Mosley and Hitler: A Comparative Analysis of Authoritarian Movements

By Lee Morley

The twentieth century was defined by conflict between opposing worldviews, the World Wars, and their consequences. The interwar period of 1918 to 1939 saw the establishment of new nation-states, the collapse of liberal democracies, and the rise of militarism leading up to the Second World War. The failure of the Weimar Republic in Germany, and the rise of Nazism is well documented and studied profusely in the field of history, however the failure of their fascist counterparts in Britain is less so addressed. Why was it that Nazism succeeded in Germany, but not Fascism in Britain? What did the Nazis do that the British Fascists didn’t? Understanding these two movements, as well as where they either succeeded to garner support or failed to, provides insights into how to challenge neo-fascist movements in the future. To that end, comparing the Nazi Party’s early years (1919-1924) to the British Union of Fascists early years, (1932-1937) helps keep the comparison grounded in their early phases of growth and support. It is also important in the continued understanding of what made Germany so ripe for the Nazi Party to take control of, whether it be a Sonderweg1 situation, or simply careful and planned manipulation on a scale never seen before or since.

The British Union of Fascists, established in 1932 by Sir Oswald Mosley, grew out of inspiration provided by the Nazis in Germany, and the Fascists under Mussolini in Italy, though Mosley believed it to be uniquely British compared to those movements’ own national ideas.2 An analysis of Mosley’s own writings and speeches reveal key differences in the ideology and methods of the Nazi Party and the British Union of Fascists helped to define their positions in interwar politics. In particular, the Nazis’ emphasis on a vague set of ideals and general nationalism, in contrast to the British Union of Fascists’ focus on a carefully curated set of policy goals, led to the British Union of Fascists’ failure to build the same momentum and group support. It was through the careful manipulation of Germans across the political, economic and social spectrums that the Nazi Party was able to rise, while Mosley’s oddly transparent policy goals made him less broadly appealing. 

The British Union of Fascists evolved primarily out of Oswald Mosley’s discontent with the existing politics of the British Parliament, with his own experience in both the Labour and Conservative parties fueling a disdain for both, and pushing him to view himself as a dissident to the political order of the day.3 Mosley’s birth into upper society and his time as an officer in the First World War helped him to become the youngest member of the Conservative Party elected after the Great War.4 This membership in Parliament was a key component of his claim to legitimacy as he established the British Union of Fascists (BUF).

While not as extensively covered as the Nazi Party, Mosley and his British Union of Fascists are far from being a historiographical footnote. Within the historiography of the BUF exists extensive works by Richard Thurlow, as well as Stephen Dorril’s Blackshirt: Sir Oswald Mosley and British Fascism which covers Mosley’s life both before and after his flirting with fascism. In that extensive biography, it is revealed that Mosley’s noble pedigree5 played a significant role in helping him to establish connections and legitimacy with both members of the establishment, as well as other disgruntled Britons. Dorril’s work to document the life of Oswald Mosley and his attempts for a rise to power is key in undressing the complex character Mosley was, as well as understanding where he fell short of emulating Hitler.6

Another key piece in the historiography of British Fascism is the aptly named The Failure of British Fascism, an anthology organised by Mike Cronin featuring the previously mentioned Richard Thurlow, alongside others. One of the most notable essays being by Roger Griffin, titled “British Fascism: The Ugly Duckling,” seeks to place British Fascism into a greater context alongside Nazism, and effectively argues that Nazism was a freak success in Germany that Mosley could never fully replicate in Britain, as the social, economic and political issues in Germany were starkly contrasted by those in Britain.7 The historiography of British Fascism relies heavily not just on these two sources, but other works by Richard Thurlow such as his work in Patterns of Prejudice, an academic journal. In his 1976 essay there, “Authoritarians and Populists on the English Far Right,” Thurlow argues that the British Union of Fascists’ popularity grew out of certain people’s admiration of the authoritarian personality.8 Much of this historiography comes from the 1980s, with limited secondary sources on the topic in the past few years, though more up to date editions have been released of these existing sources.

The Rise of Nazi Germany is one of the most studied events in human history, and within that historiography is an especially important piece to understanding that rise. William Sheridan Allen’s 1984 book The Nazi Seizure of Power offers a unique perspective on the rise of Nazism, as he focuses on the small town of Northeim and puts us on the ground to see the grassroots side of the Nazi Party. Despite its age, Allen’s work proved deeply important in explaining some of the most successful tactics of the Nazi Party, as well as presenting the grassroots side of Nazi support during their rise to power.9 the early Nazi Party in this context is Paul Madden’s “Some Social Characteristics of Early Nazi Party Members, 1919-23,” an article he wrote for the journal Central European History in 1982. Madden investigated the early Nazi Party in terms of demographics, considering their social characteristics, their age, their gender, and their position in the social hierarchy of Germany.10 This, in conjunction with Gerald Webber’s “Patterns of Membership and Support for the British Union of Fascists,” an article for the Journal of Contemporary History from 1984, provides a useful cross-section of both movements. Webber is able to explain the type of person that joined the British Union of Fascists, and to a limited extent, estimate why they may have done so.11 These two sources work hand in hand to explain who supported either movement.

Both movements broadly had the same goal, to establish an authoritarian state, develop ethnic and national policies, and exercise supreme control over their respective states. Despite having the same end goal, both movements took time to find their footing in the world of politics. Mosley’s time in Parliament prior to founding the British Union of Fascists granted him an air of legitimacy as well as a very distinct method, a constitutionalist one. According to Dorril, “Mosley insisted Fascism would succeed by constitutional methods and only when confronted by ‘red terror’ would he meet force by force to save the country.”12 From the very beginning, Mosley intended to work within the system of British parliamentary democracy in order to directly undermine it in the end. Furthermore, Mosley approached the political scene with some of the lessons of the early Nazi Party in mind:

“Jew baiting in every shape and form was forbidden. ‘The early propaganda of the Nazis against the Jews has considerably complicated their accession to power and their ability to deal with Socialist, Communist, and financial enemies of the State.’”13

Despite these lessons taken from their German counterparts, Mosley’s party nonetheless in this way alienated itself from some of the most extreme elements of British politics who otherwise may have been committed to their movement. By being direct with what was or wasn’t in line with his movement, Mosley assured that most, even other British Fascists, would find some avenue to disagree with him on politics.

While many were put off by Mosley, many groups, including the economically powerful, flirted with supporting his cause. Though the rough nature of his party and politics scared many off from outright providing financial support, according to Dorril, “Industrialists … admired Mosley’s energy and would have financed him, but for his ‘high-handedness and tactlessness.’”14 Hitler was, unlike Mosley, able to pick up financial support from industrialists in Germany, particularly from Emil Kirdorf, a very influential industrialist in the leadup to and after the First World War.15 Kirdorf and other industrialists, often through their personal finances, funded the Nazi Party and supported its rise even in its early days. Mosley never quite had the same luck with British industrialists.

A good measure of just how differently Oswald Mosley approached politics compared to Adolf Hitler is his 1936 publication Fascism: 100 Questions Asked and Answered. Throughout the pamphlet, Mosley states direct policy goals for a hypothetical Fascist-controlled government, such as his answer to question 16 “How will you gain power?”, where Mosley says:

“By legal and constitutional means. We seek power by winning of a Parliamentary majority. Directly after we have completed our election machinery we shall contest Parliamentary elections. Our first task was to create the Fascist Movement. Our second task is to create an election machine, which in Britain is a highly technical process. When this second stage is complete we shall fight elections.”16

This direct explanation and criticism of the government as a justification to eliminate many of the social freedoms in Britain may have turned away some potential supporters of his movement. Mosley’s complaints also failed to show he would take immediate action, while Hitler and the Nazis were saying that they would immediately usurp the existing world order, Mosley was bogged down in semantics, giving detailed stances on women as business leaders (question 31), farm workers’ wages (question 56), and the cotton industry (question 61).17  In Fascism:100 Questions, Mosley also clarifies his stance on the Jewish population of Britain. In question 95, “What is the Fascist attitude towards the Jews?”, Mosley answers:

“Jews must put the interests of Britain before those of Jewry, or be deported from Britain. This is not a principle of racial or religious persecution. Any well-governed nation must insist that its citizens owe allegiance to the nation, and not to co-racialists and co-religionists resident outside its borders or organised as a state within the State. The Jews, as a whole, have chosen to organise themselves as a nation within the Nation and to set their interests before those of Great Britain. They must, like everyone else, put “Britain First” or leave Britain.”18

Meanwhile, the Nazi Party was purposefully vague in their messaging as established by William Sheridan Allen’s The Nazi Seizure of Power, where he argued:

“The Göttingen recruits were attracted by another aspect of Nazism: its vague ideology of a new society in which patriotic solidarity would supplant Germany’s rigid class distinctions.”19

This difference in recruitment, with the British Fascists clearly defining their goals, and the Nazis being purposefully vague to garner wider appeal, helps to explain the complex differences between both movements.

This difference in clarity or vagueness was likely a potential cause for the electoral success of Nazism, compared to the broad failure of British Fascism. The use of purposefully vague messaging by the Nazi Party is directly contrary to the tactics employed by Oswald Mosley, and this could potentially be attributed to the key differences between the two movements’ leaders and their political backgrounds. Oswald Mosley had been an established politician in the British Parliament since the end of the First World War, while Hitler was appointed Chancellor with absolutely no prior experience in governing or politics. Mosley’s more direct and explanatory messaging could come from his prior career as a Member of Parliament, with Hitler’s vague messaging developing from a lack of actual knowledge of governing. This stark difference in their backgrounds may have helped lead to the differing views on policy and campaigning, with Stephen Cullen arguing in his 1987 article “The Development of the Ideas and Policy of the British Union of Fascists” that the more strict and explained politics of Mosley came from his parliamentary background and interest in establishing an air of legitimacy to his party as a legal and legitimate political force.20

Another factor that potentially hindered Mosley was his failure to generate international support. According to Roger Griffin’s British Fascism: The Ugly Duckling the failure of Mosley to fall in line with Mussolini and Hitler, meant that the party lacked both foreign and domestic support from existing nationalist elements, as well as failed to emulate the successes of their contemporaries in Italy and Germany. Thurlow, in his essay “Fascism and Nazism–no Siamese twins,” where he focuses on establishing the key structural, ideological, and organisational differences between British Fascists and German Nazis. Notably, Thurlow addresses the key difference in importance of Antisemitism in both movements, with Nazism regarding it as a racial distinction that could not be undone, and Fascists such as Mussolini and Mosley seeing it as a class and religious distinction that could be undone with the assimilation of their communities into the broader national identities they sought to establish.21 The lack of coherence on this issue may have made Mosley’s party less appealing to the more powerful Nazi Party as a potential ally, hindering the possibility of greater foreign support.

All that being said, the key differences between these two movements in how they went about spreading their message resulted in wildly different levels of success, even beyond the personal differences between both leaders. The BUF’s focus on a carefully curated set of policy goals made it easy to determine how much one agreed or disagreed with them, while the vague nature of Nazi policy goals meant that someone could apply their own beliefs to Nazism, making it more digestible to the average German. Hitler’s roots as a lower-middle-class Austrian, his time as a homeless man in Vienna, and his wartime service as a private soldier made him a relatable character who had clawed himself up from the bottom in the eyes of Germans in all social classes during the post-war years.22 Hitler had the support of people of all different levels of German society, but with the largest single occupation joining the party being those identifying themselves as Students.23 This strong percentage of the party populated by the lower-class and middle-class in the Nazi Party is not echoed in the BUF, with a significant heterogeneity in terms of class composition, with it becoming increasingly working class in its later years.24

Unlike Hitler, Mosley was born into a comfortably wealthy family of noble standing, with his father holding the hereditary title of Baronet Mosley.25 Mosley similarly to Hitler served in the First World War, but as an officer in a prestigious Cavalry unit and as an officer in the Royal Flying Corps, rising to the rank of Lieutenant,26 not as a private soldier in a common infantry unit like Hitler had.27 This helps to explain why Mosley found himself disproportionately supported by former officers of the British military, who acted as activists for his party.28 Both men levied their military background and service in World War I in their writings, with Hitler writing extensively in Mein Kampf of how lucky he was to participate in what he believed was a fight for Germany’s very existence.29 The First World War was formative in both movements, with Germany’s treatment under the Treaty of Versailles being one of the key complaints in Mein Kampf, leading to Hitler’s involvement in politics.30 The German reaction to the loss in the First World War is not directly paralleled by the British reaction to their victory. While both countries mourned over the dead of WWI, Germany’s loss and the expansion of the “stab-in-the-back” myth by the Nazi Party propelled nationalist fervour well beyond what was seen in Britain at the same time.

The British Union of Fascists, despite their cadre of former Army Officers, failed to appeal to the same sense of betrayal and frustration as the Nazi Party was able to cultivate in Germany. While Britain still felt the horrors of the First World War, it lacked the humiliating defeat Germany suffered. Mosley instead portrayed the WWI as the means to an end for what he claimed to be a global conspiracy orchestrated at the expense of Britain:

“The great outstanding fact which the man in the street appreciates is that Britain has been brought nearer to war than she has ever been since 1914. The Jews are shouting for a war of revenge against Germany; the pacifists are clamouring for war, one year with Japan, the next with Italy. The Jews who came out of the Napoleonic Wars, the Boer War, and the Great War with vast profit and enhanced prestige.”31

This different perspective on the First World War between the Nazi Party and Mosley’s Fascists both reveal the importance of the war in the formation of their ideologies. While Mosley didn’t have the same sense of defeat and shame about the war, he still managed to make use of it for his political ends. It was not just in tying the war to anti-semitism that Mosley was able to gain ground. Historian Stephen Cullen writes:

“Young men and women joined the BUF in order to identify with the patriotic sacrifices of the war generation, and help them fight for material recognition. Indeed, the sacrifice of the war generation was a constant theme in the BUF’s propaganda. In this the movement was, in effect, portrayed as the resurrected spirit of the war’s fallen.”32

The British Union of Fascists was careful, despite not being able to pull the same feeling of disgust about the Treaty of Versailles, to develop a connection between themselves and the war. Both Mosley and Hitler understood the utility of conflict for advancing their agendas, with Mosley posturing his messaging around a connection to the war’s dead, and those he blamed for starting the war.

With the primary comparison being of the Nazi Party’s early years (1919-1924) to the British Union of Fascists early years, (1932-1937), the actual surrounding context for both movements differed not just in culture and geographic location, but also in time. The meteoric electoral rise of the Nazi Party didn’t occur in those years, and neither did it for the British Union of Fascists, though even in those same timeframes, the Nazi Party was more successful in establishing a long term dedicated membership base in Bavaria of some 8,144 persons, little over a tenth of a percent of the population there.33 In late 1936, the British Union of Fascists in London maintained a similar number, some 8,500 persons, though the number fluctuated wildly throughout the organisation’s existence, unlike the Nazi Party’s slow and continuous rise in numbers.34 London had a roughly equal population in 1937 to Bavaria in 1924, with 8,203,012 residents in London35 compared to 7,062,024 in Bavaria.36 This would mean that the percentage of the population that was actively supporting the British Union of Fascists at the end of the comparative timeframe was actually slightly lower than it was for the Nazi Party. However, the consistency of Nazi support and the sporadic nature of support for the British Union of Fascists make these direct comparisons of percentages difficult. The Nazi Party saw continued growth, even if mild throughout the timeframe examined, while Mosley’s party actually peaked in support in its first year, then completely floundered, losing general support over the rest of its existence, and regularly changing demographics.37 Given the roughly similar levels of support, but the massively different scale of the areas discussed, it is surprising that both appealed to roughly the same classes of society, the middle-class being the primary backbone of both movements to some extent.38 Bavaria’s much larger scale and more rural nature does not seem to have significantly affected the patterns of support for the Nazi Party, nor does the urban nature of London seem to have affected patterns of support for Mosley’s party, though Mosley’s party was able to grow faster likely due to this population density.

Both movements at the very beginning struggled with their identity, and understanding how political violence could fit in with their goals. The early Nazi Party attempted a coup in 1923 often referred to now as the Beer Hall Putsch, and the reaction of Germans were mixed, and the coup failed to materialise. The Münchner Neueste Nachrichtenin (or Munich’s Latest News) accused Hitler of ehrenwortbruch, a breach of honour, for his attempted coup against the Weimar Republic.39 This reaction by one of the more significant newspapers in the city of Munich, partnered with the general failure of the coup to secure public support suggests that the German population, even in 1923, was unwilling to see a military coup overthrow their parliamentary democracy, or at least unwilling to actively participate in that coup. This reaction showed that the appetite for dictatorship in Germany existed among radicals, but there were people still willing to oppose it rather than cooperate with a violent takeover by the Nazi Party.

The closest event in similarity to this is not a coup, but a rally undertaken by the British Union of Fascists that resulted in political violence. The Battle of Cable Street saw Mosley and his party rally in the streets of London’s East End and engage in street fighting with local Communists, Jewish community members, and anti-Fascists trying to stop them from marching.40 The reaction of the Daily Mirror, a fairly popular newspaper in London at the time, was not quite as directly critical of Mosley as the Bavarian press was of Hitler, rather its title and article focused on the actual nature of the conflict and the damage done. The Daily Mirror’s reporting was far from sympathetic to the anti-Fascist movement however, with a picture of an anti-Fascist being arrested with the caption: “She was carried away by her enthusiasm – with the result that she was carried away like this.”41 The difference between the Daily Mail’s almost neutral, leaning pro-Fascist stance on the Battle of Cable Street and the Munich Latest News’ calling out of Hitler’s treason may come from the fact that the Fascists in Britain did not initiate the violence directly, rather they enabled it. This made criticism more difficult to levy against Mosley’s party in the wake of the riots, with mildly sympathetic views of anti-Communism being fairly prevalent at the time. This may be one area where Mosley’s party managed themselves better than the Nazi Party in the eyes of the public, by encouraging violence more indirectly. This allowed them to portray themselves as bringing an end to political violence and chaos, something the Nazis would eventually pivot into doing themselves. According to Allen:

 “The SPD contended that all difficulties could have been avoided if the police had been firm with the Nazis. This charge deftly obscured the main effect of the violence, which had been to make Nazi charges against the ‘Marxists’ appear reasonable in the eyes of the bourgeoisie.”42

Both parties became increasingly capable of distancing themselves from direct violence, instead developing themselves into a seemingly reasonable political entity to some.

However, even this success failed to provide Mosley with the momentum more broadly throughout Britain, with his movement primarily confined to London for support. Mosley’s appeal to the more disgruntled urban youths in London did not translate well to people even in other major urban centres of Britain at the time. His rhetoric of revolutionary change in Britain, despite the relatively comfortable situation most people lived in, failed to garner the same support as time went on. Even by 1938, Mosley continued to frame his party as a movement dedicated to a revolutionary shift for Britain:

“The Blackshirt is a revolutionary dedicated to the service of our country. We must always possess the character of the true revolutionary. […] In the true revolutionary, the first quality is the power to endure. Constancy, loyalty to cause and comrades, manhood and stability of nature. These are the qualities of the true Britain and the true revolutionary. In our movement that great character of the British has been reborn. And for that reason we carry within us the destiny of Britain.”43

Mosley’s calls to endure, and continue their fight for revolution in 1938 even as war was just on the horizon, shows a desperation and realisation that his chance for real electoral success was escaping him, and by the time of this speech his party had shrunk far from its early successes. This demographic issue, tied directly to the different messaging and communities targeted by the movements, left Mosley appealing to one major urban center, while Hitler was able to increasingly appeal to a wider range of Germans. [maybe insert the things I added here?]

Another key difference between the two parties had to do with the class status of their two leaders. Mosley never addressed his early life in his political writings to the same extent Hitler did, likely because it wasn’t politically advantageous to do so. Hitler, however, used his early life to establish credibility and pity with the average German, showing them that he was not so different from them. Hitler would speak directly to the struggles of the everyday German, with large portions of Mein Kampf’s first section dedicated to the misery of poverty: 

“Imagine, for instance, the following scene: In a basement apartment, consisting of two stuffy rooms, dwells a worker’s family of seven. Among the five children there is a boy of, let us assume, three years. This is the age in which the first impressions are made on the consciousness of the child. Talented persons retain traces of memory from this period down to advanced old age. The very narrowness and overcrowding of the room does not lead to favourable conditions. Quarrelling and wrangling will very frequently arise as a result. In these circumstances, people do not live with one another, they press against one another. Every argument, even the most trifling […] here leads to loathsome wrangling without end.”44

For many Germans, living in situations that may have directly echoed Hitler’s description here, Hitler immediately develops a sense of familiarity and understanding to their situation that Mosley could only hope to emulate from his stately manner. Hitler was careful to use his own struggles as the means to an end, a way to manipulate the German population with his life story, though he heavily mythologised it to better relate to them.

Mosley lacked this same level of familiarity and equalness to the average poverty-stricken worker, or even middle-class family who owned a small shop. He appealed primarily to two groups with two ideas. To the establishment and military class he used nationalist fervour and his own noble and parliamentary pedigrees. In a 1935 speech, Mosley would invoke these ideas of nationalism and British exceptionalism:

“Let us tonight at this great meeting  give the answer. Hold high the head of England; lift strong the voice of [the] Empire. Let us, in Europe and to the world, proclaim that the heart of this great people is undaunted and invincible. This flag still challenges the winds of destiny. This flame still burns. This glory shall not die. The soul of [the] Empire is alive, and England again dares to be great.”45

However, while he was still in Parliament during 1931, Mosley was also careful to posture himself as both a populist and a constitutionalist, willing to cooperate with other members of the Commons, in a debate over the economic situation in 1931 he argued:

“Suppose that we balance our Budget in that way, would the resulting situation be so very terrible? A deficit is regarded as a dangerous thing because it is inflation, but does any hon. Member suggest that we are in danger of inflation in a period in which prices are sharply falling. It is true that a measure like that might tend to arrest the fall of prices in this country and maintain our price level above the world level; that there would be a disparity between the two and a consequent strain upon our exchange and a possible efflux of gold.”46

Mosley’s argument to consider differing economic plans, and his ability to fall in line with and obey parliamentary expectations made him far more acceptable to existing members of the upper classes. He would also often, as with his book Fascism – 100 Questions Asked and Answered, cite the famous economist John Keynes the father of Keynesian economics, a school of thought arguing for government intervention in the economy. Mosley would indirectly refer to Keynes as a ‘great economist.’47

Despite all this cooperation with parliamentary procedure, Mosley had to reorient himself and his messaging to a limited extent for another key group. When Mosley targeted the working class, he used their distrust of the establishment, despite him ironically being part of that very establishment. Mosley would criticise his parliamentary contemporaries in 1930, even before leaving the Labour Party, saying:

“We live in a period in which politicians are not very popular. And believe me, you have my sympathy. Politicians are regarded as people who have learned to talk but not to act.”48

Mosley did, to a limited extent, attempt the same type of multifaceted posturing that Hitler did, but even when he did target himself towards the lower classes, it was clearly hypocritical. He, as a politician, was criticising politicians ostensibly of the same political party. This stark difference between the two men, not just in upbringing and background but in personality, ensured that all else being equal, Hitler was more relatable to the everyman than Mosley was.

Another key to understanding the difference between these movements are the economic circumstances of Weimar-era Germany in the 1920s, and Britain in the 1930s. Mosley had one key advantage over the early Nazi Party, the Depression. While the Great Depression formed a key basis of Mosley’s appeal in the early years of his party, Hitler had the Great War and the humiliation that came with it during his initial rise in the 1920s, but also the heavy weight of war reparations of the economy. Despite this seemingly useful timing for Mosley, Richardson argues:

“The depression in Britain between 1929 and 1932 was not an economic watershed. […] In the United States, in Germany, and in certain primary producing countries, the onset of the world depression had a shattering impact, and its consequences may have governed the course of events throughout the 1930s. Britain did not escape unaffected, but the downswing was moderate and its effects soon obliterated.”49

The Great Depression was significantly less impactful in Britain than it was in Germany or the United States, with the main chunk of support Mosley gained during the end of the depression evaporating as things returned to normal for Britons. In a 1930 British Movietone interview with Mosley, the later fascist leader called unemployment “the one problem that really matters today.”50 Mosley would regularly use the economy in his arguments, blaming the misfortune of England’s economy on Jewish communities regularly. As cited before, Mosley would state: “[It was] the Jews who came out of the Napoleonic Wars, the Boer War, and the Great War with vast profit and enhanced prestige.”51 Mosley, in the same text, would also say:

“Jews must put the interests of Britain before those of Jewry, or be deported from Britain. This is not a principle of racial or religious persecution. Any well governed nation must insist that its citizens owe allegiance to the nation and not to co-racialists and co-religionists resident outside its borders or organised as a state within the State. The Jews, as a whole, have chosen to organise themselves as a nation within the Nation and to set their interests before those of Great Britain.”52

Mosley’s anti-semitism was somewhat separate from the racialised kind in Germany. Rather, he portrayed Jews as a threat to Britain only if they did not put Britain first, whatever he might mean by that at any given time. The early days of the depression offered Mosley and his party a great opportunity for growth, with their peak of popularity matching the peak of the depression. Despite this, recovery came much quicker in England, and Mosley’s temporary support from many of the people hurt by the depression evaporated, while Hitler’s support from disgruntled war veterans and prideful nationalists in Germany would only continue to grow with time.

The aftermath of the First World War and the humiliation of the Treaty of Versailles left, in the words of historian Sally Marks, “an astonished German people, who thought their armies were on the brink of victory, [but who] awoke to the Armistice.”53 This made Germans far riper for radical politics and more desperate for change in the aftermath of the war than Britons after the depression. Economic downturn was a key part in later Nazi politics, but in the early days, those most comparable with the British Union of Fascists, it was all about pride. The early Nazi Party came to an end with Hitler’s imprisonment after the attempted Beer Hall Putsch, reforming and reshaping itself in the aftermath of these events into a political movement hoping to usurp parliamentary democracy through constitutional means, just like Mosley would attempt ten years later. In many ways, Mosley’s party had learnt much from Hitler as a contemporary, but it was in some ways ten years too late to emulate the same drawn-out rise to power. Mosley’s party, the British Union of Fascists, was banned in Britain in July of 1940, with the start of the Battle of Britain signalling an end to any hope for British cooperation with Fascists.54 Both movement’s early days ended in similar ways, outcast political fringe groups banned or put down by parliamentary democracies, and both would come back in different ways. Mosley would remain on that fringe the rest of his life, founding a successor party in 1948, the Union Movement, though it never recaptured the same possibility of success as the British Union of Fascists.55 The Nazi Party, however, came out of the Beer Hall Putsch with the understanding they could undermine the political establishment in a different way, and would work towards it until their seizure of power in the early 1930s.

With these key differences in tactics, appeal, personalities, and time it still remains difficult to fully understand why the Nazis would go on to secure national power, or if it would’ve been possible for Mosley’s party to do so given enough time before its dissolution. Despite this, there are key points where the Nazi Party was able to do things Mosley couldn’t. The Nazis were vague, working on developing broad appeal through modifying their messaging for the maximum amount of votes, rather than concerning themselves with consistency. The Nazi Party existed as an intentionally self-contradictory organisation, hoping to be everything to everyone. Mosley failed to understand the power of that manipulation, and instead tried to leverage his standing and his past in politics in order to win votes through campaigning on specific policies. He effectively said the quiet part out loud, and was public with his goals and how he hoped to achieve them. This is the key distinction between both movements, one of a political outsider saying anything to sway a crowd, and another of a politician citing rhetoric and policy goals. Hitler held the heart of the German people in his hand, speaking directly to their experiences and emotions. Mosley held the ear of a ragtag mix of disgruntled members of the establishment, and youths who wanted to bring down that very establishment.

It is key to understand both movement’s successes and failures in order to understand the culmination of their work. Hitler and the Nazis were purposefully and carefully vague, they did not want to tie themselves to any one consistent message, they made their message flexible to fit different target audiences or areas of German society. Mosley failed to do this, he was clearcut and frankly honest about his political intentions, his goals and how he hoped to achieve them. He didn’t speak with his audiences in mind, rather with his goals in mind, failing to adapt his message to different audiences in the same way the Nazis were able to. Nazism’s vague nature allowed it to receive support from across the political, economic and social spectrum of Germany, while Mosley’s dry political explanations of his goals led him to limit himself to the fringe of British politics that endorsed the exact same goals that he did. Mosley positioned himself to appeal to both extremes of the social ladder in Britain, he wanted to maintain legitimacy and work with the monarchy and establishment that he was born into, but he similarly wanted to garner support from the everyman and the working class, something he found some success in. However, the Nazi Party’s more general targeting of the middle-class in the depths of the depression meant that even those in the working class and upper class could find parts of Nazism to agree with. Hitler’s upbringing as a middle class Austrian, his war service as a common soldier, and his homelessness in Vienna all shaped an image of someone ‘just like me’ in the eyes of many Germans, something Mosley could never hope to do with the average Briton.

Fascism, particularly under Mosley and Hitler, had varying degrees of success with different classes, and with different economic circumstances. Hitler was able to take advantage of an economically downtrodden and humiliated German psyche to garner support for a complete revolutionary change in the way the country was run, with promises of grandeur and economic recovery as incentive. Mosley, on the other hand, saw the bulk of his support through a temporary phase of economic struggles that did not hit Britain nearly as hard as it hit the United States or Germany. Much of his support evaporated as the Great Depression became increasingly less impactful on the everyday life of middle class and working class Britons. Mosley’s ability to maintain the respect and support of many in the upper classes, given his pedigree and parliamentary experience, was not enough to garner economic support nor electoral support on any substantial scale. Hitler, on the other hand, was able to make connections for political and economic gain, primarily through industrialists.

This all provides a key set of warning signs for the spread of fascism in parliamentary democracies. Long term economic struggles, political or national humiliation, injured pride, conspiracy theories, and populist rhetoric all provide a powerful position for any would-be despot to garner support from people in less than ideal circumstances. Although fleeting, Mosley’s support shows that even with moderate economic issues and fears of a secret cabal controlling everything, a violent and considerably large political entity can emerge. Mosley may not have taken control in Britain, but his successes in London show us that even in a stable and long-term democracy, there always exists a threat of authoritarian rhetoric garnering support among people who feel they’ve been mistreated, forgotten, or abandoned by the system.

Bibliography:

Secondary Sources:

Allen, William Sheridan. The Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience of a Single German Town, 1922-1945. Revised edition. New York: Franklin Watts, 1984.

Cullen, Stephen Michael. “The Development of the Ideas and Policy of the British Union of Fascists, 1932-40.” Journal of Contemporary History 22, no. 1 (January, 1987): 115–36. https://doi.org/10.1177/002200948702200107. 

Dorril, Stephen. Blackshirt: Sir Oswald Mosley and British Fascism. London: Penguin Books, 2007.

Griffin, Roger. “British Fascism: The Ugly Duckling.” In The Failure of British Fascism: The Far Right and the Fight for Political Recognition, edited by Mike Cronin, 141–65. Houndmill and London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-24758-5_8. 

Kocka, Jürgen. “Asymmetrical Historical Comparison: The Case of the German Sonderweg.” History and Theory 38, no. 1 (February, 1999): 40–50. https://doi.org/10.1111/0018-2656.751999075. 

Madden, Paul. “Some Social Characteristics of Early Nazi Party Members, 1919–23.” Central European History 15, no. 1 (March, 1982): 34–56. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0008938900001394. 

Marks, Sally. “Mistakes and Myths: The Allies, Germany, and the Versailles Treaty, 1918–1921.” The Journal of Modern History 85, no. 3 (September, 2013): 632–659. https://doi.org/10.1086/670825. 

Richardson, Harry W. “The Economic Significance of the Depression in Britain.” Journal of Contemporary History 4, no. 4 (October 1, 1969): 3–19. https://doi.org/10.1177/002200946900400401. 

Sangster, Andrew. An Analytical Diary of 1939-1940: The Twelve Months that Changed the World. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017.

Thurlow, Richard C. “Authoritarians and Populists on the English Far Right.” Patterns of Prejudice 10, no. 2 (January, 1976): 13–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322x.1976.9969300. 

Thurlow, Richard C. “Fascism and Nazism — No Siamese Twins.” Patterns of Prejudice 14, no. 2 (April, 1980): 5–14. https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322x.1980.9969560. 

Turner, H. A. “Emil Kirdorf and the Nazi Party.” Central European History 1, no. 4 (December, 1968): 324–44. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0008938900014941. 

Webber, Grégoire. “Patterns of Membership and Support for the British Union of Fascists.” Journal of Contemporary History 19, no. 4 (October, 1984): 575–606. https://doi.org/10.1177/002200948401900401.

Primary Sources:

A Special Correspondent (an anonymous correspondent). “84 Arrests as Thousands Stampede in London Riots.” Daily Mirror, October 5, 1936.

“Adolf Hitlers Ehrenwortbruch,” Münchner Neueste Nachrichten. November 10, 1923.

British Movietone. “Sir Oswald Mosley Speaks on Unemployment.”  British Movietone Gazette. Original newsreel released May 26, 1930. Part of the Associated Press Archive (AP Archive). Uploaded to YouTube July 21, 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ItM7nhP1pqw. 

United Kingdom Parliament, House of Commons. House of Commons Hansard. 8 September 1931. Vol. 256. https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/1931-09-08/debates/afd195cd-46d3-4709-9994-9750b7820f0d/FinancialSituation.  

Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf. München: Franz Eher Nachfolger GmbH, 1925.

“London’s Population.” The Telegraph. August 4, 1937.

Mosley, Oswald. “Comrades in Struggle.” Speech, audio recording from the Imperial War Museum. GB, 6/1938. June 15, 1938. https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/80033694. 

Mosley, Oswald. Fascism: 100 Questions Asked and Answered. London: BUF Publications, 1936. http://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/BA55793491. 

Mosley, Oswald. “The Soul of Empire is Alive.” Speech. 1935.

Footnotes:

  1. The Sonderweg (or special path) is the idea that Germany’s path from autocracy to democracy is unique from any other in the Western world, and that this special path is what facilitated the rise of Nazism.
    Jürgen Kocka, “Asymmetrical Historical Comparison: The Case of the German Sonderweg,” History and Theory 38, no. 1 (February 1, 1999): 40–50, https://doi.org/10.1111/0018-2656.751999075. ↩︎
  2. Oswald Mosley, Fascism: 100 Questions Asked and Answered, (London: BUF Publications, 1936), 4. ↩︎
  3. Stephen Dorril, Blackshirt: Sir Oswald Mosley and British Fascism (London: Penguin Books, 2007), 136. ↩︎
  4. Mosley, Fascism: 100 Questions, 1. ↩︎
  5. Sir Oswald Mosely held the title of 6th Baronet of Mosely which was a hereditary noble title handed down on his father’s side of the family. The Mosely family had been a part of the British Nobility going back to the 12th Century. ↩︎
  6. Dorril, Blackshirt, 150. ↩︎
  7. Roger Griffin, “British Fascism: The Ugly Duckling,” in The Failure of British Fascism: The Far Right and the Fight for Political Recognition, ed. Mike Cronin (Houndmill and London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996), 151. ↩︎
  8. Richard C. Thurlow, “Authoritarians and Populists on the English Far Right,” Patterns of Prejudice 10, no. 2 (January, 1976): 13–20, https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322x.1976.9969300. ↩︎
  9. William Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience of a Single German Town, 1922-1945, revised edition (New York: Franklin Watts, 1984). ↩︎
  10. Paul Madden, “Some Social Characteristics of Early Nazi Party Members, 1919–23,” Central European History 15, no. 1 (March, 1982): 34–56, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4545948. ↩︎
  11. Grégoire Webber, “Patterns of Membership and Support for the British Union of Fascists,” Journal of Contemporary History 19, no. 4 (October 1, 1984): 575–606, https://doi.org/10.1177/002200948401900401, 589-591. ↩︎
  12. Dorril, Blackshirt, 222. ↩︎
  13. Dorril, Blackshirt, 231. ↩︎
  14. Dorril, Blackshirt, 211. ↩︎
  15. H. A. Turner, “Emil Kirdorf and the Nazi Party,” Central European History 1, no. 4 (December, 1968): 324–44, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0008938900014941, 324-344. ↩︎
  16. Mosley, Fascism: 100 Questions, 7. ↩︎
  17. Mosley, Fascism: 100 Questions, 7. ↩︎
  18. Mosley, Fascism: 100 Questions. ↩︎
  19. Allen, Nazi Seizure of Power, 25. ↩︎
  20. Stephen Michael Cullen, “The Development of the Ideas and Policy of the British Union of Fascists, 1932-40,” Journal of Contemporary History 22, no. 1 (January, 1987): 115–36, https://doi.org/10.1177/002200948702200107, 125. ↩︎
  21. Richard C. Thurlow, “Fascism and Nazism — No Siamese Twins,” Patterns of Prejudice 14, no. 2 (April, 1980): 5–14, https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322x.1980.9969560. ↩︎
  22. Madden, “Early Nazi Party Members,” 52. ↩︎
  23. Madden, “Early Nazi Party Members,” 44. ↩︎
  24. Webber, “Support for the British Union of Fascists,” 589-591. ↩︎
  25. Dorril, Blackshirt, 2. ↩︎
  26. During WW1, Mosely was initially commissioned as an officer in the 16th The Queen’s Lancers, a prestigious cavalry unit assigned to the Western Front in France. Mosely would eventually transfer to Royal Flying Corps (RFC) were he served as a pilot and air observer, he would be injured during his time in the RFC gaining him a reputation for being brave but reckless. ↩︎
  27. Dorril, Blackshirt, 16-18. ↩︎
  28. Webber, “Support for the British Union of Fascists,” 590. ↩︎
  29. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (Munich: Franz Eher Nachfolger GmbH, 1925), 148-150. ↩︎
  30. Hitler, Mein Kampf, 186-194. ↩︎
  31. Mosley, Fascism: 100 Questions. ↩︎
  32. Cullen, “Policy of the British Union of Fascists,” 125. ↩︎
  33. Madden, “Early Nazi Party Members,” 51. ↩︎
  34. Webber, “Support for the British Union of Fascists,” 599. ↩︎
  35. “London’s Population,” The Telegraph, August 4, 1937. ↩︎
  36. Webber, “Support for the British Union of Fascists,” 599. ↩︎
  37. Webber, “Support for the British Union of Fascists”, 600. ↩︎
  38. Webber, “Support for the British Union of Fascists”, 599. ↩︎
  39. “Adolf Hitlers Ehrenwortbruch,” Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, November 10, 1923. ↩︎
  40. A Special Correspondent, “84 Arrests as Thousands Stampede in London Riots,” Daily Mirror, October 5, 1935. ↩︎
  41. A Special Correspondent, “84 Arrests.” ↩︎
  42. Allen, Nazi Seizure of Power, 97. ↩︎
  43. Oswald Mosley, “Comrades in Struggle,” Speech, audio recording from the Imperial War Museum, GB, 6/1938  June 15, 1938, https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/80033694. ↩︎
  44. Hitler, Mein Kampf, 29-30. ↩︎
  45. Oswald Mosley, “The Soul of Empire is Alive,” Speech, 1935. ↩︎
  46. United Kingdom Parliament, House of Commons, House of Commons Hansard, vol. 256, 8 September 1931, column 79-81 (United Kingdom), https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/1931-09-08/debates/afd195cd-46d3-4709-9994-9750b7820f0d/FinancialSituation. ↩︎
  47. Parliament, House of Commons Hansard, column 81-82. ↩︎
  48. British Movietone, “Sir Oswald Mosley Speaks on Unemployment. The Cause of His Resignation.,” original newsreel by the British Movietone Gazette, part of the Associated Press Archive (AP Archive), original reel released May 26, 1930, uploaded to YouTube on July 21, 2015, archival newsreel, 0:24, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ItM7nhP1pqw. ↩︎
  49. Harry W. Richardson, “The Economic Significance of the Depression in Britain,” Journal of Contemporary History 4, no. 4 (October 1, 1969): 3–19, https://doi.org/10.1177/002200946900400401. ↩︎
  50. British Movietone, “Sir Oswald Mosley Speaks on Unemployment.,” 0:24. ↩︎
  51. Mosley, Fascism: 100 Questions. ↩︎
  52. Mosley, Fascism: 100 Questions. ↩︎
  53. Sally Marks, “Mistakes and Myths: The Allies, Germany, and the Versailles Treaty, 1918–1921,” the Journal of Modern History/the Journal of Modern History 85, no. 3 (September 1, 2013): 632–659, https://doi.org/10.1086/670825. ↩︎
  54. Andrew Sangster, An Analytical Diary of 1939-1940: The Twelve Months that Changed the World (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017). ↩︎
  55. Dorril, Blackshirt, 369. ↩︎