personnel, worldwide locations, ongoing and past operations, and full capabilities, it is unlikely that individuals will be able to find complete records or accounts of anything significant. Simply put, the CIA and IC are too young to conduct seriously conclusive open source research on. The most bizarre CIA programs from the 1950s are just now becoming declassified, despite the original attempts to destroy the records. Despite the best work of open source and scholarly research, it is impossible to discern a true right or wrong answer concerning the intelligence community. Had CIA documents been made available to this study, it is possible, if not likely, that at least one theory and the hypothesis would change. When understanding implications for modern day policy, it is important to note that many of the decisions of the past two decades are still used today. The Patriot Act of 2001 (where law enforcement wiretapped American citizens after 9/11), IRTPA, the 2008 change of the drone strike rules, NSDD138, and others all continue to impact the legal and institutional consequences of the CIA’s actions.
In conclusion, scholars may never find a satisfying answer for the question: to what degree did the CIA become militarized. As seen in the analysis, it is apparent that the CIA has engaged in many overt drone strikes against foreign targets. There was sufficient opportunity and motive for the agency to militarize, as well as evidence that it has. An uncertain nature following the collapse of the Soviet Union, coupled with downsizing, reorganizing, and attempts to prove the agency’s worth, were followed by a period of immense growth and investment in the intelligence community and the expansion of CIA activities. All of these factors lead one to believe in the possibility of militarization; however, to what extent the CIA modified its sources and methods, and how modified they are today, remains classified, meaning that it would be inappropriate to attempt to give a definitive answer.
The second question posed in the introduction for this paper asked what threats does this potential militarization pose to the national security of the United States? It is possible that there are already visible consequences to this militarization. While the United States invested itself heavily into the global War on Terror, traditional adversaries like Russia began to emerge as threats to the US hegemony. George Tenet declared when he became DCI in 1997 that the FBI had more agents in New York City than the CIA had clandestine officers around the world (White, 2008). Although much has changed since Tenet’s term as DCI, his statement resonates as a warning for what can happen when the priorities for the Central Intelligence Agency are forgotten. However, this paper is not meant to be alarmist in nature. The Central Intelligence Agency still remains the world’s premier intelligence organization. As the CIA’s website states: “We are the Nation’s eyes and ears, and sometimes, it’s hidden hand” (CIA, 2020).
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Anonymous Source One. Interview date: 10/16/2020.
Anonymous Source Two. Interview date: 10/19/2020.
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