Nation-Building in Afghanistan: Effect of Ethnocentrism in Counternarcotic Efforts

Amanda Lapinski

Introduction

On Sunday, August 15, 2021, the world watched in horror as Taliban fighters rode into Afghanistan’s capital city, Kabul, solidifying the group’s retaking of the country twenty years after the United States (U.S.) deposed them. Rhetoric used by the U.S. government since the Afghanistan war began in October of 2001 suggested the war was on the right track. House of Representatives (House) Congressman Eliot Engel (D-NY) pointedly addressed the misleading language during a January 2020 House hearing on Afghanistan. He stated “Year after year we heard, ‘we are making progress.’ Year after year we were ‘turning a corner.’”1 Engel also noted: “While Presidents and military officials were painting a rosy picture, the reality on the ground was a consistently deepening quagmire with no end in sight.” The Bush administration and U.S. Congress contributed to this quagmire during the first years of the war by prioritizing short-term operations that could demonstrate progress in Afghanistan and prove to the international community and the American people that the U.S. could handle expanding the Global War on Terror (GWOT). However, despite demonstrable progress, short-term efforts like those seen in Afghanistan counternarcotics failed in securing long term stability, and instead led to the disastrous U.S. withdrawal.

After deposing the Taliban, the U.S. had to reconstruct Afghanistan into a country that could enforce the rule of law within its own borders and prevent terrorist groups, like al-Qaeda, from operating. Reconstruction in Afghanistan required nation-building, a process that needed an extended period of time and a significant commitment of financial and human resources if any long-term changes were to be made.2 Previous historiography has found that the determination to invade Iraq caused nation-building efforts to suffer. Nation-building research argues that understanding the history and culture of the rebuilt nation is a crucial element for success. Yet there is an absence of research that attributes the U.S. actions during the early years to ethnocentrism. Specifically, finding an ethnocentric state of mind in the Bush administration and Congress towards Afghanistan has not been prioritized, despite the importance of understanding how a “deep-human habit” like ethnocentrism can affect the U.S. ability to fight a war in a foreign country.3 Ethnocentrism can be defined, at minimum, as an attitude that causes a group to view themselves as superior, with goals, values and standards that are universal.4 Such views can lead to incorrect assumptions about an outside group, evident in the U.S. nation-building efforts in Afghanistan.

Asking how ethnocentrism affects nation-building in Afghanistan is important as it contributes to understanding how the U.S. government viewed itself in the GWOT, and how not considering a country’s history, culture, and needs can lead to failed nation-building. This paper relies on interviews of government officials, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) report on counternarcotics, military interviews, Congressional hearings, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s memos to prove the U.S. practiced ethnocentric nation-building by prioritizing Iraq over Afghanistan. Ethnocentrism in Afghanistan is evident in the implementation of a representative democracy, the dismissal of Afghanistan in favor of an invasion of Iraq, and the prioritization of poppy eradication over alternative developments.

Nation-Building: Historiography

There is no formula for nation-building, and therefore historiography varies in the requirements and principles of reconstruction. Dr. Conor Keane, author of US Nation-Building in Iraq and Afghanistan argued that nation-building is a process in which foreign power(s) seek to build a “particular political identity” and repair or build an institutional and material infrastructure that can “become the enduring foundation of political stability after a period of armed conflict.”5 Keane’s definition advocates for a foreign power to assist in creating or rebuilding institutional and material infrastructure while also uniting the country under one common identity. In Building the Nation: Missed Opportunities in Iraq and Afghanistan, Heather Selma Gregg focused on the need for a common identity as the most important aspect of nation-building. She separated nation and state building in their meaning. ‘State-building’ is the rebuilding of governmental institutions, such as military, security, civil services, and developmental programs.6 Understanding the population is important in nation-building as the people of Afghanistan were essential to maintaining peace after the U.S. and NATO left the country. Gregg argued that “without a sense of emotional connectedness among fellow citizens and a degree of public loyalty to the state, the state is unlikely to cohere and succeed in the long run.”7 Public loyalty to the Karzai government created in 2001 faltered as Afghanistan was not ready for such a government structure, and counternarcotics efforts only furthered the issue.

Previous historiography on nation-building in Afghanistan concluded that the U.S. government’s focus on Iraq led to short term commitments in Afghanistan. Ahmed Rashid, an accomplished Pakistani journalist and author of Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia, found that the Bush administration’s first thought after invading Afghanistan was “how to declare victory, get out, and move on to Iraq.”8 He added the administration wanted “no responsibility for reconstructing” Afghanistan and was “unwilling to learn about the people or the country.”9 Rashid’s argument focused on the conservative members of the Bush cabinet who had expansive military ambitions but did not wish to expand U.S. funding of nation-building. Rashid concluded that the Bush administration demonstrated “arrogance and ignorance” when it invaded two Muslim countries without attempting to “understand the history, culture, society, or traditions of those countries.”10

Rashid’s assertion that the Bush administration demonstrated “arrogance and ignorance” is parallel to Dr. Conor Keane’s argument that bureaucratic ambivalence led to failed nation building. Keane stated: “For White House officials, the GWOT’s first battleground was simply a side-show to be disregarded in favor of the moral and material rewards that the removal of Saddam Hussein promised.”11 Keane’s argument stated it was the broader U.S. bureaucratic system’s lack of organization and concern that contributed to failed nation-building. He asserted the “complex requirements” of nation-building were ignored and, “the responsibilities of each U.S. agency, and indeed official, remained undefined or ambiguous.” Keane concluded the U.S. government demonstrated a “deep ambivalence at the heart of foreign policy bureaucracy.”12 Rashid and Keane both highlight the lack of concern within the Bush administration towards its goals in Afghanistan, an argument that can be attributed to an ethnocentric attitude.

Craig Whitlock, journalist and author of The Afghanistan Papers, also concluded that the Bush administration failed to give adequate time and resources to Afghanistan. He observed that when Afghans most needed help at the start of the war, “the Bush administration insisted on a miserly approach even as it pushed Afghanistan to build a democracy and national institutions from scratch.”13 Whitlock’s use of “miserly” reflects the lack of financial and institutional support given to Afghanistan. He also addressed the hasty building of a new Afghan government, one of the first U.S. attempts at reconstruction. Whitlock further argued that the U.S. made the “hubristic mistake” of assuming the Afghanistan conflict ended successfully and on American terms. He noted that bin Laden had not been captured, making the focus of Afghanistan occupation on military efforts to capture him rather than using the military to promote nation-building. Whitlock concluded, “Washington stopped paying much attention to Afghanistan and became preoccupied with another country in the region: Iraq.”14

Pauline Baker made a similar argument to Whitlock’s military mindset. In “Forging a U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Fragile States,” Baker asserted that only focusing on military strategies during nation-building skews “perceptions on fragile states,” which causes “operational imperatives” to supersede an understanding of what must be accomplished for long-term nation-building.15 Baker added that the military objectives were “sometimes compatible” with broader nation-building, but were pursued even if incompatible.16 The operational imperatives in Afghanistan focused on short-term efforts, such as opium eradication, over long term nation-building efforts like alternative development. Gregg elaborated on the difficulty of balancing nation-building with military operations. Similar to this paper, Gregg used counternarcotics as one example of such difficulties. She stated counternarcotics “required targeting warlords in the country,” yet the U.S. needed the Afghan warlords to “hunt for al-Qaeda and suppress the Taliban.”17 Gregg further asserted that counternarcotic operations hurt the “livelihood of average farmers who had few viable alternatives for earning a living.”18

According to Gregg, the focus on military operations led to a failure to involve the Afghan people in nation-building. Like Rashid, Gregg pointed out the United States’ disregard for Afghanistan’s unique challenges. Gregg argued that the “intervening powers” in Afghanistan predetermined how Afghanistan would be structured and why, and intervening powers did not try to “understand the population’s vulnerabilities, needs, or hopes.”19 She further added that in some instances, “efforts taken by intervening powers actually worked against the population’s needs and fueled perceptions of mistrust and insecurity.”20 Gregg’s argument can also be applied to ethnocentrism, as she noted the U.S. did not attempt to understand Afghans, and instead implemented changes the U.S. saw as most desirable.

Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, who took the lead on building the Afghan National Army, found from his experience that Afghans saw themselves as part of a nation. However, there is a difference between loyalty to a state and to a nation. Eikenberry said he had preconceptions that Afghanistan would be “a group of tribes and various ethnic groups and factions, especially after the three decades of warfare that they had been through.”21 But he found that Afghans had great pride in their tribal and ethnic identities: “At the end of the day, their first identification was as an Afghan.”22 But, as would become a problem for Afghan nation-building, Eikenberry added that Afghans have wildly “different ideas about what the Afghan state should look like.”23 Understanding these different ideas and how they intertwined within the Afghan cultural and ethnic structure was important for the development of the Afghan government and counternarcotics efforts. Keane stated that nation-building is “confronted with a unique set of problems and obstacles, arising from the historical specificity of the country in which such projects are pursued.”24 Garrett Pierman, writer of “The Grand Strategy of Nonstate Actors,” asserted the U.S. failed to understand the roles of al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, and such failure “leads to overly simple notions of non-state actors.”25 In counternarcotic efforts, the U.S. did not predict the reaction rural Afghan farmers had to eradication. Rashid argued that the U.S. tried to nation-build, without any attempt to understand the history, culture, society, or traditions of those countries.26

The United States had successfully nation-built before. The Marshall Plan after World  War II is cited in historiography as the most successful nation-building campaign in history.  James Dobbins, an expert in nation-building in Afghanistan, stated: “The cases of Germany and Japan set a standard for post conflict nation-building that has not been matched since.”27 The U.S. spent more on nation-building in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2020 ($143 billion) than it had in Western Europe.28 While the Marshall Plan in Europe was successful, Afghanistan in 2001 was an unprecedented challenge to the modern U.S. government. Post-World War II Europe had an educated and literate population, was already technologically advanced with industrialized economies, and despite regional varieties in Europe, the culture and languages were comparable to the U.S.29

In comparison, Afghanistan had a literacy rate of approximately 28 percent in 2001, and it was divided by tribal, regional, and ethnic boundaries.30 While there is the idea of an Afghan national identity, attempts to nation-build might create conflicts for reasons which preceded the arrival of  troops to Afghanistan. A soldier with experience in Afghanistan during the Taliban’s rule in the 1990s stated: “Blood feuds between families and tribes can last for generations over a perceived or actual slight.”31 Anthropologist Thomas Barfield contends that the history of political authority in the country made it difficult to install a “Marshall Plan for Afghanistan.” He notes that authority is focused on family, tribal elders, or through warlords and the Taliban.32 Stable state authority was rare in the country, even more so when authority came in the form of ruthless groups like the Taliban.

Understanding Afghanistan’s History & Ethnocentrism

The lack of understanding or knowledge the U.S. demonstrated towards Afghanistan’s history led to preventable consequences, and conceptualizing the reality of Afghanistan will assist this paper’s argument. In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to “keep the Communist sympathizing governments in power.”33 The Soviets developed infrastructure and established a trade network but “ignored Afghanistan’s complex political landscape and its  cultural nuances.”34 Consequently, a national uprising ensued and resistance groups eventually unified under the Islamic flag and became known as the mujahideen.35 Soon the Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen formed, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) began funding the resistance in 1985. In 1989 the Soviet Union left Afghanistan defeated, and the CIA followed. The Soviet Union continued to send aid to Afghanistan until 1991, when it collapsed. It is important to note that like the U.S. eventually did, the Soviets were also implementing short-term demonstratable actions and were met with resistance when it failed to consider Afghan history.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Afghans had no legitimate state, no national  leadership, and dozens of armed militia groups.36 The Soviet war crippled the Afghan economy,  so illicit activity and criminal networks flourished. The mujahideen parties broke up into warring factions, igniting a civil war for control of the country. The civil war destroyed Afghanistan’s infrastructure and economy. The Taliban, an ethnically Pashtun religious group, came to prominence and seized Afghanistan by 1996. They ruled the country under Sharia, and the way of life under the Taliban was “utterly alien to Afghan culture and tradition.”37 Before the U.S. entered Afghanistan, “the legitimacy of the Taliban regime [had] started to decrease” because it had failed to end the civil war, local and humanitarian conditions worsen, and “cultural” restrictions had become harsher.38 Because the Taliban ruled through law and order, when that faltered any faith Afghans had in their government faded. Therefore, it was important for the United States to enter Afghanistan and provide law and order through the cooperation of the Afghan people. Rashid stated that Afghans were “literally on their knees begging” for  international assistance so their “benighted country could be rebuilt.” He further adds that  Afghans “knew well enough that without security there could be no economic development,” and when the West refused to provide such security and instead relied on warlords, Afghans knew the U.S. “was insincere about rebuilding the country.”39

The failure or choice to ignore Afghan history can be attributed to ethnocentrism. Cindy  D. Kam and Donald R. Kinder defined ethnocentrism as a “general outlook on groups and group  relations, one that partitions the social world into us and them, into friend and foe.”40 Social  scientist Boris Bizumic elaborated the definition of ethnocentrism in “Theories of Ethnocentrism  and Their Implications for Peacebuilding.” He defined ethnocentrism as “a strong sense of ethnic  group self-importance and self-centeredness,”which creates an attitude that a situation could  be made better if out-groups modeled themselves based on the in-groups standards.41 The  journal article “What Is and Is Not Ethnocentrism: A Conceptual Analysis and Political  Implications,” written by Boris Bizumic and John Duckitt, clarified that ethnocentrism can be  related to many types of groups, “primarily those that are structured around specific ideologies” (political, national, religious), or other groups that have a “distinct way of life or culture.”42 The consequences of this attitude is seen in the development of a western style democracy in  Afghanistan, where the Taliban had only recently been deposed.

Duckitt and Bizumic further explained that ethnocentrism can be categorized into  different “facets.” One such facet, called the “exploitiveness” facet, can be applied to the U.S. counternarcotic strategies. This form of ethnocentrism is summarized as, “the belief that one’s  own ethnic group’s interests are of foremost importance and that pursuing them little or no consideration should be given to the views and feelings of outgroups.”43 A disregard for Afghans reliance on the opium poppy economy demonstrated this facet of ethnocentrism. In attempts to  prove the country could handle expanding its GWOT, the U.S. counternarcotics efforts were designed for short-term demonstrable results. Eradication, the physical destruction of opium crops, was the quickest way to show success. However, it was known by 2003 that the best way to curb Afghanistan’s opium crisis was through alternative development, in which aid projects are created in hopes of reducing poppy cultivation by creating legal economic alternatives. This required a long-term commitment, and the Bush administration was unwilling to do so. Ethnocentrism in nation-building translates to U.S. actions that disregarded Afghanistan’s history in order to benefit the U.S. and their sales pitch for the Iraq War.

Estabilishing Western Democracy in Afghanistan

The Bush administration demonstrated ethnocentrism when a western style democratic government was installed in Afghanistan. As previously mentioned, the 1979 Soviet invasion,  the civil war that followed, and Taliban rule left Afghanistan in a state of chaos. Establishing a complicated democracy was an unrealistic standard, yet it was pursued. On December 5, 2001, NATO allies and non-affiliated members of the international community agreed to supply aid to assist in reconstructing Afghanistan. The agreement came to be known as the Bonn Agreement,  and the standards put forth foreshadowed the consistent disregard for Afghan’s needs. The agreement was made without input from the U.S. military, creating a disconnect between nation-building and military campaigns. Keane argued that the creation of deadlines for reconstruction and the delegation of nation-building task to NATO allies in the agreement “exemplified a  preference for a short-term commitment.”44

The history of authority in Afghanistan, as previously noted by Thomas Barfield, was not  one that could easily welcome such an institution into their country. Gregg asserted “many areas  outside cities had little to no concept of a central government or the relationship between  governments and their citizens.”45 Keane said this effort was “an unlikely, if not all together  utopian challenge,” due to Afghanistan’s economic underdevelopment and “institutional fragility  born of decades of military and authoritarian rule.”46 Andrew Levin, a researcher for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), noted “the challenge of establishing a “modern” nation state with territorial integrity is  compounded by ethnic divisions and unions.”47 The appointment of Hamid Karzai as the Afghan Interim President created a challenge for nation-building. The Pashtun ethnic group, who have roots in Afghanistan and Pakistan, were upset by Karzai and his primarily Tajik government. The Tajik’s were the primary ethnic makeup of the North Alliance, the U.S. allies in Afghanistan during the Soviet War. United States Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) highlighted the difficult position the new  government was in: “our policy is to support President Karzai, but his Tajik-dominated government has alienated the majority of the Pashtun population, who live in most of the opium producing areas in Afghanistan.”48

U.S. officials lamented the idea of building this type of government. One unnamed  official said in an interview that creating this government “was idiotic because Afghanistan does  not have a history of a strong central government.” Like Keane, the official highlighted the problem time constraints put on such a plan. “The time frame for creating a strong central  government is one hundred years, which we don’t have.”49 Richard Boucher, an experienced  American diplomat, asserted that it was wrong to assume Afghanistan would become an  American style state. Boucher stated: “You are trying to build a systematic government a la  Washington, D.C. in a country that doesn’t operate that way.”50 Colonel Terry Sellers explained the issue of convincing the Afghan people to support the Karzai government: “They didn’t really understand or see a benefit of having a centralized government: “I’ve raised my sheep and goats and vegetables on this piece of land for hundreds of years and not had a centralized government. Why do I need one now?”51

Lieutenant Colonel Todd Guggisberg explained that the Afghan’s history of loyalty to  their family and tribe meant some, “couldn’t care less about who President Karzai is and the fact that he’s in charge of Kabul.”52 General Karl Eikenberry said, “the great challenge that we faced in 2002 and 2003 and still face today…is that the security institutions of Afghanistan were already highly suspect by most of the people.” General Eikenberry acknowledged the importance of understanding Afghanistan’s history; if a country is suspicious of central governments and security sectors, efforts like eradication legitimized their suspicions.

The Rush to Iraq & Counternarcotics

U.S. sights were set on Iraq almost immediately after the invasion of Afghanistan on  October 16, 2001. There were hints that Rumsfeld may have been focused on Iraq ten days after  9/11. On September 21, Rumsfeld sent a memo that asked the military academies to focus “on  pushing Arabic language instruction soon.”53 Two months later, Rumsfeld sent a memo asking  for “a piece of paper showing me the languages spoken in Afghanistan, by percentage.”54 Rumsfeld may have been surprised to learn the official languages of Afghanistan were Pashto and Dari, with smaller percentages of Uzbek and Turkman languages, not Arabic. While it could be ignorance, Rumsfeld was likely already planning logistics for a war in Iraq, particularly considering planning for a war in Afghanistan was already underway. By December of 2001,  Rumsfeld was undeniably pushing for an Iraq invasion. In a memo sent to Steve Cambone,  Rumsfeld attached a note from Newt Gingrich. The attached note stated, “no war game prior to  Afghanistan showed the campaign we are living through.” Furthermore, Gingrich guessed that  “none of the current analysis of the Iraq opportunity take into account the historic FACTS of  these three campaigns” (Speaking about Afghanistan and the U.S. involvement in Iraq during the 1990s).55  Rumsfeld responded to this note stating he wants to get involved in “war gaming” for a future invasion of Iraq. The memo is important as it demonstrated some in the Bush administration knew missions in Afghanistan were already faltering for not taking Afghanistan’s history into account, and additionally shows how quickly sights were set on Iraq in the Pentagon.56 A few weeks later, Rumsfeld was asking for all information available about Iraqi Kurds.57

Capitol Hill also set their eyes on Iraq soon after the Afghan war began. Four months  after the invasion, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held a hearing on February 5,  2002. U.S. Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) stated: “our military forces have restored civilization to Afghanistan, but our country’s greatest challenge lies ahead. We must finish the business in  Afghanistan and bin Laden before we undertake new military commitments, and then, Saddam  must go.”58 During another committee hearing on June 26, then-U.S. Senator Joe Biden (D-DE)  stated: “anyone who wants to see Saddam Hussein removed from power in Iraq will be looking very closely at the administrations game plan in Afghanistan.” Biden’s statement demonstrated that Afghanistan was important for getting support for an Iraq invasion. “Simply put, if we can’t demonstrate long term commitment in Afghanistan, nobody will trust us to make long term  commitment in Iraq.”59

The connection between the opium trade and income for terrorist groups was made early  in the Afghan invasion. However, the former warlords who were allied with the U.S. also made  their money off of the drug trade, which made counternarcotic efforts complicated. The SIGAR  report found, “when the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, countering the Afghan drug trade was neither a primary justification nor a major focus of the U.S. effort. Afghan heroin did not then and does not now enter the United States in significant quantities.”60 Congressional rhetoric, unlike what the SIGAR report found, suggested otherwise. Craig Whitlock argued that “though poppies had nothing to do with why the United States had declared war, members of Congress pressed the Bush administration to prioritize the issue.”61 He theorized this was because politically, it was difficult for Congress to explain to American voters why the U.S. was “fighting in a war to rescue a country that produced opium more than any other in the world.”62 Before the invasion, a House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources made the connection between the Afghan opium economy and terrorism. The Chairman, U.S. Representative Dan Burton (R-IN), began with “the September 11th attacks on our country  immediately highlighted the dark synergies between narcotics trafficking and international  terrorism.”63 He further implores, “we must quickly determine how best to address serious drug policy issues to which we previously had devoted little national attention.”64

The first counternarcotic efforts in Afghanistan were implemented by the United  Kingdom, who began “Operation Drown,” a “compensated eradication” program designed to give opium farmers $350 per jerib of opium poppy destroyed.65 The campaign began in April 2002 and quickly ran into trouble. Eradication, the physical destruction of crops, brought unforeseen consequences to the U. K.’s efforts. Instead of allowing the British to eradicate their poppy for good, some Afghan farmers began growing more poppy to get increased compensation, or they eradicated one season of crops and replanted after the British left.66

Michael Metrinko, a U.S. commander, seemed unsurprised from this development.  “Afghans, like most other people, are quite willing to accept large sums of money and promise anything knowing that you will go away. The British would come and hand out sums of money and Afghans would say ‘Yes, yes, yes, we’re going to burn it right now,’ and the Brits would leave. They would then get two sources of income from the same crop.”67 An agriculturalist  interviewed by SIGAR described the operation as an “appalling piece of complete raw naiveté,”  and elaborated by saying those in charge had “no knowledge of nuances and I don’t know if they really cared.”68 The outcome of Operation Drown highlighted Pierman’s assertion that understanding the actors of the state being reconstructed is required for success. The U.K. assumed Afghan farmers would prefer a one-time payment rather than continue with their livelihood.

Illicit activity, such as opium-poppy cultivation, flourished after the Soviet-Afghan war  crippled the Afghan economy. Many Afghans who did not flee were left in a country with  destroyed land and no agriculture opportunities, and soon “turned to poppy cultivation, since  poppies required little water and could grow in poor agricultural conditions.”69 Opium production increased significantly after the Taliban takeover in 1996, and by 1999 Afghanistan  became the world’s largest illicit opium supplier. Opium poppy is harvested by slicing open the  seed pod of the plant, a process called “lancing.” A milky-white sap comes from the seed pod,  and this is taken and dried into a resin, which unlike fruits, vegetables, grains, does not go bad  and is easily transported. The resin is then taken to drug labs where it is used to make illegal morphine and heroin.70 Poppy has been called the “economic glue that binds political institutions  together” and provides a “stable and reliable source of income.”71

Levin noted that “agricultural development is a key to Afghanistan’s long-term stability  by providing food, rural livelihood, and the growth of the Afghan economy.”72 Keane further argued that, “without desirable agricultural alternatives Afghans coveted the lucrative profits poppy farming ensured.”73 Vanda Felbab-Brown highlighted the importance of opium poppy to the socioeconomic makeup of Afghanistan, particularly the jobs poppy cultivation created saying: “highly-labor intensive, vastly surpassing employment opportunities in all other sectors of the economy except the security sector.” She acknowledged that due to the labor intensive process, “if all of Afghanistan’s poppy cultivation was replaced with wheat, four-fifths of the country’s people would lose their employment.” Gregg further highlighted this issue, adding “the lack of ability to offer alternatives to black market economies has arguably been the greatest hindrance to economic development in the country.”74

For the landless or land-poor, poppy is not simply a source of income. Cultivation  provides access to a range of assets, including land, water, credit, and employment.75 The opium economy can include a sharecropping system for income and the opportunity to grow non-opium crops for a household. Non-land owners can be employed as a farm laborer performing jobs such as weeding and harvesting. Opium income allows Afghans to provide food, settle debts, and invest in public opportunity such as education and transportation.76 Because the opium crop is so important to some Afghan’s livelihood, short term efforts that do not attempt to replace their lost income guaranteed counter-narcotic efforts could not stick.77 “We know that planting poppy is bad,” said Jalaluddin Khan, an opium farmer in the southern Helmand province, “but our country is destroyed, and we have received little assistance, so we have no real alternative to  poppy.”78 In a Lessons Learned interview, Colonel Dominic Cariello observed: “Ninety percent of the people’s income of the Helmand province comes from selling poppy. Now we’re taking it away. Yeah, of course they’re going to take up weapons and shoot at you. You just took away their livelihood. They have a family to feed.”79

The British accepted the campaign was a disaster and sought a global review of eradication to gain perspective. The report concluded that “premature eradication damages the  environment in which alternative livelihood initiatives operate and undermines the development  of long-term solutions to the causes of drug production.”80 The report continued, “eradication  works were preceded by comprehensive development programs to promote alternative, licit livelihoods.”81 Consequently, the U.K. would only take part in eradication where alternative livelihoods had been developed. The U.S. did not want to commit to such developments, but still wanted to move forward with counter-narcotic efforts. When the British learned about the direct effect counter-narcotic efforts had on Afghan farmers, they adjusted their operations. When the U.S. learned of the effects, they ignored the findings and continued with their mission of eradication.

In 2003, the Afghan poppy harvest increased, a fact that worried the Bush administration and members of Congress. To support the counternarcotic efforts, Congress authorized $73  million for the Department of Defense’s (DOD) operations.82 At the same time, the DOD had its hands full with the invasion of Iraq which occurred in March. Funds, interest, and operations in Afghanistan all suffered due to the invasion of Iraq, which left counternarcotics with less resources. One month before the Iraq invasion, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held a hearing titled “Reconstruction of Afghanistan.” This hearing demonstrated the distraction Iraq was to become, as well as the awareness among legislatures that current reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan were stalled or ineffective. Senator Biden stated, “We’re already seeing Afghanistan drop from the radar screen—what level of commitment will the administration display once Afghanistan has to line up behind Iraq, North Korea, and whatever comes next?”83 Chairman and U.S. Senator Richard G. Lugar (R-IN) added: “the United States will be focusing increased attention on threats posed by Iraq and North Korea, but we cannot abandon our commitments or lose sight of our goals in Afghanistan.” He reasoned sights must stay on Afghanistan because the “international community will take notice of our staying power in Afghanistan,” and goals must “bolster our ability to attract allies in the war against terrorism.”84 His statement demonstrated ethnocentrism as he clarified the U.S. goals in Afghanistan must “bolster” the ability for the U.S. to attract allies in the war on terror, rather than considering what goals would best leave Afghanistan stabilized.

David T. Johnson, the coordinator for Afghanistan Assistance in the Department of State,  said the Bush administration was “placing a greater emphasis on reconstruction,” noting that, “major infrastructure projects are getting under way, in addition to numerous small scale projects  across the country.”85 The infrastructure projects, such as Ring Road, a massive undertaking to connect one highway across all of Afghanistan, were minimal efforts designed to show an accomplishment but did not actively implement change to Afghan reconstruction. Rashid  established that these short-term efforts were “swift and cheap, such as digging a well, repairing  a small bridge, or repairing a broken-down school building, and were supposed to convince the  population reconstruction was moving ahead.”86 The small-scale projects across the country, like eradication, only alienated the Afghan people from the U.S. and the Afghan governments. While the construction of a road in a place where none existed before seems like progress to an outsider, life still remained the same for many Afghans, making the U.S. presence seem useless.

The neglect of long term efforts continued, and three months after the hearing on Afghan  reconstruction, House Representative Mark Souder (R-IN) stated: “Afghanistan is one we have  kind of turned the other way on, and, unfortunately, they are replanting the poppy, because we  have not been aggressive enough.”87 An October 16 hearing with the Foreign Relations committee of the Senate, titled “Afghanistan: In Pursuit of Security and Democracy,” saw a consensus that Afghanistan was off the radar of the United States. Additionally, there is a clear juxtaposition when the Iraq and Afghan economies were discussed. Speakers acknowledged that  Afghanistan’s economy was not viable for long term stability, yet substantially more resources were allocated to Iraq.

Compared to the opium economy in Afghanistan, Iraq had a licit and lucrative resource:  oil. The Chairman of the aforementioned hearing, Lugar, began by stating: “we should see  Afghanistan not just as a problem, but rather as an opportunity. Afghanistan was the opening  front in the war on terrorism, and visible progress there will resonate for an international  audience.” “Visible progress” as stated previously, was typically short-term projects Rashid spoke of and were ineffective. Lugar continued, “Afghanistan’s population is far less educated than Iraq’s. It lacks abundant oil resources that could serve as an engine for reconstruction. Many  areas of Afghanistan lack even rudimentary infrastructure.”88 Lugar’s words suggested  Afghanistan would be the more difficult nation to build, especially because Afghanistan needed more reconstruction funding from outside sources, as Iraq already had an existing economy.

Inconceivably, the budgets for the two war fronts were vastly different, with Iraq receiving substantially more funding. The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations bill for Iraq and Afghanistan had $87 billion allocated for reconstruction efforts. Lugar noted, “though most of the attention to the bill has focused on the funding devoted to Iraq, the bill includes $10.5 billion to continue military activities in Afghanistan and $1.2 billion in assistance to accelerate  Afghan reconstruction.”89 U.S. Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE) acknowledged, “5% less construction funding for Iraq could more than double the amount of new money available for reconstruction in Afghanistan.” He added: “while much of our attention has been focused on Iraq over the past year, we cannot lose sight of our interest in helping support the transition of stability and democracy in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is the first battle in the war on terrorism, a battle that is joined but not won.”90 The 2003 hearing showed that the U.S. was aware of the dwindling focus on Afghanistan, but remained steadfast in its pursuit of a new warfront. Additionally, Congress still demonstrated a commitment only to efforts that would directly benefit the U.S. Ahmed Rashid concluded that 2003 and 2004 saw “visible frustration” among Afghans at the lack of reconstruction in their country, including aid money spent on U.S. contractors and Western NGOs.91 The lack of long-term commitments was not lost on the Afghans, and if progress was not in sight, what made the U.S. different from the Soviets?

The U.S. Pursues Eradication

The U.S. concerns of the U. K.’s effectiveness as head of counternarcotics led to a push for an increased U.S. role in the project.92 Beginning in 2004, new counternarcotic efforts led by the U.S. and Afghan forces demonstrated the desperation for quick solutions no matter the  consequences. In response to the 2003 opium cultivation increase, Robert Charles was chosen as  the new Assistant Secretary of State for the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). Charles wanted a “far more robust campaign of crop eradication” and began advocating for such measures in Congress.93 On April 1, 2004, a House Foreign Relations hearing titled “Afghanistan: Are the British Counternarcotics Efforts Going Wobbly?” demonstrated how the desire for quick results blinded the speakers from pursuing alternative development—despite acknowledging that this was the best option. Souder began by stating that the British efforts were “stalled” just as the south of Afghanistan was getting ready for their first harvest of poppy.94 Ethnocentrism was evident when Souder stated a problem with the British efforts was that “they believe the alternative development process needs to be in place before eradication,” consistent with the findings of historiography and study results. He continued: “All of us believe that alternative development is critical for Afghanistan. All of us realize we need to spend more money on that. The question is, are they going to let the poppy out if they don’t have the alternative development in place?”95 Souder’s language suggested an immediacy to the future counternarcotic efforts, implying that if actions were not decided upon quickly the illicit opium was going to be cultivated and released into the world drug trade. However, counternarcotic efforts were yet to be successful in preventing the opium trade from occurring and any action taken in 2004 was likely to have similar consequences to the 2003 efforts.

Robert Charles testified at this hearing that there needed to be “direct, effective and measurable action” to counter the opium cultivation. He also acknowledged that, while resistance from the Afghans is likely without long term efforts, the eradication goals were more important. Charles said, “Criteria such as developing alternative development to be in place and  a preoccupation with avoiding any possibility of resistance may restrict our ability to collectively  reach these eradication goals.”96 He further added that while the U.S. feels “empathy to the very  poor people” in the world, allowing heroin and cocaine to leave Afghanistan will destroy “families all over the world,” and sooner or later, “the countries that are producing it.”97 Charles demonstrated ethnocentrism by noting yet ignoring the best option in Afghanistan in favor of quick eradication, an effort that hurts primarily rural Afghan farmers while increasing the value of opium poppy in other areas of Afghanistan.

The Afghan government, the British government, the International Security Assistance  Force (ISAF) and other agencies argued “eradication needed to be more strategic, targeting those  who could most afford to lose their opium crop and in locations where economic options were  available.”98 Major John Bates, who was on the ground during Operation River Dance, stated he and his colleagues established Congress and the President had pressured for action on the opium trade to gain more reconstruction funding. As Whitlock stated, it is difficult to justify a war in a country that produces a large portion of the world’s heroin. Bates noticed the issues with rushing eradication, however, saying: “It’s early Spring. There’s no time to have programs to train farmers to grow other crops, which is a concern for the local populace. What are farmers going to do without money from opium? We determined there was no time to develop, resource, and  implement alternative crop operations.”99 Although there was no time to develop alternative crops, Bates and his team were still responsible for eradication.

Mark L. Schneider, the senior vice president of the International Crisis Group based in  Washington, D.C. testified that: “the British, particularly in the prelude of elections, argue  against forces eradication of a small impoverished farmer’s crop when there is nothing to offer in  return,” adding that the U.K. unsurprisingly “believe it will antagonize those farmers and make them far more likely to sympathize with opposition forces.”100 Despite the U.K.’s findings after  Operation Drown, the U.S. was still going to “move forward on eradication under any  circumstances—whether there is replacement income or not.”101 Schneider’s argument is  evident by the U.S. eradication efforts during Operation River Dance during 2005 to 2006. River Dance demonstrated that the U.S. push to move into eradication directly led to Afghan anger at U.S. troops, and consequently, the Afghan government that is supposed to be building national support.

Operation River Dance & Consequences

Operation River Dance demonstrated the effects of ethnocentrism in nation-building. The training soldiers received pre-deployment reflected an ambivalent attitude towards Afghanistan. The American troops witnessing Operation River Dance quicky understood why it might fail: there were no alternative development options for the Afghan farmers. In order to successfully  nation-build, the culture and history of the country needed to be understood to implement change  that stuck. However, the focus on Iraq affected the training received by troops before deployment. Cultural training for international deployment was especially important for Afghanistan, as the Afghan way of living was far different than American culture. Major Alvin Tilley described culture shock from just how remote some Afghan villages were. “You go there and think you’re going to see Moses walking down the street.”102

The pre-deployment training received by some troops reflected the U.S. focus on Iraq and disregard for Afghanistan. Major John Bates, who received training in April of 2005, stated that instructors in charge of culture and language told trainees: “this is really for Iraq but Iraq is similar to Afghanistan.”103 Colonel Dominic Cariello stated that when he asked his cultural  instructor to train him for his specific job (training the Afghan army) his instructor informed him: “well, I haven’t been to Afghanistan so I don’t know how I’m going to tell you to do that.” He added they were “feeling their way through. They had a lot of Iraq training and now all of a  sudden they’re doing Afghanistan.”104 Major Daniel Lovett stated during his cultural awareness  class the instructor began by saying: “all right, when you get to Iraq.” When Lovett informed the instructor they were deployed to Afghanistan, the instructor replied: “oh Iraq, Afghanistan, it’s the same thing.”105 Like Donald Rumsfeld’s confusion over the languages spoken in  Afghanistan, Major Douglas Ross stated his instructor tried to teach them Arabic instead of  Pashto and Dari, leading him to conclude the training was “a waste.”106

Once deployed for eradication, it became evident to the American’s that their government had poorly planned for such operations, with many quickly realizing the only way for eradication to work was through alternative development and education campaigns. Major Doug Ross, deployed from July 2005 to July 2006, had the job of mentoring the Afghan National Army during River Dance. Ross said he never saw a plan for how to specifically eradicate or how much they should eradicate, and when he left for Afghanistan, he still did not know what his mission was. He confirmed there was no objective, just a broad order to “support eradication.”107 John Bates noted that prior to troop arrival for eradication, there had been no information campaign to inform Afghans eradication was going to take place. Bates argued that information campaigns should “have been at the national level. [President] Karzai should have had posters.108 Doug Ross said he thought they (the Afghan government) “should’ve gone in and told the local populace that next year we’re going to come in and cut down all your poppy.” Ross also noted that along with information campaigns, the U.S. should have “tried to provide other opportunities for them.”109

The importance of alternative development was reiterated bluntly by the soldiers interviewed. Bates told a story about attempting to supply seeds for Afghan farmers after their crops were eradicated. His story highlighted the “ambivalence” of the American bureaucratic system Keane discussed. Bates had connections with U.S. agricultural companies, who when asked quickly agreed to donate as many seeds as Bates thought he needed. The company added that if Bates thought he could get the seeds through U.S. customs and other customs ports, he  must have been “smoking a lot of dope…or opium.”110 In this instance, the issue was not a lack of trying for alternative development, but the complicated system of networks that had to be managed before any change could be implemented.

The lessons learned from Americans’ experience during River Dance were not surprising. The possible outcome of eradication without alternative development was acknowledged time and time again in Congress. The choice by the U.S. to ignore the facts and instead push on with eradication directly affected the broader military goal in Afghanistan. As the Afghan population continued to grow discontent with the eradication efforts, the Taliban became a logical choice for the locals. The Taliban promised to protect landowners and farmers from eradication efforts, and in turn more Afghan men joined their ranks.111 Furthermore, the  Afghan forces fighting under the Afghan government and President Karzai were associated with the eradication efforts, which alienated the Afghan people from the government they were supposed to embrace. The Director of INL’s Afghanistan-Pakistan office explained: “urging Karzai to mount an effective counternarcotics campaign was like asking an American president to halt all U.S. economic activity west of the Mississippi. That was the magnitude of what we  were asking the Afghans to do.”112

A Taliban member interviewed stated that “day by day people got fed up with this Afghan government and welcomed the Taliban back in their districts.”113 Mike Winstead explained: “because we did not give them money for that loss there and then, and because officially we were taking away their livelihood with nothing to give them, it caused a tremendous amount of hard feelings with the locals.” He elaborated that eradication was not seen as a law enforcement activity to Afghan farmers, it was “seen as punishment of the locals for growing poppy and that causes a lot of ill will.”114 Keane conducted an interview with a U.S. military commander, during which the commander called eradication “hugely counter-productive” because it put all the “weight of counternarcotics effort on the farmers—the people you’re trying to get on your side and secure from the enemy.”115 A young Taliban member testified in an interview: “the fighting started because of opium. They started destroying the opium fields of the people, that’s why they became angry.” He continued to point out the importance of opium to the economy, saying “the rich people had land and they grew opium, so it was good for them. For the poor farmers without land who worked the land, it was good, because they got 20 or 30 percent or some percentage of the opium, so for the poor workers it was also a very good job. When they started destroying the opium fields, the people— landowners, farmers, poor people— everyone became angry. And they started fighting.”116 The Taliban member’s statement supports the theory that had alternative development been pursued and a new, licit economy created, perhaps poor farmers would not have turned to the Taliban.

Conclusion

The Bush administration and Congress demonstrated ethnocentrism by its dismissal of Afghanistan’s history, culture, and nation-building needs. The war in Afghanistan was used as an opportunity to sell the U.S. ability to fight a war in Iraq, and consequently efforts were guided by  the need for quick results which never established long term change. The short-term efforts are  seen in the early establishment of a representative democracy and the prioritization of eradication over alternative development. If the U.S. had considered what the British inquiry found that eradication did not work without alternative development-perhaps counternarcotic and other reconstruction efforts could have succeeded. But the U.S. pushed forward with efforts like eradication, leading to Afghan anger, the delegitimization of the Karzai government, and a  Taliban resurgence. Understanding the history of another country that the U.S. is engaged with seems like common sense. However, when history is disregarded in favor of convenience, the consequences can be as severe, as seen in Afghanistan. If the U.S. pursues nation-building in the future, considering the country’s history and culture when conducting reconstruction will guarantee a better outcome. But, if the U.S. continues to prioritize its own military objectives while ignoring the effects of its actions, disasters like Afghanistan will continue. Perhaps the ethics of nation-building should be reconsidered, as the U.S. departure from Afghanistan caused a humanitarian disaster that continues to worsen.

Footnotes

  1. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 116-91, U.S. Lessons Learned in Afghanistan, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., January 15, 2020, Eliot Engel (D-NY). ↩︎
  2. Conor Keane, US Nation-Building in Afghanistan (New York, NY: Routledge, 2016), 24,  https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/id/ef44bf21-5894-4d85-ac09-f5a9e9695155/650045.pdf. ↩︎
  3. Cindy D. Kam and Donald R. Kinder, “Terror and Ethnocentrism: Foundations of American Support for the War on Terrorism,” The Journal of Politics 69, no. 2 (May 2007): 321, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00534.x. ↩︎
  4. Robert Axelrod and Ross Hammond, “The Evolution of Ethnocentrism,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 6  (December 2006): 926, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27638531. ↩︎
  5. Keane, US Nation-Building in Afghanistan, 3. ↩︎
  6. Heather Selma Gregg, Building the Nation: Missed Opportunities in Iraq and Afghanistan (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2018): 5,  https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv80c9vn. ↩︎
  7. Gregg, 65. ↩︎
  8. Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New  York, NY: Penguin Group, 2009), xlix. ↩︎
  9. Rashid, Descent into Chaos, xlix. ↩︎
  10. Rashid, Descent into Chaos, xlii. ↩︎
  11. Keane, US Nation-Building in Afghanistan, 6. ↩︎
  12. Keane, US Nation-Building in Afghanistan, 3. ↩︎
  13. Craig Whitlock, The Afghanistan Papers (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2021), 30. ↩︎
  14. Whitlock, Afghanistan Papers, 15. ↩︎
  15. Pauline Baker, “Forging a U.S. Policy Toward Fragile States,” Prism 1, no. 2 (March 2010): 72,  https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/prism/prism_1-2/prism_1-2.pdf. ↩︎
  16. Baker, “Forging a U.S. Policy Toward Fragile States,” 72. ↩︎
  17. Gregg, Building the Nation, 183. ↩︎
  18. Gregg, Building the Nation, 183. ↩︎
  19. Gregg, Building the Nation, 180. ↩︎
  20. Gregg, Building the Nation, 190. ↩︎
  21. Karl Eikenberry, interview by Dr. Lisa Beckenbaugh, November 27, 2006, Eyewitness to War, Combat Studies  Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi books/EyewitnessToWar_VolumeIII_Brooks.pdf. ↩︎
  22. Eikenberry, interview. ↩︎
  23. Eikenberry, interview. ↩︎
  24. Keane, US Nation-Building in Afghanistan, 3. ↩︎
  25. Garrett Pierman, “The Grand Strategy of Nonstate Actors: Theory and Implications,” Journal of Strategic Security  8, no. 4 (Winter 2015): 74, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26465216. ↩︎
  26. Rashid, Descent into Chaos, xlii. ↩︎
  27. James Dobbins, America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (Monica, CA: RAND Corporation,  2003). https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1753.html. ↩︎
  28. Whitlock, Afghanistan Papers, 30. ↩︎
  29. Keane, US Nation-Building in Afghanistan, 20. ↩︎
  30. Rashid, Descent into Chaos, 207. ↩︎
  31. SendMeHack@aol.com, email to David Davis, September 28, 2001 in E-Mail on Afghanistan, Donald Rumsfeld memo to Paul Wolfowitz, October 2, 2001, Donald Rumsfeld Snowflakes Litigation Release, Washington  Headquarters Services, https://www.esd.whs.mil/FOIA/Donald_Rumsfeld_Snowflakes_Litigation_Release/. ↩︎
  32. Gregg, Building the Nation, 168. ↩︎
  33. Gregg, Building the Nation, 157. ↩︎
  34. Keane, US Nation-Building in Afghanistan, 33. ↩︎
  35. One who engages in jihad. ↩︎
  36. Gregg, Building the Nation, 159. ↩︎
  37. Rashid, Descent into Chaos, 14. ↩︎
  38. SendMeHack@aol.com, email to David Davis, September 28, 2001 in E-Mail on Afghanistan, Donald Rumsfeld memo to Paul Wolfowitz, October 2, 2001, Donald Rumsfeld Snowflakes Litigation Release, Washington  Headquarters Services, https://www.esd.whs.mil/FOIA/Donald_Rumsfeld_Snowflakes_Litigation_Release/. ↩︎
  39. Rashid, Descent into Chaos, 196. ↩︎
  40. Kam and Kinder, “Terror and Ethnocentrism,” xx. https://www-jstor.org.ezproxy.ycp.edu:8443/stable/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00534.x?pq-origsite=summon&seq=2. ↩︎
  41. Boris Bizumic,“Theories of Ethnocentrism and Their Implications for Peacebuilding,” in Peace and Psychology in the Balkans, ed. Olivera Simic, 37, Springer, 2012. file:///C:/Users/Denise/Downloads/Bizumic TheoriesofEthnocentrism2012.pdf; Bizumic, “Theories of Ethnocentrism,” 38. ↩︎
  42. Boris Bizumic and John Duckitt, “What is and Is Not Ethnocentrism? A Conceptual Analysis and Political  Implications,” Political Psychology 33, no. 6 (2012): 896, https://www.jstor.org/stable/23324197. ↩︎
  43. Bizumic and Duckitt,  “What is and Is Not Ethnocentrism?”, 894. ↩︎
  44. Keane, US Nation-Building in Afghanistan, 66. ↩︎
  45. Gregg, Building the Nation, 173. ↩︎
  46. Keane, US Nation-Building in Afghanistan, 1. ↩︎
  47. U.S. Agency for International Development, Agriculture and Stability in Afghanistan, by Andrew Levin, AMSP  08-09, May 2009, 7, https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll3/id/2452/rec/1. ↩︎
  48. Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Hrg. 108-173, Narco-Terrorism: International Drug  Trafficking and Terrorism-A Dangerous Mix, 108th Cong., 1st sess., May 20, 2003, Orrin Hatch (R-UT). ↩︎
  49. Senior U.S. Diplomat interview, July 10, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR,  
    https://www.sigar.mil/lessonslearned/. ↩︎
  50. Ambassador Richard Boucher interview, October 15, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR,  https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/documents database/documents/boucher_richard_ll_01_b9_10152015.pdf?v=26. ↩︎
  51. Col. Terry Sellers interview, February 21, 2007, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C. https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll13/id/440/rec/2. ↩︎
  52. Lt. Col. Todd Guggisberg interview, July 17, 2006, Operational Leadership Experiences Project, https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll13/id/440/rec/2. ↩︎
  53. Academies, Donald Rumsfeld memo to Steve Cambone, September 21, 2001, Donald Rumsfeld Snowflakes  Litigation Release, Washington Headquarters Services,  
    https://www.esd.whs.mil/FOIA/Donald_Rumsfeld_Snowflakes_Litigation_Release/. ↩︎
  54. Languages, Donald Rumsfeld memo to Larry Di Rita, November 26, 2001, Donald Rumsfeld Snowflakes  Litigation Release, Washington Headquarters Services,  
    https://www.esd.whs.mil/FOIA/Donald_Rumsfeld_Snowflakes_Litigation_Release/. ↩︎
  55. Newt Gingrich, email message to anonymous, December 25, 2001, Rumsfeld Snowflakes Litigation Release,  Washington Headquarters Services, https://www.esd.whs.mil/FOIA/Donald_Rumsfeld_Snowflakes_Litigation_Release/. ↩︎
  56. War Gaming for Iraq, Donald Rumsfeld memo to Steve Cambone and General Pace, December 29, 2001, Donald  Rumsfeld Snowflakes Litigation Release, Washington Headquarters Services,
    https://www.esd.whs.mil/FOIA/Donald_Rumsfeld_Snowflakes_Litigation_Release/. ↩︎
  57. Info From Denny, Donald Rumsfeld memo to “VADM Giambastiani,” December 29, 2001, Donald Rumsfeld  Snowflakes Litigation Release, Washington Headquarters Services. 
    https://www.esd.whs.mil/FOIA/Donald_Rumsfeld_Snowflakes_Litigation_Release/. ↩︎
  58. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, S. Hrg. 107-299, Foreign Policy Overview and the  President’s Fiscal Year 2003 Foreign Affairs Budget Request, 107th Cong., 2d sess., February 5, 2002, Senator Jesse  Helms (R-NC). ↩︎
  59. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, S. Hrg. 107-708, Afghanistan: Building Stability, Avoiding  Chaos, 107th Cong., 2d sess., June 26, 2002, Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE). ↩︎
  60. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Counternarcotics: Lessons Learned from the U.S.  Experience in Afghanistan, (Arlington, VA: June 2018), 1, https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/lessonslearned/SIGAR-18-52- LL.pdf. ↩︎
  61. Whitlock, Afghanistan Papers, 135. ↩︎
  62. Whitlock, Afghanistan Papers, 139. ↩︎
  63. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 108-93, Drug Trade  and the Terror Network, 107th Cong., 1st sess., October 3, 2001, Dan Burton (R-IN). ↩︎
  64. Drug Trade and Terror, Dan Burton (R-IN). ↩︎
  65. About ½ an acre. ↩︎
  66. Rashid, Descent into Chaos, 321. ↩︎
  67. Michael Metrinko, interview, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, October 6, 2003, The Association for  Diplomatic Studies and Training, https://adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Metrinko,%20Mike.toc.pdf. ↩︎
  68. Anthony Fitzherbert, interview, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.  https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/lessonslearned/SIGAR-18-52-LL.pdf. ↩︎
  69. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan, 7. ↩︎
  70. Whitlock, Afghanistan Papers, 134. ↩︎
  71. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan, 6; Gregg, Building the Nation, 140. ↩︎
  72. Agriculture and Stability in Afghanistan, 3. ↩︎
  73. Keane, US Nation-Building in Afghanistan, 140. ↩︎
  74. Gregg, Building the Nation, 178. ↩︎
  75. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan, 86. ↩︎
  76. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan, 17. ↩︎
  77. Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Drugs, security, and counternarcotics policies in Afghanistan,” (testimony, London, U.K.,  October 29, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/drugs-security-and-counternarcotics-policies-in afghanistan/. ↩︎
  78. Abubaker Saddique, “In Afghan Province, Poppy Planting Has Strong Appeal,” Eurasianet, November 10, 2003,  https://eurasianet.org/in-afghan-province-poppy-planting-has-strong-appeal. ↩︎
  79. Dominic Cariello, interview by John McCool, February 16, 2007, Eyewitness to War, Combat Studies Institute,  Fort Leavenworth, KS. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi books/EyewitnessToWar_VolumeIII_Brooks.pdf. ↩︎
  80. The Impact of Eradication on Illicit Drug Crop Cultivation, 2003, U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office,  London, England, 10. ↩︎
  81. The Impact of Eradication on Illicit Drug Crop Cultivation, 1. ↩︎
  82. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 45. ↩︎
  83. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, S. Hrg. 108-37, The Reconstruction of Afghanistan: An Update, 108th Cong, 1st sess., February 12, 2003, Joseph Biden (D-DE). ↩︎
  84. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, S. Hrg. 108-37, The Reconstruction of Afghanistan: An Update, 108th Cong, 1st sess., February 12, 2003, Richard G. Lugar (R-IN). ↩︎
  85. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, S. Hrg. 108-37, The Reconstruction of Afghanistan: An Update, 108th Cong, 1st sess., February 12, 2003, David T. Johnson. ↩︎
  86. Rashid, Descent into Chaos, 176. ↩︎
  87. Committee on Government Reform, Select Committee on Homeland Security, Illegal Narcotics Problem in The  United States and the World, 108th Cong., 1st sess., May 1, 2003, H3627, Vol. 149. ↩︎
  88. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, S. Hrg. 108-320, Afghanistan: In Pursuit of Security and  Democracy, 108th Cong., 1st sess., October 16, 2003, Richard G. Lugar (R-IN). ↩︎
  89. Afghanistan: In Pursuit of Security and Democracy, Richard G. Lugar (R-IN). ↩︎
  90. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, S. Hrg. 108-320, Afghanistan: In Pursuit of Security and  Democracy, 108th Cong., 1st sess., October 16, 2003, Chuck Hagel (R-NE). ↩︎
  91. Rashid, Descent into Chaos, 191. ↩︎
  92. Special Inspector General Report for Afghanistan Reconstruction, ix. ↩︎
  93. Special Inspector General Report for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 85. ↩︎
  94. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources of the Committee on  Government Reform, 108-224 Afghanistan: Are the British Counternarcotics Efforts Going Wobbly?, 108th Cong.,  2nd sess., April 1, 2004, Mark Souder (R-IN). ↩︎
  95. British Counternarcotics Efforts Going Wobbly?, Mark Souder (R-IN). ↩︎
  96. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources of the Committee on  Government Reform, 108-224, Afghanistan: Are the British Counternarcotics Efforts Going Wobbly?, 108th Cong.,  2nd sess., April 1, 2004, Robert Charles. ↩︎
  97. British Counternarcotics Efforts Going Wobbly?, Robert Charles. ↩︎
  98. Special Inspector General, for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 105. ↩︎
  99. John Bates, interview by Laurence Lessard, March 5, 2007, Eyewitness to War, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi books/EyewitnessToWar_VolumeIII_Brooks.pdf. ↩︎
  100. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, S Hrg. 108-643, Afghanistan: Continuing Challenges, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., May 12, 2004, Mark L Schneider. ↩︎
  101. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, S Hrg. 108-643, Afghanistan: Continuing Challenges, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., May 12, 2004. ↩︎
  102. Alvin Tilley, interview by Angie Slattery, June 29, 2011, Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat  Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll13/id/2373/rec/1. ↩︎
  103. Bates, interview. ↩︎
  104. Cariello, interview. ↩︎
  105. Daniel Lovett, interview by Jenn Vedder, March 19, 2010, Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat  Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.  
    https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll13/id/1853/rec/1. ↩︎
  106.  Douglas Ross, interview by Brad Helton, June 23, 2008, Eyewitness to War, Combat Studies Institute, Fort  Leavenworth, KS. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi books/EyewitnessToWar_VolumeIII_Brooks.pdf. ↩︎
  107. Ross, interview. ↩︎
  108. Cariello, interview. ↩︎
  109. Ross, interview. ↩︎
  110. Bates, interview. ↩︎
  111. Theo Farrell and Antonio Giustozzi, “The Taliban at War: Inside the Helmand Insurgency, 2004-2012,”  International Affairs 89, no. 4 (July 2013): 848, 
    https://www.jstor.org/stable/23479397?refreqid=excelsior%3Af6ce256c80f8fbe928dbe97c9708e12c&ab_segments =0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&origin=. ↩︎
  112. Whitlock, Afghanistan Papers, 139. ↩︎
  113. Farrell and Giustozzi, “The Taliban at War,”848. ↩︎
  114. Mike Winstead, interview by Angie Slattery Hundley, January 17, 2012, Operation Leadership Experiences  Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll13/id/3028/rec/1. ↩︎
  115. “Interview with a U.S. Military Commander,” interview by Conor Keane, US Nation-Building in Afghanistan,  April 29, 2012, 148. ↩︎
  116. Farrell and Giustozzi, “The Taliban at War,” 852. ↩︎

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