By: Paige A. Henry
Abstract
Iran’s support of the Houthi rebels in Yemen has escalated its conflict with Saudi Arabia across numerous fronts. Through supporting this militia, Iran has aimed to challenge Saudi Arabia’s hegemony in the Middle East, while bolstering its influence. This interest stems from a longstanding rivalry rooted in different historical events, such as the Iranian Revolution (1978-9), the Iran-Iraq War (1980-8), and the Arab Spring (2010-2). The regional strategic location of Yemen serves as an opportunity for Iran to exert power, thus exposing a vulnerability for Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia. While the relationship between Iran and the Houthi rebels doesn’t strictly reflect that of a typical proxy dynamic, it is undoubtedly a mutually beneficial and multidimensional partnership that has led to significant consequences in the region. Both parties have experienced benefits from the alliance, with a common one being deterring their common rival, Saudi Arabia. While it is unlikely that Iran will emerge as a significant factor within Yemeni affairs, as it does not carry heavy influence within the political strategy and military operations of the Houthis, the regime nonetheless saw the rise of the militia as an opportunity to gain leverage in the region with minimal cost. It is also unlikely that Iran will seek to invest much larger amounts of resources, as Yemen is not considerably high on its list of priorities. Nevertheless, the alliance poses a tangible risk to regional security, demonstrating the transformation of Iranian Houthi backing into a mutually beneficial partnership with broader implications.
Literature Review
According to Cohen and Hitman (2021), the Middle East has been identified to be experiencing a new era involving a cold war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The two countries have their origins in very different civilizations, as Iran is religiously Shiite Islamic and ethnically Persian, and Saudi Arabia is Sunni Islamic and Arab. The conflict between these two rivals is said to have originated mainly from one focal base of Islam, and the consequences of this rivalry have been shaping the Middle East since 2011 (Cohen & Hitman, 2021). This research reviewed the main issue involved in this rivalry over the last four decades, and has identified that the conflict exists both because of the countries’ desire to protect their regional interests, and because of their different cultural, societal, and theological perspectives (Cohen & Hitman, 2021). It was also found that the regional circumstances have a primary role in influencing and shaping each other’s foreign and regional policies, whether these originate in the Iran-Iraq War, the First (1990-1) and Second Gulf Wars (2003-11), or the Arab Spring (Cohen & Hitman, 2021). Ultimately, this research discovered the ethnic-religious issue that divides the two regional powers is an important factor within the conflict, as both Iran and Saudi Arabia see themselves as the sole leader of the Muslim world, and both are committed to the historical hatred between Arabs and Persians, and Sunnis and Shiites.
This research was reaffirmed by Meir Litvak, who found that the strategic rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia has escalated since the outbreak of the Arab upheaval in 2011 into a war by proxy (2017). The author established three major issues that the two countries revolved around, the first being competition over regional order (Litvak, 2017). While Iran sees itself as the natural regional power due to its size, population, and historical legacy, Saudi Arabia views itself as the natural leader of the Arab side of the Gulf (Litvak, 2017). Next is a series of disputes over land and maritime borders. Litvak found that this is evident through Iran’s claims to Bahraini and Kuwaiti oil fields and its occupation of three islands in the Persian Gulf (Litvak, 2017). Finally, Litvak determined that the third issue underlying the conflict is economic competition over oil prices and frequent fights over control of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (Litvak, 2017). Due to its larger population and lower oil reserves, Iran sought higher oil prices regardless of its impact on long-term developments of the global energy market. The tension surrounding these three major issues exists in addition to religious-ideological animosity between the two countries, which the author found emphasizes the differing dynamics of Saudi and Iranian agendas even further (Litvak, 2017).
It has also been found that employing a policy of proxy war has been the most convenient way for Iran to achieve its objectives and that the option of starting a conventional war is something that Tehran, the capital of Iran, does not consider to be advantageous to its objectives (Cohen & Shamci, 2022). In the forty years since the Iranian Revolution and the replacement of the imperial monarchy with the current-day theocracy, Iran has built a network of partners, proxies, and militias in the most important neighboring territories it seeks to influence, such as Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria (Cohen & Shamci, 2022). Considering the relative weakness of both Iran’s military compared to that of its rivals and the limited number of allies it has in the region, this proxy method represents a strategic decision on Tehran’s part (Cohen & Shamci, 2022). Through their research, the authors found that while the continuous proxy war in the Middle East is not a guarantee for any regional player of its long-term dominance, it does assure that there will be continued instability in the region (Cohen & Shamci, 2022).
According to İzol and Cingöz (2022), the Arab Spring, a wave of political protests and rebellions, has caused the anarchic structure of the Middle Eastern states to become even more evident, as an axis of tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia began to cover countries such as Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Bahrain. It has been found that the critical point of this tension axis has been Yemen (İzol & Cingöz, 2022). The crisis in Yemen has now become a special area for the regional power struggle, as Saudi Arabia sees the Houthi advance in Yemen as an existential threat to their security and fears the establishment of a Shiite state next to it (İzol & Cingöz, 2022). The progress of the Houthis in Yemen was supported by Iran, causing Saudi Arabia and its allies to begin a struggle against the Houthis, which they saw as a part of Shiite expansionism. İzol and Cingöz have found that the Houthis have further developed their relations with Iran for pragmatic and ideological reasons (İzol & Cingöz, 2022). In other words, the Houthis, which have emerged as a result of Yemen’s local and social problems, have gradually become another important denominator in the Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry.
Yemen’s role in the conflict was also emphasized by Rǎzvan Munteanu, who found that Yemen is the main battleground for regional interests and that a possible failure of the Arab States to manage the Yemeni crisis will most likely represent the biggest security risk faced by Gulf monarchies in the medium and short term (2015). The author found that the political chaos and power vacuum that emerged essentially turned Yemen into an insecure climate which is likely to expand and threaten the stability of the Gulf monarchies (Munteanu, 2015). The main accusations pointed to Iran, which presumably aimed to destabilize the Gulf Cooperation Council members in order to become a regional hegemon (Munteanu, 2015). Munteanu found evidence demonstrating Iran supports Shiite rebels in Yemen and other forces interested in a secession, such as the fact that Hezobollah and Iranian Revolutionary Guards have trained Houthi rebels from Yemen (2015). The author highlights Yemen’s important role in regional geopolitics, as its location holds strategic significance. It sits right at the entrance of the Gulf of Aden and Bab el Mandeb Strait, which is crossed daily by over 3 million barrels of oil leaving the Persian Gulf to the West (Munteanu, 2015). In other words, Yemen has essentially become a very important factor regarding the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia and has turned into a battleground of geopolitical rivalries and interests.
Analysis
History
The conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia originates in several different historical events. Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the relations between the two countries deteriorated significantly, and the ideological and geopolitical struggle also deepened (İzol & Cingöz, 2022). Through this revolution, Iran’s identity experienced an extreme transformation. Essentially, a “Western-oriented, secular, and status quo defending monarchy was replaced by a revisionist regime that adopted an anti-Western, anti-imperialist rhetoric and acted on the slogan of ‘neither east nor west is just the Islamic Republic’” (İzol & Cingöz, 2022). It replaced the secular monarchy of the Shah with an Islamic Republic led by Ayatollah Khomeini. Additionally, it ended the “twin pillars policy,” which was a key element of the United States’ strategic approach toward the Middle East during the 1960s and 1970s (Adısönmez et. al., 2022). Before the revolution, Iran and Saudi Arabia were viewed as the “twin pillars” of stability, chosen for their strategic importance. This significantly shifted the balance of power in the Middle East, and created conditions for a new socio-political landscape (Adısönmez et. al., 2022).
The Iranian regime slowly began to recognize itself as a universal emancipatory movement, shaping both its domestic and foreign policy (Adısönmez et. al., 2022). At the center of this policy was an antagonism toward the West and its allies. The U.S., Israel, and Saudi Arabia were all considered a threat to the Islamic Republic of Iran as a result (Adısönmez et. al., 2022). It was important to Iran that the unity of Muslims against these enemies was thoroughly ensured. Thus, the Iran and Saudi Arabia rivalry shaped into a hegemonic struggle as Iran began to openly demonstrate these revolutionary concepts and situate itself into power within the region. Given the importance of Islam in the ideology of both nations, the rivalry has continually revolved around the meaning of Islam as well as the leadership of the Muslim World. For instance, the Iranian regime problematized the legitimacy of the Al Saud, the royal family of Saudi Arabia, and argued that they could not be accepted as the guardian of the two holy places of Islam (Adısönmez et. al., 2022). Therefore, soon after the revolution, a Shiite rebellion began in the eastern side of Saudi Arabia, demonstrating the gravity of the threat posed by Iran and the strength of its ideology. These developments intensified Saudi Arabia’s desire to re-align itself with the broader Arab world, as it took the lead to form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) with the participation of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman in 1981. Secondly, the threat posed by Iran also led Saudi Arabia to purchase more arms from the U.S., as well as to actively side with Iraq throughout the Iran-Iraq War (Adısönmez et. al., 2022).
Saudi Arabia was successfully able to balance its perceived threat from Iran during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s through its support of Iraq. Throughout this war, Saudi Arabia and Iraq found each other as allies in order to offset the threat from revolutionary Iran (Rakipoğlu, 2017). While the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia wasn’t directly allied with Iraq, it perceived the country as an opportunity to protest Iran’s claims against the legitimacy of Saudi Arabia and the religious authority of the Riyadh administration (Rakipoğlu, 2017). Saudi Arabia also encouraged other Gulf countries to back Iraq against Iran. Thus, all Gulf countries led by Saudi Arabia supported the Iraqi Baath regime militarily, financially, logistically, and diplomatically in order to reduce the influence of the Iranian Revolution and restrain the potential power of Khomeini’s regime (Rakipoğlu, 2017). These countries realized that if Iraq was defeated, then the biggest obstacle in front of Iran would no longer exist, therefore allowing opportunities for Iran to easily attack any of the Gulf countries. In addition, the U.S. also supported Iraq by providing it with airplanes to ensure surveillance at sea front and allowing it to monitor early signs of attack (Rakipoğlu, 2017). However, despite strong efforts, neither Iran nor Iraq essentially won the war. On the other hand, it can be seen that Saudi Arabia was successfully able to manage the crisis through the balance of threat, and through countering Iran and its theocratic ideology. Nevertheless, its position during the war undoubtedly perpetuated its rivalry with Iran, even though it was primarily through indirect methods.
Following the death of Khomeini in 1989, the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran seemed to have settled to an extent (Adısönmez et. al., 2022). However, the rivalry began to intensify again most significantly following the Arab Spring, which created entirely new conditions for the Middle East and Gulf region. The rivalry triggered a series of protests and demonstrations across the region, which gradually transformed into a transnational political movement leading to counter-hegemonic movements against several different authoritarian regimes (Adısönmez et. al., 2022). It turned domestic arenas of nation-states such as Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain into battlegrounds where Iran and Saudi Arabia found themselves in a power struggle with each other (Cohen & Hitman, 2021). Both countries sought to increase their influence within political transitions and to support allies and proxies aligned with their interests. For instance, the Arab Spring in Yemen presented a perfect opportunity for Iran to open a new front against Saudi Arabia. Overall, the Arab Spring intensified the rivalry, as it provided both countries with opportunities to advance their influence, thus leading to continued instability and conflict throughout the region.
Therefore, it is clear that the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia has its roots in a few different significant historical events. The Iranian Revolution, also sometimes referred to as the Islamic Revolution, in 1979 drastically changed the country into an Islamic Republic, opposing Saudi Arabia’s conservative Sunni monarchy. It developed a severely anti-Western ideology, as well as a desire to insert itself into a position of power within the Middle East. This rivalry was confirmed through Saudi Arabia’s support of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, which allowed the nation to successfully balance its perceived threat from Iran simultaneously. Finally, the conflict was further intensified through the Arab Spring, which led to extreme instability in several countries, thus creating opportunities for large regional powers to assert influence. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia sought to take advantage of this chaos in order to advance their interests and undermine each other’s power. It is a conflict that is deeply rooted in historical events, and fueled by a sectarian divide between Sunni and Shiite Islam.
Sectarian Conflict
While this conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia is multifaceted and involves several different factors, there is no doubt that one of the major contributions is sectarian differences. With the Iranian Revolution, Shia cleric Ayatollah Khomeini was given the opportunity to implement his vision for an Islamic government ruled by the “guardianship of the jurist,” meaning political and religious power is put in the hands of the clergy. This is a controversial concept among Shiite scholars that is opposed by Sunnis, who have historically separated political leadership and religion (Sergie, 2023). Under Khomeini, Iran began an experiment under Islamic rule, attempting to inspire Islamic revival through the support of groups that had specific Shiite agendas. The regime essentially began to position itself as the center of gravity for all the Shiites in the region. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia’s majority population adheres to a branch of Sunni Islam, Wahhabism, which is antagonistic to Shiite Islam (Sergie, 2023). The transformation of Iran into an overtly Shiite power after the Iranian Revolution induced Saudi Arabia to develop its own agenda of expanding Wahhabism, thus reviving a centuries-old sectarian rivalry over the true interpretation of Islam (Sergie, 2023).
This ethnic-religious conflict that exists between these two regional powers is very significant, as each side sees itself as the ultimate leader of the Islamic world, and both are committed to the historical hatred between Sunnis and Shiites, as well as Arabs and Persians (Cohen & Hitman, 2021). Saudi Arabia’s concept of Islamic government and the perceived purity of Islam promoted by the Saudis became one of its main assets, as it is the home of the two holiest places of Islam – Mecca and Medina (Kováčiková, 2019). This official status boosted Saudi Arabia’s position among other Arab and Muslim nations, as it became the heart of Islam (Kováčiková, 2019). It grew to be the center of the most authentic Islamic practice and served as an example to be followed and respected by other Muslim nations. These religious elements are reflected throughout Saudi Arabia’s domestic and foreign policy, as the tribal and religious identity of the Kingdom is reflected in the official titles of the Saudi King (Kováčiková, 2019). It is also reflected in state administration, the judicial system, education, and the role of women in society (Kováčiková, 2019). Another significant dimension of Saudi Arabia’s religious identity is its economy. It was immense wealth that allowed Saudi Arabia to “coopt Saudi society, redistribute oil wealth, provide social services, strengthen legitimacy and propagate Wahhabism all over the world as a form of religious foreign policy” (Kováčiková, 2019). Ultimately, Saudi Arabia behaves as a long-standing regional power in the Middle East, leader of the Sunni Muslims and guarantor of regional stability.
However, compared to Saudi Arabia, Iran is essentially the exact opposite when it comes to religious identity. Although Iranian national identity also revolves around religion as a legitimizing aspect of its state leadership, it manifests this religion in different aspects (Kováčiková, 2019). For instance, some of its pivotal elements include Iranian nationalism, revolutionary rhetoric, as well as Shiite Muslims’ grievance towards Sunnis and the West (Kováčiková, 2019). Persian nationalism and Islamist ideology are reflected both through Iranian foreign policy, as well as toward fellow Shiite allies and proxies. Additionally, the Iranian economy and political administration are strongly influenced by heavy sanctions and the position of Iran as an outcast on the global scene as well as among Sunni Muslim countries (Kováčiková, 2019). Being the only Shiite Muslim state in the Middle East created a sense of isolation for the regime, which became especially important following the Revolution. The notion of threat was often abused by Ayatollah Khomeini to push forward revolutionary politics, appeals to Shiite unity, and the idea that Iran stands alone amongst several enemies (Kováčiková, 2019). This ideological image is a consequence of revolutionary developments and has been exploited in order to unite other Shiite nations and proxies in the Middle East, as well as spread anti-Western beliefs. These fellow nations have in turn become significant tools of Iranian foreign policy and a method of carrying out their security interests.
It is evident that religion is one of the most important aspects of identity in both Iran and Saudi Arabia, and the differences between the two identities have been used to encourage rivalry, hatred, and conflict between the two countries and their respective allies. While religion is not the only factor within this conflict, it is undoubtedly one of the largest sources of divergence, and fuels the competition for the need to be the ultimate leader of the Islamic world. It has fostered a conflict characterized by power, influence, and leadership within the Middle East, leading both countries to attempt to advance their interests through their support of proxies.
Iranian Proxies
The Iranian regime’s efforts to carry out its agenda through proxies is one of its most defining characteristics. Relying on allied militias has been a crucial part of the strategy of Iran’s foreign policies regarding the expansion of its influence throughout the Middle East (Cohen & Shamci, 2022). One of the reasons Iran chooses to function through the use of proxies is its economy. Iran is exhausted by sanctions from several different countries, which is why it benefits from the employment of its proxies. Through this, its broken economy can persist, not only because proxy wars are more affordable than conventional ones, but also because in a time of crisis, any political accountability that it may have to face also remains deniable (Cohen & Shamci, 2022). This strategy has allowed the Iranian regime to achieve objectives deemed in its best interest.
Further, Iran often seeks to develop partnerships with dissatisfied groups within unstable or fragmented areas (Juneau, 2016). This involves groups who either reject or oppose, through violent or non-violent means, the dominant political order in their country (Juneau, 2016). However, contrary to a widespread misperception, Iran does not choose its partners on the basis of a common adherence to Shiite Islam. Rather, its primary motive lies within the opposition to the status quo, defined by the regional order dominated by the United States and its local partners, especially Saudi Arabia and Israel (Juneau, 2016). Iran pursues a variety of objectives when choosing to support these non-state actors, such as gaining access to geographic areas that it can use as a launching pad to project its influence, confront its rivals, and oppose U.S. presence (Juneau, 2016). Iran also looks to generate pressure points that can subsequently be used to perpetuate conflict with its rivals, whether it plans on using it or simply aims to demonstrate it as a potential threat (Juneau, 2016). It looks to forge ties with groups that could act against the United States or its regional interests, or against its allies, in this case Saudi Arabia.
It is evident that Iran has resisted initiating a conventional military offensive in order to turn this regional cold war in its favor (Cohen & Shamci, 2022). Considering the relative weakness of both the regime’s military compared to its enemies as well as its limited number of allies, Iran’s choice to fight its battles indirectly is a pragmatic decision. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, for instance, have made extensive military acquisitions. Their allies, Israel and Turkey have powerful militaries and are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Tehran lacks the sufficient capability to engage in conventional warfare against this combined might, explaining its unwillingness to do so. Instead, the regime has established a complex network of proxies, which encompasses both Shiite and Sunni organizations and militias. Some of these proxies include the Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi militias such as the al-Badr Brigade, the al-Mahdi Force and the Popular Mobilization Forces, the Yemen Houthis’ Ansar Allah movement, and dozens of pro-Syria/Iran militias in Syria (Cohen & Shamci, 2022). Ultimately, employing a policy of proxy war has provided Iran with the most convenient method of asserting its influence and achieving its interests. The option of beginning conventional warfare is not something that the regime sees as its best interest. Additionally, it can also be seen as an expression of the nature of its post-revolutionary system, as Ayatollah Khomeini placed a heavy significance on uniting the whole Ummah, or community of the faithful in a borderless Islamic territory (Cohen & Shamci, 2022). Thus, forty years following the Iranian Revolution, Iran has strategically established a complex network of proxies and militias in significant neighboring areas to assert its influence in.
The organization that serves as the primary vehicle for waging Iran’s proxy wars is the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC is a multifaceted organization that operates in several different territories and has duties that include providing security services to supervising cultural activities (Cohen & Shamci, 2022). The IRGC’s great financial power, which comes from repayment for its extreme loyalty to the supreme leader, not only allows the organization to operate freely in the region and act independently from Iran’s regular army but has also become the source of its power. In fact, many consider its ballistic missile program to be the cornerstone of Iran’s defense (Cohen & Shamci, 2022). The organization’s main initiator of the proxy activities carried out by Iran in the region is known to be the Quds Force, a select entity of the IRGC (Cohen & Shamci, 2022). The IRGC itself supervises foreign covert missions and military operations within the surrounding territories, as well as the progress, training, funding, equipping, and otherwise aiding of allied armed groups outside of Iran.
Houthi Rebels of Yemen
These strategic preferences have led Iran to form the Iranian “Axis of Resistance”, which refers to an unofficial military coalition between Shiite Muslim groups close to Iran that are unified by their interest to oppose the regional influence of Western countries. One of the main actors involved in this coalition is the Yemen Houthis, or Ansar Allah, a large Zaydi Shiite minority that makes up about 35% of the Yemeni population and originates in the northern city of Sa’da (Kováčiková, 2019). The Zaydi population has been continually stripped of their political power and has struggled to restore their influence in Yemen for many years. Since Yemen’s ruling class consisted primarily of Sunni tribes, Zaydis were often subjected to institutionalized discrimination (Kováčiková, 2019). Thus, in the 1990s, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi unified the Zaydi movement, vocalized Houthi demands, and stood against the current ruler of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh (Kováčiková, 2019). At this point the Houthis desired a greater say in national affairs, greater recognition of Zaydi cultural and religious rights, and an end to proselytizing by Saudi-backed institutes in the Saada province (Juneau, 2016). After Saleh became a US ally in the war on terrorism due to Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the conflict escalated because the decision was hugely unpopular with the Zaydis and a large portion of the Yemeni public (Kováčiková, 2019). This led to a series of armed fights that took place from 2004 to 2009, the most significant being the Battle of Sa’da, but the conflict didn’t bring about any significant outcomes for the Houthis. Badreddin was killed in 2004 by Saleh’s army, leading them to essentially remain silent up until the Arab Spring in 2011 (Kováčiková, 2019).
Following the Arab Spring, the Houthis were once again marginalized, this time by the new president of Yemen, Abdrabbuh Hadi. As a result of this, they initiated a “marriage of convenience” with Saleh, who still had significant influence in the Yemen military (Kováčiková, 2019). As dissatisfaction with Hadi’s government increased, the Houthi alliance grew stronger, eventually coming to a head in September 2014. Because the Yemeni military was still loyal to Saleh, they fundamentally allowed the Houthis to capture Sana’a with little resistance (Kováčiková, 2019). This began to worry the Saudis, given that the possibility of having a supposed Iran proxy at their southern border was viewed as an existential threat, and they saw the movement as an extension of Iran’s geopolitical desires to destabilize the Arabian Peninsula and expand the “Shiite crescent” (Saif, 2023). While it was not clear whether the Iranians ordered or approved the Houthi raids, the Saudis blamed Iran for the situation. (Cohen & Hitman, 2021).
This led the regime to head Operation Decisive Storm, which was supported by a coalition of Sunni Muslim countries, including the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries excluding Oman, Morocco, Sudan, Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan (Stenslie, 2015). It was also supported by the U.S., which provided logistics and intelligence and established a joint planning cell with the Saudis. (Stenslie, 2015). This operation against the Yemeni Houthis reflects a desire by Saudi Arabia to build a broad coalition in order to help establish a Saudi hegemony in the Sunni Muslim world. It also reflects the nature of the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia, as the Saudi regime took the possibility of Iranian presence near its border as a serious threat, and it did not want to take any chances. The conflict underwent a dynamic of politicization of religious identities, as the Saudis then began to identify the Zaydis with Iran and Shiite Islam (Kováčiková, 2019). This led the regime to perpetuate its view that the conflict was a sectarian Sunni-Shiite proxy war, and thus managed to isolate the Houthis politically and diplomatically. Therefore, there was no other option but for the militia to ask for help from Iran and Hezbollah (Kováčiková, 2019).
Historically, there has been minimal contact between Iran and Zaydis in northern Yemen (Juneau, 2016). For the majority of the time, Iran stayed out of the 1962-1967 Yemeni civil war, providing only limited support. Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, small numbers of Zaydis began traveling to Iran to study Shiite Islam. Among them was the current leader of the Houthis, Abdul Malik al-Houthi, along with his brother, the late founder of the movement (Juneau, 2016). However, aside from these periodic contacts, Yemen was not a forerunner on the Islamic Republic’s list of foreign policy priorities.
Then, in 2011, the Arab Spring in Yemen created a perfect opportunity for Iran to perpetuate its conflict with Saudi Arabia. The sectarian conflict enabled Iran to insert itself strategically and decisively into the mix (Cohen & Hitman, 2021). With support from Iran, the Houthi movement evolved into a well-organized, committed militia. Despite denials from Iran regarding any financial and military support to the Houthis, sympathetic voices among Iranian officials are present. For instance, in September 2014, Ali Akbar Velayati, advisor to the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini, said that Tehran, “supports the Houthis in their rightful struggles” (Cohen & Hitman, 2021). Additionally, Iranian Politician Alireza Zakani claimed that the Houthi takeover of Sanaa was a “victory for Iran”, and that “Iran now controls Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, and Sanaa” (Cohen & Hitman, 2021). Yemen seems to be viewed as a small backyard battlefield that serves the main purpose of keeping Riyadh distracted militarily, politically, and economically (Kováčiková, 2019). The relationship between Iran and the Houthi rebels is undoubtedly a complex one and is based upon a few different factors.
Proxy or Partnership?
A proxy can be referred to as a domestic party forced by a foreign sponsor to intervene in an internal conflict on its behalf (Duner, 1981). In this sense, it is difficult to view the Houthi rebels as an Iranian proxy. The Houthis for a long time have fought according to their own agenda without Iranian encouragement, as they have fought the Yemeni government since the early 1990s without external involvement (Saif, 2023). However, there is an alternative view of proxies that associates them with an informal collaborative partnership where one party materially sponsors another to achieve its own strategic goals (Moghadam & Wyss, 2020). When looking at proxies through this lens, it is possible to have the Houthis fit the definition, and view them as an extension of Iranian interests. This partnership is demonstrated through several different aspects, including material support, an ideological affinity, and similar strategic interests. However, it is also important to consider the aspects that may reject the notion that the Houthis are seen as an Iranian proxy.
Iranian support for the Houthis originated with providing inspiration for their social mobilization methods in the 1990s. This expansionary strategy was based on an Iranian model, which the Houthi leadership was exposed to during the 1990s (Saif, 2023). It mirrored Iran’s early strategy of uniting the Shiite population in southern Lebanon, which enabled the Houthis to turn their movement into a broader socio-political movement. Iran’s influence then began to increase through continued military and weapons aid. According to an April 2015 report to the UN Security Council’s Iran Sanctions Committee, Iran started shipping small amounts of weapons to the Houthis in 2009 (Landry, 2015). It identified a pattern of arms shipments by sea and detailed seven possible incidents of such deliveries. In one instance, in April 2009, an Iranian vessel transferred crates of weapons to Yemeni boats in international waters. Additionally, in February 2011, an Iranian fishing vessel was seized by Yemeni authorities and found to be carrying 900 Iranian-made anti-tank and anti-helicopter rockets (Landry, 2015). Iran then came to play a larger role in supporting the Houthi war effort after Saudi Arabia intervened in 2014, by providing military advice and weaponry. There were numerous media reports since mid-2014 that have claimed that units from Iran’s IRGC were training and equipping Houthi troops, and Houthi fighters reportedly traveled to Iran and Lebanon for training, with Hezbollah playing a key facilitation role (Juneau, 2016). It was around this same time that Iran also began to be more open about its role in Yemen, as in 2015, Iran’s deputy Foreign Minister publicly pledged political support for the Houthis and for Yemeni unity (Juneau, 2016). Thus, it is evident that there has been clear indication that Iran has provided military support for the Houthi rebels during crucial times.
Despite this support and aid, there is little to no evidence that indicates that the Houthis have become dependent on Iranian assistance, or have succumbed to Iranian authority. Over the years, the Houthis have maintained autonomy with respect to their domestic constituencies, political strategy, and battlefield operations (Saif, 2023). They have their own political agenda, which rests primarily on the desire to regain political authority in Yemen. They did not require Iranian assistance when they rose to power in Yemen, and have maintained a strong constituency that allowed them to grow a domestic power base. Iran is aware of its inability to influence Houthi decision-making, as Iranian officials believe that due to their decades of experience, strategic understanding of the country, organizational structure, and military knowledge, the Houthis do not fundamentally need Iran (Esfandiary & Tabatabai, 2016). Further, the Houthis are developing their own foreign policy, forming direct ties with other Iranian partners in the region and continuing to pose a risk to rivals like Saudi Arabia (Juneau, 2021).
Instability in Yemen is a significant threat to Saudi Arabia’s security, and the regime sees involvement in the conflict as a necessary response for maintaining Saudi hegemony. The Saudi interest in Yemen ultimately stems from the desire to secure its southern border, combat terrorist threats, and safeguard regional security, as well as disarm the Houthi militias from their weapons, with an emphasis on ballistic missiles (Cohen & Hitman, 2021). If these desires are met, then the Iranian influence in Yemen will diminish, which is Riyadh’s ultimate goal. The concern stems from two primary factors:religion and politics. It views the conflict in Yemen to be a “religious war that is reestablishing the balance between sects” (Esfandiary & Tabatabai, 2016). In the political aspect, the Saudi mindset is shaped by a desire to curb Iran’s influence in the Arab world, and curb its expansion entirely (Esfandiary & Tabatabai, 2016). It wants to prove to the Middle East region as a whole, to the U.S., and to Iran that it is the regional hegemony in the Arabian Peninsula. Thus, it is clear that the Houthis represent a major priority for Saudi Arabia, making it willing to invest significant resources to mitigate the threat.
However, despite Saudi Arabia’s significant concern, Iran’s interests in Yemen are ultimately limited. Whatever number of resources and materials Iran has provided to the militia, it demonstrates a fraction of what Saudi Arabia has invested (Esfandiary & Tabatabai, 2016). The country is not a priority for the Islamic Republic in the same way that Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon are (Juneau, 2016). These countries, the nuclear issue, and relations with the U.S. are much more important for Iran, as in these regions it is willing to invest significant resources and tolerate a higher level of risk (Juneau, 2016). There are very high levels of instability in Yemen that would require a major commitment of resources in order for Iran to truly shape events with any significance. In other words, the cost of Iranian engagement would seem to outweigh any potential benefits. There is no indication that Iran’s assistance has had more than a marginal impact on the internal balance of forces in Yemen, and it has been far from a game-changer (Juneau, 2026). Despite this, seeing the Houthis expand their power and seize the capital of Sanaa in 2014 piqued Iran’s interest, as it knew that Saudi Arabia was anxious at the prospect of a mounting insecurity on its vulnerable southern border (Juneau, 2021). Even though the events in Yemen were not of its making, Iran realized an opportunity to consolidate new trends that have led to a decrease in the influence of its rival, Saudi Arabia. The regime understands that the situation in Yemen represents a dire threat and a major priority to its rival, so, to an extent, it band-wagoned on Houthi success.
In this sense, the relationship between Iran and the Houthi rebels is most sensibly seen as a mutually beneficial and multidimensional partnership, rather than a proxy. Like much of its foreign policy, Iran took advantage of an opportunity that presented itself in Yemen, which was to “assist and attempt to influence the actions of what it describes as an oppressed group with a similar ideology in order to project power and further assert itself as a force to be reckoned with in the Middle East, with the collateral benefit of poking Riyadh in the eye” (Esfandiary & Tabatabai, 2016). The Houthis’ unexpected power and capabilities essentially allowed the Iranians to indirectly put Saudi Arabia under pressure, especially along its border, with a limited material investment. Iran sees its axis of resistance as a fundamental strategy to maintain its position of power in the Middle East and surrounding regions. The Yemeni militia has remained a valuable opportunity for the regime, capable of pressuring the Saudis when needed.
On the other hand, the Houthis have also largely benefited from Iran’s support so far as this is a marriage of mutual convenience (Ardemagni, 2023). The Iranian support certainly played a significant role in helping the Houthis grow their power. The regime provided the group with a significant number of small arms, as well as more advanced and lethal weapons (Juneau, 2021). It also used complex smuggling and procurement networks to provide more technologically advanced parts that the Houthis could then assemble with assistance from Hezbollah and IRGC advisers (Juneau, 2021). This has enabled the militia to field short and long-range drones and an increasingly diversified fleet of missiles capable of striking deep inside their rival, Saudi Arabia (Juneau, 2021). Additionally, Iran has given fair diplomatic support to the Houthis, through formally recognizing the Houthis’ government and welcoming a Houthi ambassador to Tehran in 2019 (Furlan, 2023). Therefore, while the Houthis have been benefiting from Iran’s support in terms of military and politics, Iran has also been benefiting from the consequences of the partnership. It recognizes the threat the militia poses to its historical rival and has been able to maintain an influence with little cost.
All things considered, while the partnership is more complex than a patron-proxy one, it still carries real risks for regional security, particularly within Saudi Arabia. For very low economic investment, the Iranian regime has been able to maintain giving support to the Houthis to help them significantly increase their ability to pressure Saudi Arabia. In fact, Riyadh claims that it has intercepted, as of February 202, almost 900 Houthi missiles and drones since 2015 (Juneau, 2021). Granted, the military and regional impact of these strikes have been fairly limited with no significant damage to the Saudi empire. However, two aspects that have been significant are the symbolic consequences, as well as the longer-term implications of this conflict and the complex relationships it involves. The important trend is that the Houthis have been able to advance their interests in Saudi Arabia and inflict damage in the area. Consequently, Iran is thus able to assert its own influence by extension in a region that it has maintained a historical rivalry with. The Yemeni conflict has ultimately transformed into an opportunity for Iran to maintain access to power without requiring significant resources or materials. It is clear that this support of the Houthi rebels has certainly played a role in perpetuating the long-standing conflict, as Saudi Arabia has voiced its concern over the presence of an Iranian-backed militia at its southern border, as well as invested significant resources to demonstrate its superiority.
Conclusion
Iran’s support of the Houthi rebels in Yemen has perpetuated its conflict with Saudi Arabia on multiple dimensions. Through backing this militia, Iran has sought to challenge Saudi Arabia’s dominance in the Middle East, as well as assert its own influence. This desire reflects the long-term implications of a decades-long rivalry that has its roots in several different historical events, such as the Iranian Revolution and the Arab Spring. The Houthis have provided Iran with a valuable opportunity to project its power in a very strategic location that represents a vulnerability of Riyadh. While the relationship between Iran and the Houthi rebels is not so much of a prawn-proxy dynamic, it is undoubtedly a mutually beneficial and multidimensional partnership that has led to significant consequences in the region. Both have experienced benefits from the alliance, with a common one being deterring their common rival of Saudi Arabia. While it is unlikely that Iran will emerge as a significant factor within Yemeni affairs, as it does not carry heavy influence within the political strategy and military operations of the Houthis, the regime nonetheless saw the rise of the militia as an opportunity to gain leverage in the region with a minimal cost. It is also unlikely that Iran will seek to invest much larger amounts of resources, as Yemen is not considerably high on its list of priorities. Regardless, it is evident that this support of the Houthi rebels has transformed into a mutually beneficial partnership that has carried a real risk to regional security.
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